Abstract
This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who knows the characteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has imperfect information about the value of demand.
We study several Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. We find equilibria where the incumbent prefers not to pay the renewal fee for the patent hoping that it will be interpreted by the challenger as a signal of low market profitability.
We would like to thank T. van Dijk, J. Donze, J. Gabszewicz, P. Mahenc, R. Renault and the participants at the 10th ADRES Congress in Strasbourg, the ESEM 96 meeting in Istanbul, the 23rd annual EARIE conference in Vienna and two referees of “Les Annales” for their comments. All errors are naturally ours.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bagwell, K., Ramey, G. (1990). — “Advertising and Pricing to Deter or Accomodate Entry when Demand is Unknown”, IJIO, 81, pp. 93–113.
van Dijk, T. (1995). — “Innovation Incentives Through Third Degree Price Discrimination in a Model of Patent Breadth”, Economic letters, 47, pp. 431–435.
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J. (1986). — “Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: an Introduction and Overview”, in Handbook of Industrial Organization, ed. Schmalensee et R. Willig.
Gallini, N. (1991). — “Patent Policy and Costly Imitation”, Rand Journal of Economics, 23, pp. 52–63.
Gilbert, R., Shapiro, C. (1990). — “Optimal Patent Length and Breadth”, Rand Journal of Economics, 21, pp. 106–112.
Horstmann, I., MacDonald, G. M., Slivinski, A. (1985). — “Patent as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (maybe) not to Patent”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, pp. 837–858.
Klemperer, P. (1990). — “How Broad should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?”, Rand Journal of Economics, 21, pp. 113–130.
Lanjouw, J., Pakes, A., Putnam, J. (1996). — “How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: Uses of Patent Renewal and Application Data”, Working paper 5741.
Levin, R. C., Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R. R., Winter, S. G. (1987). — “Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development”, Brookings papers on economic activity, 3, pp. 783–831.
Macho-Stadler, I., Pérez-Castrillo, D. (1991). — “Contrats de licences et asymétrie d’information”, Annales d’Economie et Statistique, 24, pp. 189–208.
Pakes, A. (1985). — “On Patent, R&D and the Stock Market Rate of Return”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, pp. 390–409.
Schankerman, M., Pakes, A.(1985). — “Valeur et Obsolescence des brevets”, Revue Economique, 36, pp. 917–941.
Scotchmer, S., Green, J. (1990). — “Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law”, RAND Journal of Economics, 21, pp. 131–146.
Warshofsky, F. (1994). — The Patent Wars. The battle to own the world’s technology, John Wiley, Sons, Inc., New York.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Crampes, C., Langinier, C. (2000). Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents. In: The Economics and Econometrics of Innovation. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3194-1_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3194-1_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-4971-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-3194-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive