Abstract
The tendency of many neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, and psychologists to present, largely unwittingly, their metaphysical beliefs as scientifically established facts has been enhanced since the advent of noninvasive, functional brain imaging. In the second section of this chapter, titled “Word Salads,” I describe how this tendency is mediated by the inconsistent use of language. In the subsequent four sections, I review some of the consequences of this conceptual shortcoming. Namely, in the third section, I illustrate with examples the error of considering as a scientific fact the metaphysical belief that the human will is neuronally determined, and therefore, in reality, that there is no freedom of choice. In the fourth and fifth sections, I review critically the exaggerated claims found in the professional literature that functional neuroimaging allows for the specification of the neuronal mechanisms of consciousness and the even more extravagant one, that thoughts may be “read” in the monitors of functional neuroimaging devices.
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Papanicolaou, A.C. (2020). Conjectures Masquerading as Facts. In: Allen, D.M., Howell, J.W. (eds) Groupthink in Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36822-7_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36822-7_11
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