Abstract
This chapter from 2010 reproduces the conclusions from a study of one mediator, the Swedish diplomat Jan Eliasson, and his involvement in six different mediation situations, during a thirty-year period. The authors emphasize the mediator’s style (scope, method, mode and focus) and relate it to the outcome of the efforts. Based on this, the chapter suggests ten implications for mediation research and mediation practice.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
This is a slightly edited version (done by PW) of Chapter 8 “Going Ahead: Lessons for Mediation Theory and Practice” co-written by Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen 2010, The Go-Between. Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation, Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, pp. 105–135. Reproduced with permission. The book and the present text build on six of Ambassador Jan Eliasson’s experiences of mediation, notably two cases in the Iran-Iraq War 1980–88 (one with Olof Palme), between Burma/Myanmar-Bangladesh 1992, Sudan’s humanitarian crisis 1992, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 1994 and situation in Darfur (Sudan) in 2007–08 (with Salim Salim).
- 2.
This citation comes from Saadia Touval, ”Why the U.N. fails”, Foreign Affairs, 73, no 5 (September/October 1994), 51. Other scholars discuss the proposition that the United Nations gets to manage the tougher cases. See Daniel Frei ”Conditions affecting the effectiveness of International Mediation” 26, 1976 and Jacob Berecovitch and Richard Jackson, International Conflict A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945–1995, Christchurch, New Zealand: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1997).
- 3.
Jan Egeland, “The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Facilitation through the Norwegian Channel” in Herding Cats. Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, ed. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aal (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p 532.
- 4.
Mona Juul “Israel or Palestine? Experiences in mediation and mediators in the Middle East” Development Dialogue, no 52 (November 2009), 34–35.
- 5.
Max van der Stoel, “The Role of the OSCE High Commissioner in Conflict Prevention” in Herding Cat, op.cit., 68.
- 6.
Martti Ahtisaari, “What Makes for Successful Conflict Resolution?” Development Dialogue, No 53 (November 2009): 42.
- 7.
Note however that some purely humanitarian mandates of actors within multilateral organizations, such as the role of Sergio Vieira de Mello at the UNHCR in the Cambodian mission after the Paris Agreement in the early 1990s, were indeed used for political objectives. Vieira de Mello, as head of the challenging task of managing the return of hundreds of thousand of Cambodian refugees, was one of the few UN staff in Cambodia that would start talking with representatives of the Khmer Rouge about humanitarian issues to solidify the fragile political process in post-conflict Cambodia, and in this way “use humanitarian successes to pursue political ends.” See Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame, Sergio Vieria De Mello and the Fight to Save the World, London: Penguin 2008:124.
- 8.
Isak Svensson and Peter Wallensteen 2010. The Go-Betweeen. Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation, Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, Chapter 3.
- 9.
See Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. Burundi on the Brink 1939–95: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000), pp. 56–57.
- 10.
Svensson/Wallensteen (2010), Chapter 3.
- 11.
See for instance the conclusions of Kelly M. Greenhill and Salomon Major 2006. “The Perils of Profiling–Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords," International Security 31, no 3, Harald H Saunders 2007) “The Multilevel Peace Process in Tajikistan”, Herding Cats, op.cit., 159–179 and Harmonie Toros (2008). “We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists! Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts” Security Dialogue, 39, no 4 (2008), 407–426. Desirée Nilsson comes to a somewhat different conclusion, finding that not all rebel movements in a conflict have to sign an agreement for peace to prevail between those parties who actually settle their conflict peacefully (2008). Nilsson, D. “Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements”, Journal of Peace Research 43, no 4 (2008): 479–495.
- 12.
See the work of Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen (2008). “Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946–2007” Journal of Peace Research 45 (5): 697–710.
- 13.
See Nilsson (2008), “Partial Peace”.
- 14.
For more on this, see Peter Wallensteen and Mikael Eriksson, Negotiating Peace: Lessons from Three Comprehensive Peace Agreements, Uppsala, Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2009.
- 15.
See the report of the Secretary-General, issued 9 December 1991 (S/23273 1991).
- 16.
See the reports emanating from the later missions of Iqbal Riza and his colleagues in 1987 and 1988 (S/17911 1986, S/18852 1987) as well as reports without Riza (S/20134 1988).
- 17.
See Daniel Kurran, James K. Sebenius and Michael Watkins, “Two Paths to Peace: Contrasting George Mitchell in Northern Ireland with Richard Holbrooke in Bosnia–Herzegovina.” Negotiation Journal 20, no. 4 (2004): 513–537, 519.
- 18.
Ibid.
- 19.
See Richard C. Holbrooke, “The Road to Sarajevo” in Herding Cats, pp. 341–342.
- 20.
Kurran, Daniel, James K. Sebenius and Michael Watkins. "Two Paths to Peace”, 525.
- 21.
See Chester Crocker, “Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Namibia-Angola Settlement of 1988” in Herding Cats, p. 229.
- 22.
Thomas Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 175.
- 23.
De Soto, Alvaro. “Ending Violent Conflict in El Salvador.” Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds., Herding Cats, p. 374.
- 24.
Fabienne Hara “Burundi: A Case of Parallel Diplomacy,” in Herding Cats, p. 147.
- 25.
See Egeland, “The Oslo Accord”, 530–531 and Juul, “Israel and Palestine?” 35.
- 26.
See Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, 175.
- 27.
See Höglund, Kristine and Isak Svensson. “Fallacy of the Peace Ownership Model.” Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2009.
- 28.
Van der Stoel, “The Role of the OSCE High Commissioner in Conflict Prevention”, 71–72.
- 29.
Ibid.
- 30.
See Martin, Harriet. Kings of Peace-Pawns of War. London: Continuum International, 2006, 25.
- 31.
See Höglund and Svensson “Fallacies of the Peace Ownership Approach”.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Wallensteen, P., Svensson, I. (2021). Going Ahead: Lessons for Mediation Theory and Practice. In: Peter Wallensteen: A Pioneer in Making Peace Researchable. Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice, vol 30. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62848-2_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62848-2_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-62847-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-62848-2
eBook Packages: HistoryHistory (R0)