Abstract
In his commentary on the second book of the Sentences, Bonaventure discusses the nature of various creatures, including nonhuman animals. He provides an insightful approach to the question of whether or not ‘free choice’, ‘decision’ or ‘judgment’ (liberum arbitrium) – which he defines with Augustine as joint “faculty of reason and will” – is found in rational creatures alone. He clearly spells out what it means to be free or to ascribe freedom (libertas) to a being or to a cognitive power. Moreover, he discusses how the traditional denial of free choice to nonhuman animals is compatible with the observation that several of their behaviours give us the impression of being voluntary and free.
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Notes
- 1.
On his life and his writings, see Cullen (2006), 3–23.
- 2.
On the role and reception of the Sentences, see the introduction to Chap. 14.
- 3.
I translate ‘arbitrium’ with ‘choice’ although it is not identical with the term ‘electio’ that I also translate with ‘choice’ (see text 23). Yet, ‘free choice’ is the usual term for this subject and more common than ‘free decision’ or ‘free judgment’.
- 4.
For a brief summary and analysis of the text, see Davis (2017), 112–115.
- 5.
Ants were traditionally taken to act with foresight as they store food for the winter; see Chap. 11.
- 6.
This definition actually appears in Peter Lombard’s Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, b. II, dist. 24, ch. 3, ed. Brady (1971), 452, but was commonly (mis)attributed to Augustine.
- 7.
I.e., the Good itself that is not desired for the sake of something else; see Davis (2017), 113.
- 8.
John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, c. 41 (= II.27), ed. Buytaert (1955), 153.
- 9.
Anselm of Canterbury, De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio III.11, ed. Schmitt (1968), 284. Bonaventure’s quotation is imprecise insofar as Anselm does not mention free choice in that passage.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Anselm of Canterbury. (1968). De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio (Opera omnia 1.2) (F. S. Schmitt, Ed.). Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann.
Bonaventure. (1885). Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum magistri Petri Lombardi: In secundum librum Sententiarum (Opera omnia 2). Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae.
John of Damascus. (1955). De fide orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundius and Cerbanus (E. M. Buytaert, Ed.). St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute.
Peter Lombard. (1971). Sententiae in IV libris distinctae. T. 1, P. 2, Liber I et II (I. Brady, Ed.). Grottaferrata: Collegium S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas.
Secondary Sources
Cullen, C. M. (2006). Bonaventure. New York: Oxford University Press.
Davis, R. G. (2017). The weight of love: Affect, ecstasy, and union in the theology of Bonaventure. New York: Fordham University Press.
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Oelze, A. (2021). Free Choice (Bonaventure, Commentarius in secundum librum Sententiarum, Distinction 25, Single Article, Question 1). In: Animal Minds in Medieval Latin Philosophy. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 27. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67012-2_22
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