Coming Full Circle: The 2016 Washington Summit

Abstract

The last iteration of the NSS process took place from October 2014 to April 2016. Russia, a co-constructor of the idea of nuclear security with the U.S. since 1996, dropped out of the Summit preparations even though it was kept informed by the U.S. till late 2015. Process issues pre-occupied the Sherpas for several months as the U.S. struggled to inject further innovation into the outcomes. The attempt to force the pace in informal groups dealing with post-2016 follow-up in select international forums succeeded only partially as the group outcomes were renegotiated in the Sherpa meetings back to familiar common denominators. A specific effort to advance learning on comprehensiveness either through the Summit process (led visibly by Switzerland) or on the sidelines through a gift basket of weapon states (led quietly by the U.S.) did not succeed. Another type of comprehensiveness intruded harshly on the NSS from the real world. The rise of ISIS and the terror attacks in Paris and Brussels brought broader counter-terrorism issues to the forefront of the Summit discussions in Washington. The previous two years’ tilt toward nuclear materials minimisation and transparency, pushed by non-proliferation experts within the nuclear security community, thus underwent a correction, helping preserve the boundaries of nuclear security as a distinct area of nuclear learning. The Action Plans and Gift Baskets adopted at the end of the Summit laid down the pathways for pursuing and preserving nuclear security learning beyond 2016. The most noteworthy vehicle for follow-up is a Nuclear Security Contact Group, which preserves the core of the NSS Sherpas’ construct.