Disorientation and Cognitive Enquiry

Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that the experience of the emotion of disorientation should be a background affect in intellectual enquiry, both motivating the enquiry and being necessary to instill certain epistemic virtues in the inquirer and can also play the role of an indicator of when the project threatens to traverse the boundary of sense. I firstly elaborate how disorientation can be understood as an emotion and the type of emotion it is, namely what aspect of the world it makes salient. I argue that it is an emotion that is evoked through the encounter with what we might want to call ‘mystery’. I then expand on my claim that disorientation has a role in cognitive enquiry as an indicator of where the boundary of sense has been overstepped by looking at disorientation, mystery and nonsense. It then be necessary to look at how an enquiry can maintain a relation to the possible interruption of disorientation and what epistemic virtues it is necessary to be open to and responsive to from the experience of disorientation when following through a line of enquiry. Lastly I discuss the practical consequences of this study outlining what this perspective on disorientation means for carrying out philosophical studies, how it should inflect our educational practices and what lessons can be learnt in terms of psychopathology and recovery from trauma.