Abstract
As stabilization is surely one of those “wicked problems,” whose dynamism causes it to evolve even as the solution is being identified, it is impossible here to determine what precise prescription should be applied to “fix” every insurgency or alternative governance structure that opposes or does not support the political framework for which Stabilizers advocate. There are some universal approaches that can be considered in tandem with in-depth, persistent assessments and deep knowledge of the historical, cultural, societal, economic, and political context of each area of interest.
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Notes
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- 4.
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- 10.
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Chido, D.E. (2020). The Stabilization Trap. In: Strategic Intelligence and Civil Affairs to Understand Legitimacy and Insurgency. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20977-3_2
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