Skip to main content

Life Among the Triangles and Trapezoids: Notes on the Theory of Rent-Seeking

  • Chapter
The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking

Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy ((TREP,volume 1))

Abstract

Some government programs and policies reduce wealth through rent creation. In this paper we focus on the theory of rent-seeking, and armed with an analytical model of the rent-seeking process, we make three basic points. First, we explain why perfect dissipation of rents is not equivalent to a competitive return to rent-seeking. Second, we demonstrate that the social cost of rent creation may be smaller when all rents are dissipated by rent-seeking than when no rents are dissipated. Third, we explain that regardless of whether rents are dissipated in transferring them, there is a distribution effect of rent-seeking that has been ignored in the literature.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Baysinger, B., and Tollison, R.D., “Evaluating the Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation.” Atlantic Economic Journal 8 (December, 1980 ): 22–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J.M.; Tollison, R.D.; and Tullock, G. (eds.). Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. College Station: Texas AM University Press, 1982.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harberger, A., “Monopoly and Resource Allocation.” American Economic Review 44 (May, 1954): 77–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Higgins, R.; Shughart, W.F.; and Tollison, R.D. “Free Entry and Efficient Rent Seeking.” Public Choice,forthcoming.

    Google Scholar 

  • Posner, R. A., “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation.” Journal of Political Economy 83 (August, 1975 ): 807–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rogerson, W. P., “The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis.” Bell Journal of Economics 13 (Autumn, 1982 ): 391–401.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tollison, R.D. “Rent Seeking: A Survey.” Kyklos 35 (1982): 575–602.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G., “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” Western Economic Journal 5 (June, 1967 ): 224–32.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1988 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Higgins, R.S., Tollison, R.D. (1988). Life Among the Triangles and Trapezoids: Notes on the Theory of Rent-Seeking. In: Rowley, C.K., Tollison, R.D., Tullock, G. (eds) The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_13

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-1963-5_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-5200-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4757-1963-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics