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Public Sector Performance Management in a Principal-Agent Context: Some Reflections

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Inter and Intra Government Arrangements for Productivity

Abstract

The general principle of division of labor creates the potential to achieve technical (internal) and allocative (external) efficiency. This lies at the heart of a discussion on autonomous agencies and contract management. To be beneficial, a division of labor should result in specialization, and consequently there should be a subsequent step of coordination. Whether this coordination is guaranteed in the market system, in organizations, or in a mix of both, and what kind of information should be used to ensure satisfactory coordination to obtain the full yield of specialization and division of labor, is a major question.

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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Bouckaert, G. (1998). Public Sector Performance Management in a Principal-Agent Context: Some Reflections. In: Halachmi, A., Boorsma, P.B. (eds) Inter and Intra Government Arrangements for Productivity. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2864-4_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2864-4_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5015-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-2864-4

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