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Transcendental Illusion in the First Antinomial Conflict

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Kant and Post-Tractarian Wittgenstein
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Abstract

In their criticism of metaphysics, Kant and Wittgenstein invoke elaborated conceptions of philosophical illusion. ‘The essential thing about metaphysics’, says Wittgenstein, is ‘that the difference between factual and conceptual investigations is not clear to it.’ (RPP I §949) The error, he says, arises from the fact that, in philosophy, ‘[w]e don’t look at the actual language-game’.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a good introduction, see Allison 2004: 396–412, 419–421.

  2. 2.

    See Grier 2001: 126 (including note 43), 275, 278.

  3. 3.

    Cf. ‘To say that there was a time when there was nothing is on the same level and as nonsensical as to say part of my visual field is not coloured.’ (LWL: 109).

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Correspondence to Bernhard Ritter .

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Ritter, B. (2020). Transcendental Illusion in the First Antinomial Conflict. In: Kant and Post-Tractarian Wittgenstein. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44634-5_5

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