Abstract
In classical Western logic, “contradiction” refers to the conjunction of two opposite propositions. The law of non-contradiction is the most fundamental principle of Aristotelian logic. According to this law, an object can’t possess opposite properties at the same time and in the same respect, i.e., “S is both P and not-P at the same time and in the same aspect” (the conjunction of “S is P” and “S is not P”) can’t be true, if P and not-P are contradictory opposites or contrary opposites. But, “S is both P and not-P” is often asserted and even taken for granted by Chinese philosophers. However, the apparent inconsistency between many Chinese paradoxical propositions and the law of non-contradiction will disappear, once the context of the former is understood. Furthermore, contextualized “S is P and not-P” in Chinese philosophy reveals something very significant: dialectical relations are real, and things always exist as the unity of opposites. Although “S cannot be P and not-P” is logically consistent, it is an abstraction that does not take the context of the utterance and multi-dimension of things into consideration. On the contrary, a proposition like “S is P and not-P,” though paradoxical, reflects reality better since dialectical relations present in everything and everywhere.
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Notes
- 1.
This is the ontological version of the law of non-contradiction. According to some scholars, “There are arguably three versions of the principle of non-contradiction to be found in Aristotle: an ontological, a doxastic and a semantic version. The first version concerns things that exist in the world, the second is about what we can believe, and the third relates to assertion and truth. The first version (hereafter, simply PNC) is usually taken to be the main version of the principle and it runs as follows: ‘It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect’ (with the appropriate qualifications) (Metaph IV 31005b19–20) … A table can be actually red and potentially not red, but not actually red and actually not red at the same time” (Gottlieb 2019). This version of the law of non-contradiction has been formulated as ¬◊(∃x)(Fx ∧ ¬Fx) (see Wedin 2004). The doxastic version of the law of non-contradiction (also known as its psychological formulation) is stated as “It is impossible for anyone to believe that the same thing is and is not, …” (Metaphysics. 1005b23–25); its semantic version or logical formulation can be summed up as “opposite assertions cannot be true at the same time” (Metaphysics 1011b13–20) (see both Gottlieb 2019 and Horn 2018).
- 2.
As Laurence R. Horn puts it, “In accounting for the incompatibility of truth and falsity, LNC [the law of non-contradiction] lies at the heart of Aristotle’s theory of opposition, governing both contradictories and contraries. … LNC applies to both forms of opposition in that neither contradictories nor contraries may belong to the same object at the same time and in the same respect (Metaphysics 1011b17–19)” (Horn 2018).
- 3.
The concept of contrary used there is from classical logic which presupposes existential import.
- 4.
For the sake of simplicity, “not-P” in this chapter is used to represent both contradictory property and contrary property. Given that the law of non-contradiction does apply to both contraries and contradictions and what this chapter is concerned with is their relations to the law of non-contradiction only, using “not-P” to represent both contradictory property and contrary property will not sacrifice any logical consistence.
- 5.
Given that “s is P and not-P” is a logical equivalent of “s is P and s is not-P”, for the sake of convenience, in this chapter I will use “s is P and not-P” as “s is P and s is not-P” wherever the latter is discussed.
- 6.
In predicate logic, “s is P and not-P” or “s is P and s is not-P” can be formulated as follows: “Ps ∧ ¬Ps” (“s” refers to an arbitrary thing, and “P” and “not-P” refer to opposite properties); in propositional logic, it can be formulated as “A ∧ ¬A” (“A” represents “s is P,” and “¬A” represents “s is not-P”). Then, according to the law of non-contradiction, “Ps ∧ ¬Ps” or “A ∧ ¬A” is always false.”
- 7.
Some scholars have argued that the law of non-contradiction has been explicitly recognized and formulated in classical Chinese philosophical writing. For more details, see Cheng1971: 226–27.
- 8.
Joseph Needham’s and Christoph Harbsmeier’s translation with my minor revision. See Needham and Harbsmeier 1998: 215.
- 9.
My translation, but FungYu-lan’s (see Fung 1952: 257) and Joseph Needham’s translation (Needham 1998: 217) are referred.
- 10.
- 11.
See Mo Jing [Moists Canons], “Explanations A,” Mozi: 213.
- 12.
Hui Shi 惠施 (380–305 BC) was one of the most important members of the School of Names or School of Logicians. He was a good friend of Zhuangzi. His both propositions are recorded in the Zhuangzi. See Zhuangzi, “Tianxia,” (莊子•天下): 362 (“a white dog is black”) and 359 (“Each thing is the same as other things and yet each thing is different from other things”).
- 13.
Interestingly, Heraclitus (c. 530–470 B.C.) believed something similar to the yin yang, but such an idea did not prevail in ancient Greece in the way the doctrine of the yin yang does in China.
- 14.
From now on, the translations in the chapter are all mine unless otherwise noted.
- 15.
The idiom is derived from a story like this: once upon a time, there was an old man on the frontier. One day he lost his horse. This was a very bad thing for him. But very soon, the lost horse came back home and brought another horse with it. This was very good. Then his son got injured when he rode on one of these two horses. So, good fortune brought misfortune. But, later on young men were called to go to the army and join a war. Since his son was injured and he was not able to be a soldier, his son was safe. Therefore, misfortune again brought the old man good fortune. The story first appears in the Huainanzi, “Renjian Xun” (淮南子•人間訓).
- 16.
The two feudal domains Chu and Yue (in the period of the Warring States, 482–221 B. C.) were in fact far apart.
- 17.
Since the original sentence is written in classical Chinese, it may be interpreted, and consequently translated, in various ways. The interpretation on that my translation is based here is adopted from Zhang Dainian (1982, 112).
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
The translation is from Cary F. Baynes. See Richard Wilhelm and Cary F. Baynes 1967: 670.
- 21.
This refers to “Xici Zhuan B” (系辭傳•下) in Yijing (Book of Changes).
- 22.
This proposition is recorded in the Zhuangzi, “Tianxia” (莊子•天下). See Zhaungzi, 359.
- 23.
This proposition is recorded in the Zhuangzi, “Tianxia” (莊子•天下). See Zhuangzi: 359.
- 24.
- 25.
For details of their five psychological experiments, see Peng and Nisbett 1999: 744–749.
- 26.
For the similar idea, see Fung1948: 19–20.
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Acknowledgement
I would like to thank the editor of the volume, Professor Fung Yiu-ming, for his valuable comments on earlier versions of this chapter. My appreciation also goes to Dr. Lawry Finsen and two anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions. In addition, I am grateful to the University of Redlands for awarding me a faculty research grant during 2015–2016 for working on the chapter.
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Jiang, X. (2020). Contradiction. In: Fung, Ym. (eds) Dao Companion to Chinese Philosophy of Logic. Dao Companions to Chinese Philosophy, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29033-7_7
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