Interactionist Models II

Abstract

A common weakness of most models of emotion is that they either ignore genetic variability completely, or worse, they evoke genetics as a tautological explanation. For example, as discussed in Chapter 12, there is a high concordance rate between panic disorders and anxiety and/or depression in biological relatives. Such correlations tell us only that a genetic predisposition may exist and not that genetic vulnerability does exist. To interpret these findings as “panic disorder patients are genetically vulnerable to panic attacks” is, pure and simply, tautological. It is equally plausible (and tautological) to infer that anxiety and depression may be produced by the intense psychosocial stress of coping with a relative who experiences spontaneous panic attacks. “Wasn’t that your uncle Fred who freaked out in the middle of church last week?” A correlation implies only that a relationship exists, but it does not tell us why the relationship exists.