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Descartes and the Problem of the Criterion

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Sceptical Doubt and Disbelief in Modern European Thought

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Abstract

In recent years, studies on ancient skepticism and its relationship to modern skepticism have become prominent. The development of exegesis and research regarding ancient skepticism has been highly compelling and allows us today to see with greater clarity and relevance its relationship with modern skepticism. Most studies on this relation focus on methodological doubt. It is evident that methodological doubt has a close relationship with some of the arguments found in ancient skepticism—both Academic and Pyrrhonian—although there are also very important differences. However, it has become common to highlight only this point in the relation between Descartes and the ancient skeptics. I believe that this interpretation is inadequate, because it is too narrow. There is a typical skeptical problem present in the Third Meditation, though not exclusively there, which coincides with the problem of the criterion of the ancient skeptics.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It is important to emphasise that Descartes is not and did not pretend to be a skeptic. Strictly speaking, the term ‘Cartesian skepticism’ is contradictory. This term is used, especially in contemporary epistemology, to refer to the skeptical arguments presented by Descartes in the First Meditation. Descartes uses skepticism methodically; its purpose is not to induce suspension of judgment or the denial of knowledge or imperturbability, but rather to produce certainty and truth. When I speak of Cartesian skepticism, this qualification must always be borne in mind.

  2. 2.

    Traditionally two variants of ancient skepticism are recognized: Academic and Pyrrhonist. According to Sextus, the Academic skepticism (specifically that of Arcesilaus and Carneades) leads to negative dogmatism, i.e., that claim that I know only that I know nothing, to borrow the famous Socratic maxim, and this differentiates it from Pyrrhonian skepticism. Sextus’s interpretation is highly questioned today. See PH I, 1–4. The following abbreviations have been used for Sextus Empiricus’s works: PH = Outlines of Pyrrhonism . References are to book, number, and page. All translations of PH are from The Skeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism, translated, with Introduction and Commentary by B. Mates, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.

  3. 3.

    See G. Fine, “Descartes and Ancient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 2, p. 199.

  4. 4.

    AT III, 274. This abbreviation refers to Descartes, R. Œuvres de Descartes . Edited by Adam & Tannery, Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1996. References are to volume and page number. All translations are from The Philosophical Works of Descartes . Edited and translate by Anscombe & Ross. 2 vols., Cambridge University Press, 1981.

  5. 5.

    See, G. Fine, op. cit., p. 200–201, n. 16.

  6. 6.

    AT IV, 573–575.

  7. 7.

    See La Verité des Sciences contre les Sceptiques et les Pyrrhoniens (Paris, 1625). See G. Fine, op. cit., pp. 200–201 and n. 9.

  8. 8.

    AT II, 38–39; V, 147; VII, 120, 130,171–172; VIII B 36–37; IX 103.

  9. 9.

    PH I, 12.

  10. 10.

    PH I, 26.

  11. 11.

    PH II, 18–20.

  12. 12.

    PH I, 29.

  13. 13.

    See C. Perin, “Descartes and the Legacy of Ancient Skepticism”, in J. Broughton & J. Carriero, (eds.) A Companion to Descartes , Blackwell Publishing, 2008, pp. 52–65.

  14. 14.

    AT VII, 18.

  15. 15.

    AT VII, 19.

  16. 16.

    AT VII, 21.

  17. 17.

    See C. Perin, op. cit.

  18. 18.

    Idid., p. 53.

  19. 19.

    Discussions on this point can be found in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat & J. Barnes (eds.) Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980; M, Burnyeat, (ed.) The Skeptical Tradition, Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press. 1983; J. Annas &, J. Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985; M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987; G. Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996; M. Burnyeat & Frede, M. (eds.), The Original Sceptics: A Controversy , Indianapolis, Hackett, 1997; R. Bett, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

  20. 20.

    AT., VII, 18.

  21. 21.

    AT., VII, 24; 59–60; 461; 476.

  22. 22.

    See M. Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed”, in Philosophical Review, XCI, January, 1982, pp. 3–40; M. Burnyeat, “The Sceptic in his Place and Time”, in Burnyeat & Frede 1997, pp. 92–128; R. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmo to Spinoza, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979; R.J Hankinson, The Sceptics, London & New York, Routledge, 1995; M. Williams, “Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt, in A.O. Rorty (ed.) Essays on Descartes ’ “Meditations”¸ Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986, pp. 117–39; M. Williams, “Descartes’ transformation of the skeptical tradition”, in R. Bett (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 288–313.

  23. 23.

    PH I, 100–117.

  24. 24.

    PH I, 19–20.

  25. 25.

    AT VII, 130; VIIIB, 366–367.

  26. 26.

    PH I, 36–164.

  27. 27.

    PH I, 164–177.

  28. 28.

    PH I, 166.

  29. 29.

    PH I, 168.

  30. 30.

    PH I, 169.

  31. 31.

    See J. Barnes, The Toils of Scepticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990; G. Striker, “Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy”, in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 83, 2001, pp. 113–129; G. Striker, “Sceptical Strategies”, in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, & J. Barnes (eds.), op. cit., pp. 54–83 und in G. Striker, Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 92–115; R. Fogelin, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994.

  32. 32.

    G. Striker, op. cit., p. 123.

  33. 33.

    See, Aristotle, An. Post., 72b 15–25.

  34. 34.

    PH I, 116; see AT VII, 35.

  35. 35.

    PH I, 117

  36. 36.

    AT VII, 36.

  37. 37.

    AT VII, 35.

  38. 38.

    AT IX, 111.

  39. 39.

    AT VII, 124–125; 214.

  40. 40.

    AT VII, 36.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia

    Mauricio Zuluaga

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  1. Mauricio Zuluaga
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  1. National University of Colombia, Bogotá D. C., Colombia

    Vicente Raga Rosaleny

  2. Federal University of Sao Paulo, São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil

    Plínio Junqueira Smith

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Zuluaga, M. (2021). Descartes and the Problem of the Criterion. In: Rosaleny, V.R., Smith, P.J. (eds) Sceptical Doubt and Disbelief in Modern European Thought. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 233. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55362-3_5

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