Skip to main content

The Concept of the Person and the Problem of Freedom

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Uncovering Critical Personalism

Abstract

This chapter presents my translation of two segments of a book that William Stern published in 1918. The first segment, which served as the introduction to that book, provides an overview of his understanding of the personalistic concept of the person and of the dynamics of person-world relationships. He explains how the concept of psychophysical neutrality transcends the age-old ‘mind-body problem.’ The second segment of this chapter presents material that appeared in the fourth chapter of the 1918 book. Here, Stern takes up directly the challenge of explaining how a scientific psychology aimed at achieving causal explanations for human actions can be reconciled with critical personalism’s teleological thesis, according to which a person’s actions are causally determined in part by the goal-oriented person him/herself.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: In brackets I present here what Stern included as footnote 1 in the original text of the Introduction to Volume II of Person and Thing. [The more precise distinction of the concept of ‘personality’ from the more general concept of ‘person’ will be developed elsewhere.]

  2. 2.

    Brackets added, JL.

  3. 3.

    TRANSLATOR’S NOTE: In brackets I present here what Stern included as footnote 1 in the original text of that section of Chap. 4 of Person and Thing being presented here. [Kant explicitly contrasted the causality of compulsion with the causality of freedom; obviously, he regarded only the causality of compulsion as knowable and scientifically applicable, while he regarded the causality of freedom only as a moral demand. For us, both causalities, as well as their joint workings (and, ultimately, even the reduction of mechanical causality to teleological causality, cf. Volume I) are regarded as aspects of philosophical knowledge.]

Reference

  • Stern, W. (1923). Person und Sache. System der philosophischen Weltanschauung. Zweiter Band: Die menschliche Persönlichkeit (dritte unvereänderte Auflage) [Person and thing: A systematic philosophical worldview. Volume 2: The human personality (3rd unrevised edition)]. Leipzig: Barth.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to James T. Lamiell .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Lamiell, J.T. (2021). The Concept of the Person and the Problem of Freedom. In: Uncovering Critical Personalism. Palgrave Studies in the Theory and History of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67734-3_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics