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The Notion of Judicial Independence: Impartiality and Effectiveness of Judges

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Judicial Power in a Globalized World

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Abstract

The independence of the judiciary serves as a shield for the judicial process in a well-working democratic society: it provides for the protection of the judicial system both against external influences and also to the individuals who have recourse to courts in order to settle their disputes. When speaking of judicial independence and the quality of judicial decisions, we are analysing two sides of the same coin: guaranteeing the independence of judges is as important as improving the quality of judicial decisions as the two notions are strongly inter-dependent. Therefore I approach the topic of judicial independence focusing on impartiality and effectiveness.

Dilexi iustitiam et odivi iniquitatem.

Péter Paczolay is Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Szeged, former President of the Constitutional Court of Hungary (2008–2015) and Judge at the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct; Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia from 2010; Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the International Judiciary.

  2. 2.

    Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom, no. 7819/77, 7878/77, ECtHR 1984, § 78.

  3. 3.

    Montesquieu (1992), p. 157.

  4. 4.

    Beaumartin v France, no. 15287/89, ECtHR 1994, § 38.

  5. 5.

    Sramek v. Austria, no. 8790/79, ECtHR 1984, § 42.

  6. 6.

    Sajó and Uitz (2017), p. 144.

  7. 7.

    “When a government party makes a policy decision, therefore, it can be effectively impossible to determine whether this is a decision of the party in government, the party in parliament, or indeed the wider party organization in the country as a whole. In practice it is likely to be a complex interaction between all three.” Laver (2008).

  8. 8.

    For the importance of the separation of powers between political organs and the judiciary see: Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, ECHR 2002-IV, § 78.

  9. 9.

    Wittes (2009).

  10. 10.

    Flux v. Moldova (no. 2), no. 31001/03, ECtHR 2007, § 27.

  11. 11.

    Sacilor-Lormines v. France, no. 65411/01, ECtHR 2006, § 67.

  12. 12.

    Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], nos. 39,343/98 and 3 others, ECtHR 2004, § 193.

  13. 13.

    Hamilton et al. (1961), p. 465.

  14. 14.

    CCJE Opinion No. 1(2001), paras. 11, 12; Council of Europe, Challenges for judicial independence and impartiality in the member states of the Council of Europe, SG/Inf(2016)3rev, para. 34.

  15. 15.

    Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 38784/97, ECtHR 2002-I, § 58.

  16. 16.

    Sajó and Uitz (2017), p. 319.

  17. 17.

    Sajó and Uitz (2017), p. 319. See also: Campbell and Fell v. UK, Henryk Urban and Ryszard Urban v. Poland.

  18. 18.

    I do not address here the closely connected question of ‘Qui custodiet ipsos custodes’.

  19. 19.

    European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6(1).

  20. 20.

    Venice Commission, European Standards on the Independence of the Judiciary, A Systematic Overview. Study No. 494/2008, para. 1.

  21. 21.

    Council of Europe, Recommendation (94)12 of the Committee of Ministers on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges, Principle I, 2(a).

  22. 22.

    Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), Opinion n. 1 on standards concerning the independence of the judiciary and the irremovability of judges, CCJE (2001) OP N°1.

  23. 23.

    Judicial Independence

    2. Judicial independence and impartiality are essential prerequisites for the operation of justice.

    3. Judicial independence shall be statutory, functional and financial. It shall be guaranteed with regard to the other powers of the State, to those seeking justice, other judges and society in general, by means of national rules at the highest level. The State and each judge are responsible for promoting and protecting judicial independence.

  24. 24.

    European Standards on the Independence of the Judiciary: A Systemic Overview, Venice Commission, Strasbourg, 3 October, 2008.

  25. 25.

    Report on the independence of the judicial system part I: The independence of judges. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 82nd Plenary Session (Venice, 12-13 March 2010), CDL-AD(2010)004.

  26. 26.

    Report on the independence of the judicial system part I: The independence of judges. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 82nd Plenary Session (Venice, 12–13 March 2010), CDL-AD(2010)004, paras. 6–7, 10.

  27. 27.

    Sajó and Uitz (2017), p. 156.

  28. 28.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Ukraine, 2015, para. 73.

  29. 29.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Ukraine, 2015, para. 91.

  30. 30.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Ukraine, 2015, para. 92.

  31. 31.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Ukraine, 2015, para. 13.

  32. 32.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Albania, 2015, para. 8.

  33. 33.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Albania, 2015, para. 1.

  34. 34.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Albania, 2015, para. 9.

  35. 35.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Albania, 2015, para. 84.

  36. 36.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Albania, 2015, para. 84–85.

  37. 37.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Albania, 2015, para. 100.

  38. 38.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Albania, 2015, para. 107.

  39. 39.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Albania, 2015, para. 107.

  40. 40.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Albania, 2015, para. 107.

  41. 41.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Poland, 2017, para. 6.

  42. 42.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Poland, 2017, para. 11.

  43. 43.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Poland, 2017, para. 129.

  44. 44.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Poland, 2017, para. 95.

  45. 45.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Poland, 2017, para. 31.

  46. 46.

    Venice Commission Opinion, Poland, 2017, paras. 51 and 109.

  47. 47.

    In the case Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, ECtHR 2016, for example, the Court referred to Opinion on the draft law on introducing amendments and addenda to the Judicial Code of Armenia (term of office of court presidents), adopted at its 99th Plenary Session (Venice, 13–14 June 2014, CDL-AD(2014)021), and to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Human Rights (DHR) of the Directorate General of Human Rights and the Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe, on the draft law on amendments to the Organic Law on General Courts of Georgia, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 100th Plenary Session (Rome, 10–11 October 2014, CDL-AD(2014)031. On how the impact of Venice Commission opinions are reflected in the case-law of the Court, see Bode-Kirchhoff (2014), pp. 55–72.

  48. 48.

    Venice Commission, The Division for Independence and Efficiency of Justice of the Council of Europe, The various aspects of external and internal independence of the judiciary, Guido Neppi-Modona, 2012, CDL(2012)035.

  49. 49.

    “It is true that the irremovability of judges by the executive during their term of office must in general be considered as a corollary of their independence and thus included in the guarantees of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). However, the absence of a formal recognition of this irremovability in the law does not in itself imply lack of independence provided that it is recognised in fact and that the other necessary guarantees are present.” Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom, no. 7819/77, 7878/77, ECtHR 1984, § 80.

  50. 50.

    Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom, no. 7819/77, 7878/77, ECtHR 1984, § 78; Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], nos. 39343/98 and 3 others, ECtHR 2004, § 190.

  51. 51.

    Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, Series A no. 301 B, ECtHR 1994, §. 49.

  52. 52.

    Moiseyev v. Russia, no. 62936/00, ECtHR 2008, § 182.

  53. 53.

    Parlov-Tkalčić v. Croatia, no. 24810/06, ECtHR 2009, § 86.

  54. 54.

    Piersack v Belgium, no. 8692/79, ECtHR 1982, § 30; Bajaldziev v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no.4650/06, ECtHR 2011, §§ 30–32.

  55. 55.

    Bajaldziev v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no.4650/06, ECtHR 2011, § 30; Nikolov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 41195/02, ECtHR 2007, § 19.

  56. 56.

    Padovani v. Italy, Series A no. 257-B, ECtHR 1993, § 26; Morel v. France, no. 34130/96, ECtHR 2000-VI, § 41; Bajaldziev v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 4650/06, ECtHR 2011, § 31.

  57. 57.

    Bajaldziev v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 4650/06, ECtHR 2011, § 32.

  58. 58.

    Bajaldziev v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 4650/06, ECtHR 2011, § 32.

  59. 59.

    Procola v Luxembourg, no. 14570/89, ECtHR 1995, § 45.

  60. 60.

    Piersack v Belgium, no. 8692/79, ECtHR 1982, § 30.

  61. 61.

    Piersack v Belgium, no. 8692/79, ECtHR 1982, § 30.

  62. 62.

    Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 21722/11, ECtHR 2013, § 107.

  63. 63.

    Haarde v. Iceland, no. 66847/2, ECtHR 2017, § 103.

  64. 64.

    “The notion of separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary … has assumed growing importance in the case-law of the Court.” Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 46295/99, ECtHR 2002-IV, § 78.

  65. 65.

    Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, ECtHR 2013, § 49; Thiam v. France, no. 80018/12, ECtHR 2018, § 59.

  66. 66.

    Van der Hurk v Netherlands, no. 16034/90, ECtHR 1994, §§ 44–55.

  67. 67.

    Van der Hurk v Netherlands, no. 16034/90, ECtHR 1994, §§ 44–55.

  68. 68.

    European Commission for Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), Checklist for promoting the quality of justice and the courts adopted by the CEPEJ at its 11th plenary meeting (Strasbourg, 2–3 July 2008).

  69. 69.

    Dworkin (1986), pp. 147–150.

  70. 70.

    11/1992. (III.5.) Constitutional Court decision on the statute of limitation, in Kritz (1995), p. 631.

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  1. European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France

    Péter Paczolay

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    Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque  & Krzysztof Wojtyczek  & 

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Paczolay, P. (2019). The Notion of Judicial Independence: Impartiality and Effectiveness of Judges. In: Pinto de Albuquerque, P., Wojtyczek, K. (eds) Judicial Power in a Globalized World. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20744-1_22

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