Abstract
Many vertically integrated power companies have been restructured worldwide during the last three decades for improving the competitiveness and efficiency of energy industry. However, a perfectly competitive power market does not exist in real world, and most of the present electricity markets can be considered as oligopoly electricity markets. Some generation companies (GenCos), in these imperfect competition situations, possess market power to obtain more profits at the cost of other market players. Strategies of market power can be categorized as capacity withholding and financial withholding. When either strategy is successful, higher profits of GenCos and lower market performance are expected.
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Salarkheili, S., SetayeshNazar, M. (2020). Impact of Capacity Withholding on Hosting Capacity Analyzing. In: Zobaa, A., Abdel Aleem, S., Ismael, S., Ribeiro, P. (eds) Hosting Capacity for Smart Power Grids. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40029-3_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40029-3_6
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