Abstract
During the 1975–2003 period, any contact between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was virtually non-existent. Barring a few thousand Greek Cypriots who decided to remain in their villages in Karpasia and were henceforth called ‘stranded’ (in Greek εγκλωβισμένοι or egklovismenoi, literally meaning ‘trapped’), a few hundred Turkish Cypriots who remained in areas under the control of the Republic of Cyprus, and the singular situation of the border villages Potamia and Pyla, the geographical separation on the basis of ethnic origin was absolute. The relocation from one part of Cyprus to another was prohibited, with the sole exception of the Maronite population who reserved the right to sporadically visit their villages in northern Cyprus and any relatives of theirs residing in Kormakitis. An entire generation of Cypriots grew up in a divided Cyprus, having no contact whatsoever with the other community and the other half of the country.
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Notes
- 1.
Gradually, their numbers dwindled, with many of them being pressured by the Turkish Cypriot regime to move to southern Cyprus. Nowadays, a few hundred Greek Cypriots remain in the area, with two Greek Cypriot schools, a primary school and a junior high school still active in the Rizokarpaso village. The term egklovismenoi is linked to the term ‘occupied territories’, which, in the context of the Greek Cypriot narrative, refers to the presence of the Turkish army in northern Cyprus and how this presence guarantees the Turkish Cypriot control of these territories. The opening of the checkpoints in 2003 and the improvement of the situation for these people makes the term egklovismenoi sound even more problematic than before. An elderly Greek Cypriot woman in Rizokarpaso made a revealing remark in response to a recent news story which, surprisingly, slipped through the censorship of the Greek Cypriot public broadcasting: ‘It’s not us who are egklovismenoi, it’s you’—this is what the woman told a reporter when the latter referred to her as one of the egklovismenoi. Politis (2017) The enclaved is you [Οι εγκλωβισμένοι εσείς είσαστε], Politis, 9/10/2017 https://politis.com.cy/politis-news/kypros/oi-egklovismenoi-eseis-eisaste/
- 2.
Apart from Kormakitis, the big Maronite village, prior to 1974 most other Maronites lived in the Karpaseia, Agia Marina and Asomatos villages, from which they were displaced, similar to the rest of the Greek Cypriot population. In 2017, the Turkish Cypriot authorities promised that they would extend the special status of Kormakitis to the other three Maronite villages, rebuilding structures and allowing populations to settle in those areas. Despite their political integration in the Greek Cypriot community and their advanced assimilation, the Maronites, as Roman Catholics who have been largely uninvolved in the inter-communal conflict, remain a distinct group in the Cyprus dispute. The 2017 promise has not yet been materialised.
- 3.
The official international term is ‘internally displaced’, since ‘refugees’ suggests populations that were displaced to other countries. Interestingly, the term ‘refugees’ prevailed among the Greek Cypriot population with reference to the 1974 displaced persons, replacing the previous term ‘afflicted by the Turks’ (Τουρκόπληκτοι) that had been used for Greek Cypriots who were displaced during the inter-communal conflicts.
- 4.
For the construction of the ‘Turk’ concept in Greek Cypriot children’s imagination, see Spyrou S. (2002) ‘Images of ‘the Other’: ‘The Turk’ in Greek-Cypriot children’s imaginations, Race, Ethnicity and Education’, 5(3), pp. 255–272.
- 5.
I have observed first-hand the difficulty of negotiating the ‘Turkish Cypriot’ concept and its two constituents, Cypriot (i.e. good, friendly, familiar) and Turkish (i.e. bad, hostile, foreign) through the personal experience of my daughter who has attended pre-school and primary school in the Greek Cypriot public education system. Frequently visiting northern Cyprus and keeping in touch with Turkish Cypriot friends do not suffice in themselves—I needed to have several discussions with her in order to help her debunk various stereotypes.
- 6.
Papadakis Y. (1998) ‘Greek Cypriot narratives of history and collective identity: Nationalism as a contested process’, American Ethnologist, 25(2): 149–165, and Papadakis Y. (2008) ‘History education in divided Cyprus: A comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot school-books on the “History of Cyprus”’, Nicosia: PRIO Report 2. Retrieved from: http://file.prio.no/files/projects/Report-History%20Education%20low.pdf
- 7.
Achniotis, C. (2009) ‘Deep state in the Greek Cypriot schools’ [Βαθύ κράτος στο ε/κ σχολείο], Kalemi (September 2009), pp. 10–13.
- 8.
For an in-depth examination of the ideological and political orientation of the Greek Cypriot education system during the independence years up to 1974 see Pavlou, P. M. (2015) State, Ideology, Politics and Education in Cyprus 1959–1974 [Κράτος, ιδεολογία, πολιτική και εκπαίδευση στην Κύπρο 1959–1974] Athens: Papazisi
- 9.
The ability to socially and historically contextualise an individual experience is one of the most important attributes of sociology. Mills, C. W. (1959) The Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 10.
As demonstrated by Psaltis (2011), Hellenocentric individuals are less trusting towards Turkish Cypriots, less willing to forgive or to take the perspective of the other community and have less positive feelings towards them. Psaltis, C. (2011) Intergroup trust and contact in transition: a social representations perspective on the Cyprus conflict, in I. Markova and A. Gillespie (eds.) Trust and conflict: representation, culture and dialogue, London, Routledge, pp. 83–104.
- 11.
The Muslim presence in Cyprus dates back to the Middle Ages. The community that was identified in the twentieth century as Turkish Cypriots was in fact first formed in the sixteenth century when the Venetian-controlled Cyprus came under Ottoman rule in 1571. However, these historical facts are either dismissed as a technicality in the framework of the dominant, ethnocentric Greek Cypriot discourse or, in the most aggressive versions of this discourse, are brought forth to illustrate the problem: the Turkish Cypriots are presented as the vestiges of old conquerors of whom one must be careful and from whom one must, at the very least, maintain a safe distance.
- 12.
The difficulty of bicommunal communication and the inability to have bicommunal contact prior to 2003 is vividly described by Yiannis Papadakis as an ‘echo of the dead zone’, with each community hearing an echo of its own voice. Papadakis Y. (2005) Echoes from the Dead Zone. London & New York: I.B. Tauris.
- 13.
Papadakis Y. (2003) ‘Nation, narrative and commemoration: Political ritual in divided Cyprus’, History and Anthropology, 14(3), pp. 253–270.
- 14.
Panayiotou 2009.
- 15.
The relationship of gender and nationalism is a huge topic which cannot be sufficiently dealt with in this book. However, it is important to point out the instrumentalisation of women both in the actual conflict and in the nationalist narrative that accompanies and structures it. The nationalist and gendered orders are inter-related and interacting with the capitalist order and its class structure, with all of them together supported by and supporting the militarisation of the island and its culture. See Cockburn, C. (2004) The Line: Women, Partition and the Gender Order in Cyprus, Zed Books.
- 16.
The repetitive symbolism of victimhood via images of women effectively reflects, sustains and sharpens traditional gender roles and reproduces the marginalisation of women in politics assigning for them a secondary role in a broadly masculinist narrative. In the last decade a sustained effort has been waged to include gender in the peace negotiations agenda promoting action on gender mainstreaming in the conflict and post-conflict setting. Demetriou O. (2019) Gender in the Cyprus negotiations, Nicosia: PRIO.
- 17.
Ultimately, 1510 Greek Cypriots and 429 Turkish Cypriots were registered as ‘missing persons’ in the CMP.
- 18.
The account is provided by Christos Efthymiou, a founding member of the Bi-communal Initiative of Relatives of Missing Persons, Victims of Massacres and other Victims of War 1963–74.
- 19.
The crimes committed in 1974 against Turkish Cypriot civilians by a Greek Cypriot paramilitary group in the Maratha, Aloa and Santalaris villages have finally entered the Greek Cypriot public sphere in the last decade or so, following a series of initiatives and events held by the extra-parliamentary left, the Bi-communal Initiative of Relatives of Missing Persons, Victims of Massacres and other Victims of War 1963–74 and AKEL. Two documentaries tackling the massacre have been filmed: Toni Angastiniotis’ Voice of Blood (2005) and Soula Chatzikyriakou’s My Own Truth (2010). The latter was even aired by the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (RIK), Cyprus’ public broadcasting service.
- 20.
In the official Greek Cypriot narrative, the 1963 inter-communal conflict is called ‘Turkish mutiny’ in an attempt to make the Turkish Cypriot community appear to bear sole responsibility for it, allegedly trying to overthrow the government in accordance with Turkey’s plan. Within that context, the Greek Cypriot community and its armed forces are called ‘defenders of the state and law’ whereas the Turkish Cypriot community and its armed forces are called ‘rebels’.
- 21.
In recent years, there have been several award ceremonies, with these individuals receiving awards by the peace-reunification movement.
- 22.
The recent series of stories in Politis newspaper focused precisely on this aspect of impunity. http://politis.com.cy/article/tribute/fakelos-p-ta-egklimata-pou-eminan-atimorita-stin-kipro
- 23.
The first massive wave of displacement as the result of straightforward intimidation and fear took place in 1956–1958, with Turkish Cypriots principally, but not exclusively, as its target. The second, bigger wave, that happened in 1963–1964 concerned, in its overwhelming majority, Turkish Cypriots. Finally, the third, much bigger wave happened in 1974–1975, initially predominantly for Greek Cypriots and subsequently for Turkish Cypriots as well, thus laying the ground for the segregation conditions that were maintained until 2003 and which continue to this day.
- 24.
Olga Demetriou documents comprehensively through a theoretical and critical perspective the loss management that was structured in arbitrary terms and how universal concepts of statuses and rights were subsumed in instrumentalised goals, political expediencies and logics of maintaining and reproducing the ethnic conflict.
Demetriou O. (2018), Refugeehood and the Post Conflict Subject: Reconsidering Minor Losses. New York State University of New York Press.
- 25.
Kızılyürek 2009. Kızılyürek 2010.
- 26.
Strong P. N. (1999) The Economic Consequences of Ethno-national Conflict in Cyprus: The Development of Two Siege Economies after 1963 and 1974. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. London: London School of Economics.
- 27.
Attalides M. A. (1981) Social Change and Urbanisation in Cyprus: A Study of Nicosia. Nicosia: Social Research Centre.
- 28.
Panayiotou 2011a.
- 29.
Panayiotopoulos P. I. (1995) ‘Cyprus: The developmental state in crisis’, Capital and Class, 57: 13–53.
- 30.
Ilican, 2011. Moudouros N. (2017b) ‘The “New Homeland” and Turkish Cypriot opposition in the 1974–1981 period’, The Cyprus Review, 29, pp. 135–158.
- 31.
Strong 1999.
- 32.
Trimikliniotis N. (2011) ‘Note for a non-recognised “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” Class variables’, [Σημείωση για τη μη αναγνωρισμένη “Τουρκική Δημοκρατία Βόρειας Κύπρου”. Ταξικές παράμετροι] Theseis, 144, January–March 2011 http://www.theseis.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1137&Itemid=29
- 33.
Sonan S. (2014) In the Grip of Political Clientelism: The Post-1974 Turkish Cypriot Politics and the Politico-Economic Foundations of Pro-Taksim Consensus. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Duisburg: Universität Duisburg-Essen.
- 34.
Moudouros N. (2018) ‘“TRNC” in the Turkish Cypriot context: A moment of multiple and contradictory interpretation’, Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitical Review, 3 (Spring 2018), pp. 34–59.
- 35.
Sonan 2014.
- 36.
Tocci N. (2004) EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus?. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate.
- 37.
Ghali’s Set of Ideas outlined a solution to the Cyprus dispute, adumbrating how power was to be shared in the united Federated State, along with territorial readjustments and scenarios on managing the property disputes. At the time, it was the UN’s most comprehensive solution plan for the Cyprus dispute up until then, surpassed only by the Annan Plan a decade later, which was similar in its philosophy and sense of balance.
- 38.
Supported by the government and funded by the Church, the 1996 motorcycle protest was meant to be a repetition, in a different manner, of the women’s protest that had transpired almost a decade before. Groups of motorcyclists took off from Berlin, reached Athens and then sailed to Cyprus, intent on breaking through the ceasefire line and reaching Kyrenia. In occupied Cyprus, Rauf Denktaş’ government encouraged the Grey Wolves organisation, the main far-right nationalist force in Turkey and northern Cyprus, to take matters into their own hands, with the Turkish army being standby. At the 11th hour, realising the possibility of an armed conflict, Clerides called for the cancellation of the protest. However, some groups of motorcyclists did not comply and attempted to go over to the other side, in the process of being attacked by Turkish nationalists, culminating in the death of Tasos Isaak. Following Isaak’s funeral, a group of Greek Cypriots again reached the same area. When Solomos Solomou attempted to take down the Turkish flag from the outpost he was shot dead.
- 39.
Christodoulou D. (1992) Inside the Cyprus Miracle: The Labours of an Embattled Mini-economy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
- 40.
Ioannou, G. (2017c) ‘The labour field in Cyprus during the period of Cypriot independence’ [Το εργατικό πεδίο στην Κύπρο την περίοδο της κυπριακής Ανεξαρτησίας], Theseis, 141 (October–December 2017), retrieved from http://www.theseis.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1393&Itemid=29
- 41.
Ioannou G. and Sonan S. (2019) Inter-communal contact and exchange in Cyprus’ Higher Education Institutions: Their potential to build trust and cooperation. Nicosia: PRIO.
- 42.
Katircioğlu S. T. (2010) ‘International tourism, higher education and economic growth: The case of north Cyprus’, The World Economy 33(12): 1955–1972.
- 43.
Yorucu V. and Keles R. (2007) ‘The construction boom and environmental protection in northern Cyprus as a consequence of the Annan Plan’, Construction Management and Economics, 25(1): 77–86. It should be added that the equivalent economic boom in southern Cyprus also had a detrimental effect to the environment.
- 44.
Ilican 2011.
- 45.
The 1997 closure of casinos in Turkey and the absence of casinos in southern Cyprus until recently led to the opening of a number of casinos in northern Cyprus. The 1990s also saw a boom in nightclub businesses. Guven-Lisaniler F., Rodriguez L. and Uğural S. (2005) ‘Migrant sex workers and state regulation in north Cyprus’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 28(1): 79–91.
- 46.
Barthes R. (1972) [1957] Mythologies, London: Paladin.
- 47.
Mavratsas M. (1998) Facets of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus. Ideological Confrontations and the Social Construct of Greek Cypriot Identity 1974–1996 [Όψεις του Ελληνικού Εθνικισμού στην Κύπρο. Ιδεολογικές αντιπαραθέσεις και η κοινωνική κατασκευή της ελληνοκυπριακής ταυτότητας 1974–1996] Athens: Katarti.
- 48.
Kızılyürek N. (1999) Cyprus: The Impasse of Nationalisms [Κύπρος: το αδιέξοδο των εθνικισμών] Athens: Mavri Lista.
- 49.
This absence of Turkish Cypriots is constructed not only with respect to the present but also the past. After all, the selective reading of history and cultural legacy is the most distinctive feature of nationalism, along with its belief in the timeless continuity of the nation from antiquity to the present. It is precisely within this context that the dominant conception of ‘Greek Cyprus’ is constructed, wherein the Turkish Cypriots are perceived, at best, as a historical accident of the Ottoman period and in that capacity, they can be tolerated but never accepted by this idea of ‘Cypriotness’. At worst, the Turkish Cypriots are regarded as undesirables, a foreign body at odds with the concept of ‘indigeneity’ that the Greek Cypriot nationalism claims and monopolises for itself.
- 50.
The ‘Δεν ξεχνώ’ (I Don’t forget) slogan was established as the standard policy in schools post-1974 with regard to the Cyprus conflict, the goal being to pass down memories of the former Greek Cypriot presence in northern Cyprus to the younger generation. The official Greek Cypriot narrative about the Cyprus dispute was established in this context. To this day, images of churches, archaeological sites, natural and urban landscapes of pre-1974 northern Cyprus can be found in the notebooks of primary school students.
- 51.
Bryant R. (2012a) ‘Partitions of memory: Wounds and witnessing in Cyprus’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 54(2): 332–360.
- 52.
For a large part of the Greek Cypriot population that have never crossed the checkpoints, the same stance may still be adopted today. For example, the fact that Kyrenia had a population of 5000 in 1974 and nowadays has risen to 50,000 does not seem to affect the official narrative.
- 53.
In effect, the conflicting goals of recognition and non-recognition generate a public discourse which hinders dialogue between the leaders of the communities and this is disseminated in the entire society. See Constantinou, C. M. and Papadakis Y. (2001) ‘The Cypriot state(s) in situ: Cross-ethnic contact and the discourse of recognition’, Global Society, 15(2), pp. 125–148.
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Ioannou, G. (2020). Separation as a Lived Reality, as a Promise and as a Taboo 1975–2003. In: The Normalisation of Cyprus’ Partition Among Greek Cypriots. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50816-6_3
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