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Transparency and Access to Justice in CETA: Issues and Shortcomings

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CETA's Investment Chapter

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EYIELMONO,volume 13))

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Abstract

Both the principle of transparency and access to justice are essential prerequisites for upholding the Rule of Law and ensuring that anyone who is affected by the outcome of a dispute has access to the proceedings. The chapter aims to examine the extent to which the contracting parties have achieved greater transparency and access to justice. In particular, this chapter examines whether the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules and other related provisions constitute a decisive step towards greater transparency as well as elaborating whether the transparency requirements interfere with other considerations, such as confidentiality and procedural fairness. This chapter will further assess whether the parties have confronted the challenges pertaining to the access to justice resulting from the high costs of investment disputes. The chapter finally argues that CETA’s provisions on transparency have the potential to ease the tension between the public law nature of investment disputes and the lack of transparency in investment arbitration. The same cannot be argued, however, with respect to access to justice concerns as the parties have missed an important opportunity to confront these pressing issues in investment arbitration. Despite the fact that the high costs of a dispute can be covered by third-party funding, it is argued that this method is not a panacea and, most importantly, it could jeopardise the integrity of the arbitral proceedings.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (2010), p. 9. The way transparency is understood across different legal systems is not the same. However, a comparative study suggests that open hearings and access to dispute-related documents are key aspects of this notion. See Asteriti and Tams (2010) and UNCTAD (2012).

  2. 2.

    See generally Szilagyi (2017).

  3. 3.

    See generally Maupin (2013).

  4. 4.

    Brabandere (2014), pp. 155–159.

  5. 5.

    For a comparative study See Delaney and Magraw (2008).

  6. 6.

    ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulations, Regulation 22 and 23. It is interesting to note that this regulation was adopted because of the ‘public nature of the institution’. See Parra (2012), p. 104.

  7. 7.

    ICSID Convention, Art. 48 (5). An OECD finds that approximately 50% of the cases obtain consent from the disputing parties in order to be published. Furthermore, the disputing parties take several months to send their consent to ICSID to publish the award. See generally OECD (2005).

  8. 8.

    ICSID Convention, Rule 32 (2).

  9. 9.

    Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, para.7.

  10. 10.

    NAFTA, Chapter 5.

  11. 11.

    Maupin (2013), pp. 21–26.

  12. 12.

    Shirlow (2016), p. 626.

  13. 13.

    For an overview of the debates in the EU regarding transparency See Calamita (2014); Jemielniak and Unuvar (2016), No. 75.

  14. 14.

    In a seminal paper it is argued that despite various attempts to promote greater transparency, there are a few loopholes in place permitting secrecy in investment disputes. The paper concludes with a suggestion that greater transparency will be achieved with explicit provisions requiring the mandatory disclosure of arbitral awards and documents and/or information. See Hafner-Burton and Victor (2016).

  15. 15.

    NGOs advocate in favor of the publication of information related to disputes. See generally Bernasconi and Johnson (2011).

  16. 16.

    UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 2.

  17. 17.

    Bianco (2015), p. 89.

  18. 18.

    UNCITRAL Rules. Art. 3 (1).

  19. 19.

    CETA, Art. 8.36 (2).

  20. 20.

    ibid, Art. 8. 36 (3).

  21. 21.

    Kee (2015), p. 92.

  22. 22.

    UNCITRAL, Art. 6 (1). Under various sets of procedural rules, arbitral proceedings are confidential unless the parties agree to waive confidentiality (AAA, ICC, LCIA, SCC, etc.).

  23. 23.

    ibid. Art. 6 (2).

  24. 24.

    CETA, Art. 8.36 (5).

  25. 25.

    Alexander (2015), p. 247.

  26. 26.

    Mollestad (2014), p. 14.

  27. 27.

    Feldman (2016), p. 16.

  28. 28.

    UN (2010), pp. 11–12.

  29. 29.

    Feliciano as cited in Lam and Unuvar (2019), p. 10.

  30. 30.

    Knahr and Reinisch (2007), p. 103.

  31. 31.

    ibid, p. 107.

  32. 32.

    ibid.

  33. 33.

    ibid.

  34. 34.

    ibid, p. 104.

  35. 35.

    UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 6 (2).

  36. 36.

    ibid, Art. 7 (2).

  37. 37.

    CETA. Art. 8.36 (4-5).

  38. 38.

    ibid, Art. 8.36 (4-5).

  39. 39.

    CETA, Art. 8. 36 (6).

  40. 40.

    UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 7 (3).

  41. 41.

    ibid, Art. 7 (3).

  42. 42.

    CETA, Art. 36 (6).

  43. 43.

    Investment Treaty Working Group of the International Arbitration Committee (2016), p. 116.

  44. 44.

    UN (2010), p. 17.

  45. 45.

    Augsburger (2015), p. 284.

  46. 46.

    Scherer et al. (2015), p. 3. See generally De Chazournes and Rukia (2015).

  47. 47.

    See Ruscall (2015), pp. 4–5.

  48. 48.

    ibid.

  49. 49.

    UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 4 (1b). In order to prevent conflicts of interest, the rules require the submitting party to disclose any connection, direct or indirect, which the third person has with any disputing party.

  50. 50.

    UNCITRAL, Art. 4 (3a).

  51. 51.

    Boisson de Chazournes (2004), p. 333.

  52. 52.

    ibid. Art. 7 (7).

  53. 53.

    ibid, Art. 4 (5).

  54. 54.

    European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/40/Rev.1.

  55. 55.

    ibid.

  56. 56.

    A prominent example is the Piero Foresti case, where the tribunal had to balance competing interests, such as fairness and efficiency. Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Letter from the Secretary of the Tribunal.

  57. 57.

    Art. 5 of the UNCITRAL Rules state that a tribunal shall ensure that the disputing parties are given a reasonable opportunity to present their observations.

  58. 58.

    See generally Gomez (2012), pp. 551–553.

  59. 59.

    Paparinskis and Howley (2015), p. 216.

  60. 60.

    Bernhard von Pezold and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15, Procedural Order No. 2, para. 50–53.

  61. 61.

    UNCITRAL Rules, Art. 5 (2).

  62. 62.

    ibid, Art. 7 (7). These circumstances include situations where publication of documents could hamper the collection or production of evidence or where such publication could lead to the intimidation of witnesses. Additionally, in Biwater case, the tribunal listed the following issues as failing into the scope of the integrity of the arbitral process: (1) preserve the Tribunal’s mission and mandate to determine finally the issues between the parties (2) preserve the proper functioning of the dispute settlement procedure (3) preserve and promote a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties (4) ensure the orderly unfolding of the arbitration process (5) ensure a level playing field (6) minimise the scope for any external pressure on any party, witness, expert or other participant in the process (7) avoid “trial by media”. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural order No. 3, para. 135.

  63. 63.

    Shirlow and Caron (2020), p. 6.

  64. 64.

    Hodgson and Campbell (2017).

  65. 65.

    Enhancing efficiency and promoting lower costs are directly related to decisions on the costs of arbitration. However, this section is not concerned with the debate regarding the different methods a tribunal could use to allocate costs to the disputing parties (unadjusted costs order, fully or partially adjusted costs orders etc.). The focus of this section is the total amount of costs and the barriers they create in accessing justice. See generally Zivkovic (2018).

  66. 66.

    Hodgson and Campbell (2017), p. 6.

  67. 67.

    ibid, p. 12.

  68. 68.

    ibid, pp. 14–15.

  69. 69.

    United Nations Commision on International Trade Law (2018), p. 16.

  70. 70.

    Franck (2019), p. 291.

  71. 71.

    The EU Commision recently proposed the adoption of rules for mediation. Approval by Council, Member States and Canada is pending. See ‘Proposal for a Council Decision as regards the adoption of rules for mediation for use by disputing parties in investment disputes (2019).

  72. 72.

    ibid, p. 318.

  73. 73.

    Howse (2017), p. 231.

  74. 74.

    Scholars argue that while it is the duty of arbitrators to reduce time and costs, IIAs don’t usually include any detailed rules regarding this obligation. See generally Mohebbi and Asgharian (2018).

  75. 75.

    Franck (2019), p. 118.

  76. 76.

    ibid, p. 303.

  77. 77.

    ibid, p. 304.

  78. 78.

    ibid.

  79. 79.

    CETA, Art. 8. 27 (5).

  80. 80.

    ibid, Art. 8. 39 (6).

  81. 81.

    Franck (2019), p. 5.

  82. 82.

    Lenk (2019), p. 252.

  83. 83.

    ibid, p. 253.

  84. 84.

    Nash (2013), p. 98.

  85. 85.

    ibid.

  86. 86.

    See generally Van Boom (2011).

  87. 87.

    ibid. p. 27.

  88. 88.

    ibid, p. 26.

  89. 89.

    There are also concerns that TPF commercialises investment arbitration and, subsequently, leads to frivolous claims. This criticism has been discussed in ch. 4 section 4 3 B (2).

  90. 90.

    ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force (2018), p. 224.

  91. 91.

    Commentators argue that TPF facilities pose risks to the integrity of the arbitral proceedings through excessive control of the dispute since ‘the funded party becomes a proxy for the funder’s interests’. See Chan (2015), p. 308.

  92. 92.

    Steinitz (2011), p. 1324.

  93. 93.

    Garcia (2018), p. 2912.

  94. 94.

    CETA, Art. 8. 26 (1). The same obligation exists in the General Standard 7 of the IBA Guidelines.

  95. 95.

    ibid, Art. 8. 26 (1).

  96. 96.

    IBA Guidelines, General Standard 6 (1).

  97. 97.

    ibid, Explanation to General Standard 6 (b).

  98. 98.

    There are no known investment disputes where an arbitrator was disqualified or an award challenged based on conflicts of interests involving a TPF facility.

  99. 99.

    For examples See Muhammet Çap & Sehil In_aat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6; EuroGas Inc. and Belmont Resources Inc. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/14.

  100. 100.

    In contrast to CETA, there are treaties where the third-party funding arrangements and the funder’s interests in the dispute should be disclosed. See IBA Arbitration SubCommittee on Investment Treaty Arbitration (2018), pp. 63–64.

  101. 101.

    Steinitz (2011), p. 1328; UNCTAD (2019).

  102. 102.

    Report of the ICCA-Queen Mary Task Force on Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration (2018), p. 14.

  103. 103.

    Brekoulakis and Rogers (2019), p. 3.

  104. 104.

    Steinitz (2011), p. 1328.

  105. 105.

    ibid.

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    Kriton Dionysiou

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Dionysiou, K. (2021). Transparency and Access to Justice in CETA: Issues and Shortcomings. In: CETA's Investment Chapter. European Yearbook of International Economic Law(), vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66992-8_7

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