Abstract
Much has been made of the so-called transformative securities legislation of the New Deal and the new and unique American central bank of 1913, but in regard to the questions raised in Chap. 1, it may be doubted that they in fact brought significant changes. The financial markets have made use of the new technologies but most of their participants and underlying processes have continued, and an important function of the banking system has continued to be the monetization of the government debt.
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Wood, J.H. (2020). So Who Governs?. In: Who Governs?. Palgrave Studies in American Economic History. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33083-5_7
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