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Cyprus: Firmly Committed to the Non-recognition of Kosovo

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The Politics of Recognition and Engagement

Part of the book series: New Perspectives on South-East Europe ((NPSE))

Abstract

The decision by Cyprus not to recognise Kosovo is based on Turkey’s occupation of the northern third of the island. As a result, Cypriot foreign policy is underpinned by the respect of international law, including United Nations resolutions. However, the country’s European Union membership, shifting geopolitical interests and the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence allowed Cyprus to soften its approach on Kosovo somewhat. This has led to some limited engagement between Nicosia and Pristina. Nevertheless, Cyprus remains firmly against recognising Kosovo until an agreement is reached between Pristina and Belgrade and endorsed by the UN.

The content of this chapter is the sole responsibility of the author, who is writing in a personal capacity, and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of her employer.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Ioannides, Isabelle, ‘Cyprus and EU enlargement to the Western Balkans: A Balancing Act’, Journal Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 17(4), 2017, p. 631.

  2. 2.

    See, for example, ‘Απαντήσεις του Υπ. Εξωτερικών σε ερωτήσεις δημοσιογράφων—Εξελίξεις στη Γεωργία—27/08/2008’ [Answers of the Foreign Minister to questions by journalists—Developments in Georgia—27/08/2008] (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, 25 April 2016); ‘Vote by U.N. General Assembly Isolates Russia’, New York Times, 27 March 2014. The one exception to this could be the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nicosia has traditionally supported Armenia because of its bonds with the Armenian community in Cyprus, a community that after the 1974 Turkish invasion chose to move south of the Green Line and live under the Republic of Cyprus–controlled areas with the Greek Cypriots. Conversely, Turkey has traditionally cooperated with Azerbaijan and maintained complicated and highly charged relations with Armenia. Relations between Turkey and Armenia are further blackened by the Ottoman genocide against the Armenian minority in the early 1900s in what is today’s Turkey.

  3. 3.

    ‘Christodoulides outlines Cyprus foreign policy pillars at Athens Lecture’, European Business Review, 4 May 2018.

  4. 4.

    Exchange with Cypriot official, September 2018.

  5. 5.

    Kentas, Giorgos, ‘Cyprus: Position paper on Kosovo’, Kosovo calling: international conference to launch position papers on Kosovo’s relation with EU and regional non-recognising countries (Pristina: Kosovo Foundation for Open Society and British Council, 2012), p. 124.

  6. 6.

    See, for example, ‘The Minister of Foreign Affairs met with his Serbian counterpart, in Belgrade’ (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, 3 December 2010).

  7. 7.

    The Cyprus government and the Church of Cyprus sent considerable humanitarian aid to the Western Balkans in the 1990s, channelling it exclusively to the Serbs because of the sociopolitical and historical links with the FYR. See Kentas, ‘Cyprus: Position on Kosovo’, p. 125.

  8. 8.

    However, most exchanges on Kosovo happen in Belgrade. Interview with Cyprus diplomat, April 2018.

  9. 9.

    ‘Ο Υπουργός Εξωτερικών ενημερώνει Πρέσβεις για την εξωτερική πολιτική’ [The Foreign Minister informs Ambassadors about the foreign policy] (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, 4 March 2013).

  10. 10.

    Interview with Cypriot diplomat, June 2018.

  11. 11.

    Official of one of the EU non-recognisers, September 2018.

  12. 12.

    James Ker-Lindsay et al., ‘The national politics of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans’, Journal Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 17(4), 2017, p. 518.

  13. 13.

    Ioannides, Isabelle, ‘Cyprus and EU enlargement to the Western Balkans: A Balancing Act’, p. 631, 643.

  14. 14.

    According to Protocol 10 of the 2003 Accession Treaty, the Republic of Cyprus has joined the EU in its entirety but because of the Turkish occupation, the acquis communautaire only applies to the part of Cyprus south of the dividing Green Line, which comes under the jurisdiction of the island’s only internationally recognised government.

  15. 15.

    See, for example, Diez, Thomas, Last Exit to Paradise? The EU, the Cyprus Conflict, and the Problematic ‘Catalytic Effect’ (København: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2010); Tocci, Nathalie, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

  16. 16.

    Ioannides, Isabelle, ‘Cyprus’, in EU Member States and Enlargement towards the Balkans (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2015), p. 169.

  17. 17.

    ‘Cyprus calls for probe into charges of UN sanctions-busting’, AFP, 30 July 2002.

  18. 18.

    Interview with official from Cyprus MFA, May 2014.

  19. 19.

    Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Δελτίο Τύπου—Η Υπουργός Εξωτερικών επαναβεβαίωσε τη προσήλωση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στην ευρωπαϊκή προοπτική της Αλβανίας [Press release: The Foreign Minister reaffirmed the European Union’s commitment to the European perspective of Albania], 1 August 2012.

  20. 20.

    Interview with official from Cyprus MFA, May 2014.

  21. 21.

    See, for example, Christou, George and George Kyris, ‘The Impact of the eurozone crisis on national foreign policy: Enhancing Europeanization in the case of Cyprus’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 55, 2017, pp. 1290–1305.

  22. 22.

    See, the Cyprus Serbia Business Association: http://www.cyprus-serbia.org.cy/index.php?pageid=1&lang=en

  23. 23.

    Statistical Service, Intra-extra EU trade statistics (summarised data) August 2016, Foreign Trade Statistics, Series III, Report No. 148 (Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus, 2016), pp. 19–20.

  24. 24.

    Statistical Service, Arrivals of tourists by country of usual residence (Nicosia: Printing Office of the Republic of Cyprus, 5 April 2016).

  25. 25.

    ‘Cyprus does not support Kosovo independence’ (Belgrade: Government of Serbia, 23 July 2008); ‘ΠτΔ: Ιστορικοί, πολιτιστικοί και θρησκευτικοί δεσμοί με Σερβία’ [President of the Republic: Historical, cultural and religious links with Serbia], Politis, 10 May 2018.

  26. 26.

    Kentas, ‘Cyprus: Position Paper on Kosovo’, p. 127.

  27. 27.

    ‘Cyprus House of Representatives: Yugoslavia’, Cyprus News Agency, 25 March 1999.

  28. 28.

    ‘US Embassy: Cypriot Parties’, Cyprus News Agency, 11 June 1999.

  29. 29.

    ‘President Clerides: Kosovo Crisis’, Cyprus News Agency, 26 March 1999.

  30. 30.

    See, UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK): https://unmik.unmissions.org/united-nations-resolution-1244.

  31. 31.

    See, for example, the latest UN Secretariat, Assessment of Member States’ contributions for the financing of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018, ST/ADM/SER.B/963, p. 2.

  32. 32.

    ‘RoC to follow EU consensus on Kosovo independence’, US Diplomatic Cable, 27 March 2007.

  33. 33.

    ‘Europe divided over Kosovo plan’, Euroactiv, 2 April 2007.

  34. 34.

    James Ker-Lindsay, Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), p. 68.

  35. 35.

    ‘Time up for Kosovo status talks’, BBC News, 10 December 2007.

  36. 36.

    While Turkey was the fifth country to recognise Kosovo’s independence in February 2008 and pledged €30 million at the 2008 Donors Conference for Kosovo, the ‘TRNC’ only went as far as to congratulate Kosovo on its independence, but it did not recognise it. ‘Turkey to donate 30 Million Euro to Kosovo’, ‘Cyprus PIO: Turkish Press and Other Media, 08-07-16’, 8 July 2016; ‘Ercakica on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence’ and ‘Reactions continue on the declaration of Kosovo’s independence and on the result of the election in Cyprus’, Cyprus PIO: Turkish Press and Other Media, 08-02-20, 20 February 2008.

  37. 37.

    ‘Kosovo UDI legally invalid’ (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, 18 February 2008).

  38. 38.

    Press conference by Foreign Minister in Brussels—Cyprus’ position on Kosovo (Nicosia: Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 20 November 2007).

  39. 39.

    Spyros Economides and James Ker-Lindsay, ‘Forging EU Foreign Policy Unity from Diversity: The ‘Unique Case’ of the Kosovo Status Talks’, European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 15, 2014, p. 504.

  40. 40.

    Kursani, Shpend, ‘A Comprehensive Analysis of EULEX: What Next?’, Policy Paper No.1/13 (Pristina: Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, January 2013), footnote 64, p. 13.

  41. 41.

    Communication with EU official, July 2018.

  42. 42.

    Jitske Hoogenboomp, ‘The EU as a Peacebuilder in Kosovo’, paper prepared for the Civil Society Dialogue Network (CSDN) Member State Meeting ‘Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans’, in Bucharest, Romania, 28 June 2011, p. 11.

  43. 43.

    Ioannides, Isabelle, D.3.5. Policy recommendation report on implications of the changing relation between the ethical dilemmas of internal/external security, Deliverable submitted October 2010 (M31) in fulfilment of requirements of the FP7 Project, Converging and Conflicting Ethical Values in the Internal/External Security Continuum in Europe (INEX) (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 2010), p. 47.

  44. 44.

    ‘Policy issues’ (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, 4 July 2016).

  45. 45.

    ‘Global issues: Kosovo’ (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, 4 July 2016).

  46. 46.

    ‘Kosovo/EULEX: At Full Operating Capability, but not Without Problems’, US Diplomatic Cable, 8 April 2009.

  47. 47.

    See ‘Accordance with international law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Kosovo (Request for an Advisory Opinion)’, Written statement, Submitted to the International Court of Justice (Nicosia: Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus, 17 April 2009).

  48. 48.

    ‘Accordance with international law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion’, ICJ Reports 2010 (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 22 July 2010).

  49. 49.

    ‘The Minister of Foreign Affairs met with his Serbian counterpart’, in Belgrade (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, 3 December 2010).

  50. 50.

    See Ioannides, Isabelle, ‘Peace and Security in 2018: An Evaluation of EU Peacebuilding in the Western Balkans’, PE 621.816 (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, May 2018).

  51. 51.

    ‘Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, at the Meeting of Heads of ΕU Representations: ‘Main issues of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union that are part of the competencies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Enlargement, Southern Neighbourhood, Development policy and Humanitarian aid’, Nicosia’ (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, 6 June 2016).

  52. 52.

    Interview with Cypriot diplomat, May 2014.

  53. 53.

    Interview with EU official, July 2018.

  54. 54.

    When Nicosia took up the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (November 2016–May 2017), former Foreign Minister Kasoulides noted: ‘One of the reasons we had successful Presidencies is that when we take these responsibilities, we work in a neutral way, we leave our national interests aside and we promote the interests of the Union. We are going to do the same with the Council of Europe. We are going to have a neutral, objective Presidency and we will work professionally to deal with matters, especially the acute matters that need to be dealt with, like Ukraine, Georgia and Turkey; they are all going to be dealt with in this way’. See ‘The Minister of Foreign Affairs met with his Polish counterpart’ (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, 2016).

  55. 55.

    James Ker-Lindsay and Spyros Economides, ‘Standards before Status before Accession: Kosovo’s EU Perspective’, in Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 14(1), 2012, p. 91.

  56. 56.

    Interview with Cyprus MFA official, 8 May 2013.

  57. 57.

    Kentas, ‘Cyprus: Position paper on Kosovo’, p. 130 (ft. 229).

  58. 58.

    Galiatsatos, Panagis, ‘Πιο κοντά Ε.Ε. με Κόσοβο’ [The EU Is Closer to Kosovo], Kathemerini, 26 October 2013. This meeting had taken place at a time when Greece and Pristina were discussing opening the ‘Kosovo office for economic and trade issues’ in Athens, and whose leaders had also met at the same UN General Assembly.

  59. 59.

    Interview with official of the Kosovo MFA, 8 December 2017. As Ker-Lindsay explains, ‘the decision had been made in reflection of the reality of Kosovo’s growing recognition on the international stage and the wish on the part of Nicosia not to be seen as ‘difficult’ over Kosovo, given that 23 of the 28 members of the EU had recognised Kosovo and that, apart from Spain, the other non-recognisers—Greece, Romania and Slovakia—were all adopting increasingly moderate positions’. James Ker-Lindsay, ‘Engagement without recognition: the limits of diplomatic interaction with contested states’, International Affairs, 91(2), 2015, p. 280.

  60. 60.

    ‘Kosovo, Written Statement of the Republic of Kosovo by Avdullah Hoti—Minister of Finance, Governor for the Republic of Kosovo Annual Meeting 2017 in Nicosia’ (London: EBRD, 2017).

  61. 61.

    ‘Κυπριακό και Κοσσυφοπέδιο στην ατζέντα των Υπουργών Εξωτερικών Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας—Σερβίας’ [Cyprus and Kosovo on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Cyprus—Serbia] (Nicosia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cyprus, 11 May 2018).

  62. 62.

    ‘ΠτΔ: Ιστορικοί, πολιτιστικοί και θρησκευτικοί δεσμοί με Σερβία’ [President of the Republic: Historical, cultural and religious links with Serbia], Politis, 10 May 2018.

  63. 63.

    Exchange with EU diplomat, in Brussels, 23 July 2018.

  64. 64.

    ‘Romania and Cyprus to join Spain on Kosovo ahead of Sofia Summit?’, European Western Balkans, 31 March 2018.

  65. 65.

    ‘Σύνοδος Κορυφής στη Σόφια. ΠτΔ: Καμιά τρίτη δύναμη δεν μπορεί να εξασφαλίσει ένα ελπιδοφόρο αύριο στα Βαλκάνια’ [‘Summit in Sofia. PoR: No third power can ensure a hopeful tomorrow in the Balkans’], TVOne News, 17 May 2018.

  66. 66.

    Interestingly, the Cyprus media did not report who sat around the table, presumably so as not to raise any eyebrows.

  67. 67.

    ‘Fight over Declaration Clouds EU’s Western Balkans Summit’, RadioFreeEurope, 5 April 2018.

  68. 68.

    ‘Council of the EU, Sofia Declaration, 17 May 2018’, EU-Western Balkans Summit, EU Leaders’ Agenda, Sofia 2018.

  69. 69.

    ‘Apostolova Gainsays Minister Hoxha’s Statements on Kosovo Visa Liberalization Date’, Schengen visa info, 9 May 2018.

  70. 70.

    ‘Where I can go without visa’ (Pristina: Kosovo Ministry of European Integration). However, Serbian nationals—residents of Kosovo with Serbian passports—whose passports were issued by the Serbian Coordination Directorate, need a visa to enter the legal point of entry into Cyprus.

  71. 71.

    ‘EU: No visa liberalisation without meeting last two criteria (Koha)’, Kosovo Media Highlights (Pristina: Office of Strategic Communications and Public Affairs, UNMIK, 29 November 2016).

  72. 72.

    Discussion with EU official, February 2018.

  73. 73.

    Exchange with Cypriot diplomat, September 2018.

  74. 74.

    ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, S/2013/72 (New York: United Nations Security Council, 4 February 2013), p. 6.

  75. 75.

    ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo’, S/2014/68 (New York: United Nations Security Council, 30 January 2014), p. 5.

  76. 76.

    Vöckler, Kai et al, Post-conflict development and civic imagination (divided cities), Proceedings, Conference and workshop organised by Archis Interventions in collaboration with Friedrich Ebert Foundation Cyprus on 25 May 2013 at Home for Cooperation, Nicosia Buffer Zone, Cyprus (Nicosia: Archis Interventions, 2013), p. 5.

  77. 77.

    Interview with NGO worker, in Nicosia, 21 May 2013.

  78. 78.

    Fazliu, Eraldin, ‘Recognition Denied: Cyprus’, Kosovo 2.0., 7 November 2016.

  79. 79.

    ‘KCSS create partnership with the civil society from Cyprus’ (Pristina: KCSS, March 2015).

  80. 80.

    ‘PRIO Cyprus workshop, Posted on Researchers from the University of Birmingham organised a series of events on lessons from and for the Cyprus Conflict’, University of Birmingham, 25 June 2018.

  81. 81.

    ‘Building Knowledge about Kosovo (v.2.0)’ (Pristina: Kosovo Foundation for Open Society, 10 April 2018).

  82. 82.

    An exception is Baranowska, Grazyna, ‘The Role of Intercommunal Dialogue in Revealing the Fate of Disappearances and Missing Persons: Cases of Kosovo and Cyprus’, Knowledge & Action, Humanity in Action, 2015.

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  1. Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium

    Isabelle Ioannides

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  1. Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece

    Ioannis Armakolas

  2. European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

    James Ker-Lindsay

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Ioannides, I. (2020). Cyprus: Firmly Committed to the Non-recognition of Kosovo. In: Armakolas, I., Ker-Lindsay, J. (eds) The Politics of Recognition and Engagement. New Perspectives on South-East Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17945-8_10

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