Abstract
This chapter aims to present the second structuring element of practical life: autonomy, understood in terms of reciprocal recognition. I presented this way of conceiving autonomy in my book Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice. I have developed this conception of autonomy in continuity with the works of Habermas, Apel and Honneth. Reciprocal recognition autonomy is conceptualized from the perspective of intersubjectivity, which assumes vulnerability and progressiveness in its acquisition, since in this process, the conditions that enable autonomous action can be affected by external or internal circumstances. This kind of autonomy emphasizes the processes of justification in which interpersonal or intrapersonal reasons are given for choosing a course of action. As with practical rationality and imagination, this kind of autonomy is also specifiable in different practical contexts in which there will be different requirements and justifying logics for its exercise.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
- 2.
The insight of reciprocal recognition autonomy can be reconstructed in Brandom’s explanation of the ‘attitude-dependence of normative statuses’ in Kant and Hegel (Brandon 2009: 67–72).
- 3.
This idea is present in what Agustín Reyes (2019), following the work of Andy Clark and Joel Anderson, calls ‘scaffolding autonomy’.
- 4.
- 5.
The internal relationship between intersubjectivity, vulnerability and autonomy has been specially developed by Joel Anderson (2016).
- 6.
This relation can be seen in Korsgaard’s argumentation, in which ethical autonomy, which in her case is equivalent to the conceptions of practical identity, leads to moral autonomy (1996: 120–1).
References
Anderson, Joel. 2016. Vulnerability, Autonomy Gaps and Social Exclusion. In Vulnerability, Autonomy and Applied Ethics, ed. Christine Straehle, 49–68. New York: Routledge.
Anderson, Joel, and Axel Honneth. 2005. Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition and Justice. In Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism, ed. John Christman and Joel Anderson, 127–149. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Apel, Karl-Otto. 1996. The A Priori of Communication Community and the Foundation of Ethics: The Problem of a Rational Foundation of Ethics in the Scientific Age. In Selected Essays. Volume 1. Ethics and the Theory of Rationality, 1–67. Trans. E. Mendieta. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
Brandom, Robert. 2009. Reason in philosophy: Animating ideas. Cambridge, MA/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Cortina, Adela. 1987. Karl-Otto Apel. Verdad y responsabilidad. In Teoría de la verdad y ética del discurso, ed. Karl-Otto Apel, 9–33. Barcelona: Paidós.
Darwall, Stephen. 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, Ronald. 2000. What Is Equality? Part II: Equality of Resources. In Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, 65–119. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Elster, Jon. 1999. Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
Forst, Rainer. 2002. Contexts of justice: Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1990a. Discursive Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification. In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Trans. C. Lenhardt and S.W. Nicholsen, 43–115. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 1990b. Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel’s Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics? In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 195–215.
———. 1998. What is Universal Pragmatics. In On the Pragmatics of Communication, 21–103. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Honneth, Axel. 1995. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
———. 2007. Decentered Autonomy: The Subject After the Fall. In Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory. Trans. J. Farrell, 181–194. Cambridge: Polity Press.
———. 2014. Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. Trans. J. Ganahl. New York: Columbia University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 2011. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Trans. M. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1984. Essays on Moral Development, Volume II. The Philosophy of Moral Development: The Nature and Validity of Moral Stages. San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers.
Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mackenzie, Catriona, and Natalie Stoljar, eds. 2000. Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mead, George H. 1972. Mind, Self & Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Meyers, Diana T. 1989. Self, Society and Personal Choice. New York: Columbia University Press.
———. 2004. Being yourself. Essays on identity, action and social life. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Modzelewski, Helena. 2017. Emociones, educación y democracia: una proyección de la teoría de las emociones de Martha Nussbaum. México: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM.
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford/Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
Nussbaum, Martha. 2001. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O’Neill, Onora. 2000. Bounds of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pereira, Gustavo. 2013. Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Piaget, Jean. 1965. The Moral Judgment of the Child. New York: The Free Press.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
———. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
———. 2001. In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly. Cambridge, MA/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Reyes, Agustín. 2019. El análisis ético de las políticas públicas y la autonomía relacional andamiada. In Ética aplicada. Perspectivas desde Latinoamérica, ed. Mauricio Correa and Juny Montoya. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes (forthcoming).
Scanlon, Thomas M. 1986. The Significance of Choice. In The Tanner Lectures of Human Values, ed. Sterling M. McMurrin, vol. 7, 149–216. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Solomon, Robert. 2007. True to Our Feelings. What Our Emotions Are Really Telling Us. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stewart, Francis. 2005. Groups and Capabilities. Journal of Human Development 6 (2): 185–204.
Strawson, Peter F. 1962. Freedom and Resentment. In Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 48: 1962, ed. Gary Watson, 1–25. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Taylor, Charles. 1985. What is Human Agency? In Philosophical Papers: Human Agency and Language, vol. 1, 15–47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wellmer, Albrecht. 1991a. The Dialectic of Modernism and Postmodernism: The Critique of Reason since Adorno. In The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Postmodernism. Trans. D. Midgley, 33–74. Cambridge: Polity Press.
———. 1991b. Ethics and Dialogue: Elements of Moral Judgment in Kant and Discourse Ethics. In The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Postmodernism, 88–170.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Pereira, G. (2019). Autonomy. In: Imposed Rationality and Besieged Imagination. Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26520-5_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26520-5_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-26519-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-26520-5
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)