Skip to main content

EAK-Schema and Its Epistemic Actions

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Awareness in Logic and Epistemology

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ((LEUS,volume 52))

  • 159 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter constitutes the core of this research and is structured as follows: Sect. 5.1 will describe each of the central notions and afterwards combine them in a diagram that will show how these concepts converge into the EAK-Schema that represents the informational attitudes of the agent, leading to Explicit Aware Knowledge. Then, Sect. 5.2 will describe five different epistemic actions. Each action will move information from one zone of the diagram to another, or, in other words, each action will reflect an informational attitude of the agent and transform the information she has access to. Finally, Sect. 5.3 will enumerate some advantages of the EAK-Schema both regarding Epistemology and Logic.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Notice that this set could also include false information, which would always be located outside the green ellipse.

  2. 2.

    A preliminary approach to what will be explained here has been published in Fernández-Fernández and Velázquez-Quesada (2018).

  3. 3.

    This paper has been analysed in Sects. 2.2 and 3.2.

  4. 4.

    This approach could be extended to a multi-agent scenario.

References

  • Ågotnes, T., & Alechina, N. (2007). The dynamics of syntactic knowledge. Journal of Logic and Computation, 17(1), 83–116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duc, H. N. (1997). Reasoning about rational, but not logically omniscient agents. Journal of Logic and Computation, 7(5), 633–648.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fagin, R., & Halpern, J. Y. (1988). Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 34(1), 39–76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fernández-Duque, D., Nepomuceno-Fernández, Á., Sarrión-Morillo, E., Soler-Toscano, F., & Velázquez-Quesada, F. R. (2015). Forgetting complex propositions. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 23(6), 942–965.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fernández-Fernández, C., & Velázquez-Quesada, F. R. (2018). Reconsidering the ‘Ingredients’ of Explicit Knowledge. In P. Arazim & T. Lávička (Eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2017 (pp. 47–60). London: College Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerbrandy, J., & Groeneveld, W. (1997). Reasoning about information change. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 6(2), 147–169.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gettier, E. (1963). Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23(6), 121–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hill, B. (2010). Awareness dynamics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 39(2), 113–137.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jago, M. (2009). Epistemic logic for rule-based agents. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 18(1), 131–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Konolige, K. (1984). A Deduction Model of Belief and its Logics. Ph.D. thesis, Computer Science Department, Stanford University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plaza, J. A. (1989). Logics of public communications. In M. L. Emrich, M. S. Pfeifer, M. Hadzikadic, & Z. W. Ras (Eds.), Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Methodologies for Intelligent Systems, pp. 201–216. Tennessee: ORNL.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Benthem, J., & Velázquez-Quesada, F. R. (2010). The dynamics of awareness. Synthese, 177(Supplement-1), 5–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Ditmarsch, H., & French, T. (2011). Becoming aware of propositional variables. In M. Banerjee & A. Seth (Eds.), Logic and Its Applications—4th Indian Conference, ICLA 2011, Delhi, India, January 5–11, 2011. Proceedings. Volume 6521 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp. 204–218). Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Ditmarsch, H., French, T., & Velázquez-Quesada, F. R. (2012). Action models for knowledge and awareness. In W. van der Hoek, L. Padgham, V. Conitzer, & M. Winikoff (Eds.), AAMAS 2012, Valencia, Spain, June 4–8, 2012 (pp. 1091–1098). Richland: IFAAMAS.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Ditmarsch, H., Herzig, A., Lang, J., & Marquis, P. (2009). Introspective forgetting. Synthese, 169(2), 405–423.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Velázquez-Quesada, F. R. (2013). Explicit and implicit knowledge in neighbourhood models. In D. Grossi, O. Roy, & H. Huang, (Eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction—4th International Workshop, LORI 2013, Hangzhou, China, October 9–12, 2013, Proceedings. Volume 8196 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science (pp. 239–252). Berlin: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Claudia Fernández-Fernández .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Fernández-Fernández, C. (2021). EAK-Schema and Its Epistemic Actions. In: Awareness in Logic and Epistemology. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 52. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69606-1_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics