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Prohibiting Discrimination

  • Chapter
Disabled Persons and the Law

Abstract

During the fifteen years that have passed since President John F. Kennedy expressed this challenge, gains have been made on behalf of blacks, women, the poor, and the powerless toward assuring equal justice for all. The Civil Rights Acts of 19642 and 19683 and the Voting Rights Act of 19654 have brought us as a nation closer to a positive resolution of the question posed. Under the impetus of such legislation millions of blacks were enfranchised to vote, segregation in public accommodations eliminated, and employment discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex or national origin”5 proscribed. In fact, there have been great changes in the last ten years in the generally accepted social roles of women and blacks.

“The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and opportunities ...”1

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References

  1. Speech of President John F. Kennedy, June 11, 1963, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1963, p. 6, Col. 8 (cited in Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1078–1079(1964)).

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  2. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq. (1976).

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  11. See Note, supra note 9, at 1513. But see Wright, supra note 7, at 77 (handicapped generally have a higher risk of injury; therefore the cost of their insurance is correspondingly higher).

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  15. Note, supra note 9, at 1503 nn. 12 & 13.

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  16. These legal restrictions on rights are dealt with as a separate topic in this series of model acts. However, they are mentioned here because they demonstrate how pervasively negative attitudes and assumptions have affected our society, including our legal system. See Chapter 1: Personal and Civil Rights, supra.

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  17. Bonfield, supra note 1, at 1079.

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  27. See id., at 1079.

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  42. 42 U.S.C. §2000d (1976).

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  46. 29 U.S.C. §793(1976).

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  50. But cf. Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (implied cause of action found to exist under §504 until promulgation of effective enforcement mechanisms). See Wright, supra note 7, at 89–97 for a discussion of private right of action under 29 U.S.C. §793.

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  51. See Note, supra note 10 at 834.

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  52. Id.

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  53. Proposals to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination against disabled persons in private employment have not met with congressional approval, despite strong support for the amendments among the disabled population. Note, supra note 9, at 1502. One commentator, stating that Congress “has chosen not to amend Title VII to prohibit handicap discrimination,” lists thirty-three amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that have been proposed but not enacted during the years of 1972 to 1977. Wright, supra note 7, at 65–66 n. 2. For a discussion of the advantages and potential problems of amending Title VII. to include the disabled see Weiss, supra note 8. See also Note, supra note 10.

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  54. Of course, in any scheme designed to remedy discrimination and to provide equality of opportunity the most important element is not the apparatus chosen, but rather the commitment of the political leadership to make the scheme work. See Note, supra note 10, at 817.

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  55. See CHART I: Persons Covered by Statutes.

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  57. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. §378–2 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §613.330 (1973); and R.I. GEN. LAWS §28–5–7 (1968 & Supp. 1977).

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  58. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 149 §24k, Ch. 272 §98 (West Supp. 1977–1978).

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  60. An example of this criticism can be found in the South Dakota statute which entitles blind and otherwise physically disabled persons to “reasonably equal accommodations” of a place to which the general public is invited. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §20–13–23.1 (Supp. 1977). The meaning of “reasonably equal accommodations” is not given in the statute.

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  61. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §363.03 [Subd. 1 (4)(a)] (West Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. §4–33–7(D) (1974 & Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §955(h)(6) (Purdon Supp. 1978–1979).

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  62. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.02(A) (Page Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §955(a) (Purdon Supp. 1978–1979).

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  63. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. §44–1009(3) (Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §354-A:8 (III) (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.02 (E)(4) (Page Supp. 1977).

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  64. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B §20. (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §64–306(4)(a) (Supp. 1977); ORE. REV. STAT. §659.430(1)(a) (1973).

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  65. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §37.1502(b) (Supp. 1978–1979); N.M. STAT. ANN.§4–33–7(G)(2) (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §955(h)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1978–1979).

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  66. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §601A.8(3) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §363.03[Subd. 2(2)(c)] (West. Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5–12(f) (West 1976).

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  67. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. §207.190 (Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §37.1504 (Supp. 1978–1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5–12(1) (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §4–33–7(H) (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §955(h)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1978–1979).

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  68. See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §46:1952(B) (West Supp. 1978), MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §65–306(13) (Supp. 1977).

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  69. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. §44–1009(a)(3) (Supp. 1975); ORE. REV. STAT. 659.425(1)(1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS §28–5–7(D) (Supp. 1977).

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  70. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§53–35 (West Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §37.1503 (Supp. 1978–1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §354-A:8(V-b) (Supp. 1977).

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  71. In New Mexico a significant portion of the housing market is not covered by the anti-discrimination statute. Sales or rental of single-family housing is exempted if the owner has not engaged in proscribed advertising expressing a limitation or preference for specified minority group persons and he or she does not own more than three single-family dwellings. N.M. STAT. ANN. §4–33–8 (A) (1974 & Supp.1975). A similar exemption exists in New Hampshire with the additional requirement that the owner does not use the sale or rental serivce of a real estate broker in the transaction. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §354-A:8(V-b)(a) (Supp. 1977).

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  72. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §22–9–1–13(c) (Burns Supp. 1977) (employer not required to modify physical plant or administrative procedures to accommodate a handicapped person); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §46:1952(E) (West Supp. 1978) (owner of public accommodations not required to modify property or provide higher degree of care for disabled person); NEB. REV. STAT. §20–131.03(1977) (person renting housing not required to modify property to accommodate the special needs of any lessee). But see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §37.1207 (Supp. 1978–1979)(employer not exempted from obligation to accommodate employee or applicant for employment).

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  73. Montana will exempt a person from complying with a provision if the commission for human rights finds that “reasonable grounds” exist for an exemption. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §64–306.1 (Supp. 1977).

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  74. IND. CODE ANN. §22–9–1–3(1) (Burns Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §601A.9(1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§64–306(5) (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5–12(i) (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §4–33–7(H) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §296-a(McKinney Supp. 1972 to 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.021 (Page Supp. 1977).

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  75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.02.1 (Page Supp. 1977).

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  76. See IND. CODE ANN. §22–9–1–3(1) (Burns Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §37.1402 (Supp. 1978–1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §363.03 (Subd. 5) (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §64–306(7) (Supp. 1977); ORE. REV. STAT. §659.150(2) (1973) WIS. STAT. ANN. §101.223 (West Supp. 1978–1979).

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  77. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§37.1401–37.1402 (Supp. 1978–1979).

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  78. ORE. REV. STAT.§659.150 (2) (1973).

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  79. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§627.644, 627.6576 (West Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch.175-§§120A (West Supp. 1977–1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §72A.20 (West Supp. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §58–251.5(1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3999.16 (Page Supp. 1977); ORE. REV. STAT. §746.225 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS §42–62–14 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §48.30.300 (Supp. 1977).

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  80. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 73 §1031(2) (Smith-Hurd 1974 & Supp. 1978).

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  81. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 175 §120A (West Supp. 1977–1978).

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  82. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§627.644, 627.6576 (West Supp. 1978).

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  83. N.C. GEN. STAT. §58–251.5 (1975)

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  84. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3999.16 (Page Supp.1977).

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  85. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §48.30.300 (Supp. 1977).

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  86. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §22–9–1–10 (Burns 1974 & Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §64–319 (Supp.1977).

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  87. MINN. STAT. ANN. §363.073 (West Supp. 1978).

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  88. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 48 §854 A (Smith-Hurd Supp.1978).

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  89. N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5–32 (West 1976).

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  90. See supra note 85.

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  91. N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5–35 (West 1976).

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  92. MINN. STAT. ANN. §363.03 (Subd. 4) (West Supp. 1978).

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  93. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §64–306(6)(a) (Supp. 1977).

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  94. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B §11c (Supp. 1978).

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  95. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §64–321 (Supp. 1977).

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  96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §959 (Purdon Supp.1978–1979).

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  97. See CHART 1: Persons Covered By Statutes (The District of Columbia housing statute covers the physically and the mentally disabled but the employment provision is limited to the physically disabled).

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  98. Washington, for example, prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability only in the areas of employment and insurance but gives additional protection to other minorities in housing, public accommodations, and credit transactions. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§49.60.176 (Supp. 1977) (prohibits discrimination based on race, creed, color, national origin, sex or marital status in credit transactions); §49.60.215 (1962) (prohibits discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin in public accommodations); §49.60.222 (Supp. 1977) (prohibits discrimination based on sex, marital status, race, creed, color or national origin in real estate transactions).

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  99. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§49.60.040 (Supp.1977).

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  100. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.§22–9–1–3(q) (Burns Supp. 1977).

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  101. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B §19(b)(u) (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §64–305(13) (Supp.1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5–5(q) (West 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS §28–5–6 (H) (Supp.1977).

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  102. HAWAII REV. STAT. §378–1 (1976).

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  103. IOWA CODE ANN. §601 A.2 (1975).

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  104. Note, Potluck Protections for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of-Disability, 8 LOY. CHI. L.J. 814, 838 (1977). But See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Poc. R.R. Co. v. Wash. State Human Rights Comm’n., 14 Fair Empl. Proc. Case 130, 132 (1976). After vacating a prior ruling that the anti-discrimination statute was void because it lacked a definition of the term “handicapped” the. Washington Supreme Court adopted the definition found in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.

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  105. See supra note 101.

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  106. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.01 (M) (Page Supp 1977).

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  107. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. §659.030 (1)(a) (1973); IND. CODE ANN. §22–9–1–3 (Burns Supp. 1977).

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  108. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §37.1103 (Supp.1978–1979).

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  109. Indiana seems to carry this narrowing trend to an extreme by providing that before a person can bring a valid complaint of employment discrimination that individual first must be “properly certified as a handicapped person.” Thus a disabled individual must be classified and officially certified as a member of the protected class before he or she can claim any protection under the statute. This is not required of persons in any of the other protected classes. IND. CODE ANN. §22–9–1–13(c) (Burns Supp.1977).

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  110. MINN. STAT. ANN. §363.04 (West Supp. 1978).

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  111. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §293 (McKinney 1972).

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  112. N.J. STAT. ANN. §10.5–7 (West 1976) (state attorney general and a commission compose the Division of Civil Rights).

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  113. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. §207.200 (Supp.1976).

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  114. ORE. REV. STAT. §§659.040–659.045 (1973).

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  115. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §959 (Purdon Supp. 1978–1979).

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  116. Note that the number here is greater than that given in the summary table supra since some states provide for such powers in only one area. This total figure draws from all three areas listed.

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  117. See, e.g., N.J., N.Y., Ohio, Pa., and R.I.

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  118. However, commissions may seek judicial action to remedy discriminatory practices.

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  119. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §53–35(d) (West Supp. 1978) (penalty for discrimination in housing and public accommodations).

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  120. ALASKA STAT. §18.06.040 (1974).

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  121. D.C.CODE ANN. §6–1506(1973).

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  122. Note, supra note 10, at 837. See also Weiss, Equal Employment and the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J. LAW & SOC. PROB. 457, 465 (1974) and Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1114–1119(1964). But cf. Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26 EMORY L.J. 65, 89–97(1977) (no private right of action should be implied under 29 U.S.C. §793).

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  123. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §601A.5(4) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5 §4612 (4) (Supp. 1978).

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  124. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §297(6) (McKinney Supp. 1972 to 1977).

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  125. See Bonfield, supra note 122, at 1113.

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  126. N.J. STAT. ANN. 10:5–38 (West 1976).

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  127. D. Matthew Powell, Associate Director of the project, had primary responsibility for drafting this model statute.

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  128. The bases for discrimination given in the model statute are those most commonly found in state civil rights statutes. Other possible bases include status with regard to public assistance (Minnesota), liability for service in the armed forces (New Jersey), alcoholism, drug addiction, and sexual preference. Only disability and use of adaptive devices are specifically recommended for inclusion in the statute. (See Summary of the Act supra.)

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  129. 29 U.S.C. §706(6) (1976).

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  130. 45 C.F.R. §84.3(j)(1977).

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  131. See discussion in Review of State Legislation, Protected Class supra.

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  132. Analysis of Final Regulation, §504, 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1977).

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  133. See Wright, supra note 4, at 70.

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  134. Some states have prohibited discrimination because of seeing eye dogs. See e.g. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §46:1951–1953 (West Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT.§20–129 to 131 (1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §168 (1976); S.C. CODE §§43–33–10 to -70 (1976).

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  135. See e.g. Indiana, New Jersey, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon and Pennsylvania.

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  136. See Note, Potluck Protections for Handicapped Dis-criminatees: The Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 LOY. CHI. L.J., 814, 839 (1977).

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  137. Note, supra note 9, at 840.

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  138. See supra note 8.

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  139. See Note supra note 9, at 840.

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  140. The Wisconsin anti-discrimination statute is noteworthy in that it forbids an employer “to contribute a lesser amount to the fringe benefits, including life or disability insurance coverage, of any employee because of a handicap.” WIS. STAT. ANN. §111.32(5)(f)(2) (West Supp. 1978–1979). Prior to 1976 the statute provided that an employer’s exclusion of a handicapped employee from life or disability coverage did not constitute discrimination. However, in Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations (14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 344) (1976) the court affirmed a finding of discrimination for refusal to hire a person with leukemia because of “the risk of future absenteeism and the higher insurance costs.” Id. at 345. The court stated that although some discrimination in insurance coverage of a handicapped employee was permitted, an employer was not permitted “to discriminate in hiring on the basis of increased insurance costs.” Id.

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  141. Note, supra note 9, at 820.

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  142. Id. at 821.

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  143. While equal pay provisions cover sex, 29 U.S.C. §206 (d) (1976), age (40–65 years of age), 29 U.S.C. §§621–634 (1976) and race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1976), disabled persons have only limited coverage under 29 U.S.C. §793 (1976) applicable to federal contracts over $2500. The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §214–16 (1976) authorize the Secretary of Labor to provide employment under special certificates of individuals whose earning or productive capacity is impaired by physical or mental deficiency or injury at wages which are substantially less than the minimum wage established by Section 206 of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206 (1976). For a criticism of this practice see Bernstein, The Right to an Adequate Income and Employment, Principal Paper in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 272–295 (M. Kindred ed. 1976). These persons would not be covered by the act, since they would not be “qualified.”

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  144. Katz, Sexual Harassment, Ethnic Slurs and other Breaches of the Employer’s Obligation to Maintain a Discrimination-Free Work Environment, 13 ARIZ. B.J. 42 (April, 1978).

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  145. Follmann, Insurance, Principal Paper in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 144, 149, 160 (M. Kindred ed. 1976).

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  146. See Wright, supra note 4, at 77, 86.

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  147. See 41 Fed. Reg. 29, 564 (1976) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. §84.18).

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  148. See supra note 5. But see Wright, supra note 4, at 84–89.

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  149. Note, Equal Employment and the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J.L. SOC. PROB. 457, 472–76 (1974).

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  150. Id. at 476.

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  151. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).

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  152. See 45 C.F.R. §84.12 (1977).

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  153. Id.

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  154. Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 IOWA L REV. 1067, 1109 (1964).

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  155. Id.

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  156. See Note, supra note 22, at 476.

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  157. Id. at 478–479.

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  158. Id. at 480.

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  159. See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §37.1502(b) (Supp. 1978–1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §4–33–7 G(2) (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. §955(h)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1978–1979).

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  160. For examples in existing state statutes see MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B §22 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §64–306(4)(a) (Supp. 1977); ORE. REV. STAT. §659.430(1)(a) (1973).

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  161. For examples in existing state statutes see KY. REV. STAT. §207.190 (Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §37.1504 (Supp. 1978–1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5–12(i) (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN §4–33–7(H) (Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §955(h)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1978–1979). See also Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Propsals, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1106–07(1964).

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  162. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §5–331 (McKinney 1978) and TEXAS REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1293a (Vernon Supp. 1978). While no cases have yet interpreted the statutes in these two states, there is case law upholding provisions voiding existing agreements for the rental of property. See Industrial Development & Land Company v. Goldschmidt, 56 Cal. App. 507, 206 P. 134 (1922). See also Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398(1934). Judicial enforcement of restrictive racial covenants in land deeds is unconstitutional. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). But while such covenants are judicially unenforceable, it re-qures legislative action to make the covenants themselves illegal. Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, §804(c), 42 U.S.C. §3604(c) (1970) contains language very similar to subsection 6(4) of this act. Based largely on this language at least one court has found it unlawful to include such covenants in deeds even if no effort is made to enforce them. Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F. 2d 603, n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev’g 330 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1971). In Mayers v. Ridley homeowners whose deeds contained restrictive racial covenants successfully brought suit enjoining the recorder of deeds from accepting for filing any instrument containing a restrictive racial covenant and requiring the recorder of deeds to mark such instruments in the volumes in which they are recorded to indicate that such covenants are void and unenforceable.

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  163. See Bonfield, supra note 27, at 1105–06.

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  164. For a general discussion of statutory provisions prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations see Bonfield, supra note 27, at 1095–1107.

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  165. Id. at 1100.

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  166. Id. at 1105–06.

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  167. This section is based upon the Ohio credit practices provisions administered by the Ohio Civil Rights Office. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.021 (Page Supp. 1977).

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  168. References to mandatory insurance programs may be found in Friday, Insurance: Reaction Comments, in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 169 (M. Kindred, ed., 1976); Goldberg, State Laws Mandating Mental Health Insurance Coverage, 28 HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 759 (October 1977).

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  169. For discussion of insurance coverage for the mentally retarded see Follman, Insurance, Principal Paper in THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 144–70 (M. Kindred ed. 1976).

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  170. See id. and Goldberg, supra note 41.

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  171. Follman, supra, note 42, at 146.

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  172. 29 U.S.C. 794 (1976). Section 504 states that “no otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”

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  173. It is intended that the state’s governor designate the Office of Civil Rights to develop rules for implementing this section as the Department of Health, Education and Welfare has done. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 8’4 (1977). These should then be used by other state agencies which oversee recipients of state financial assistance to develop rules to enforce the provisions of this section.

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  174. 29 U.S.C. 793 (a) (1976). Section 503(a) states: “Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals ... The provisions of this section shall apply to any subcontract in excess of $2,500 entered into by a prime contractor in carrying out any contract for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States ...” See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§10:5–31 to 37 (West 1976) for an example of an existing comprehensive state statute covering public contracts.

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  175. See also the discussion of the organization of a state advocacy office in Chapter 9: Advocacy, infra.

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  176. See e.g. IND. CODE ANN. §22–9–1–6 (Burns Supp. 1977), IOWA CODE ANN. §601A.3 (Supp. 1978–1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4112.04 (Page Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§49.60.051, 49.60.120 (Supp. 1977).

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  177. This approach is used in Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §363.05 (West Supp. 1978), in New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§10:5–7 through 10:5–10 (West 1976), and in New York, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §293 (McKinney 1972).

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  178. The following text is based largely upon an article by Bonfield discussing state civil rights statutes. See Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1110–1119(1964).

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  179. A number of states have supplemented administrative enforcement mechanisms with provisions for private civil suits. Most of these states require a complainant to elect the remedy by demanding that the aggrieved party pursue either a private suit or administrative enforcement. This eliminates needless badgering of the defendant. See e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §36–516(b) (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE §54.3 (West Supp. 1978); KY. REV. STAT. §207.230 (Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5 §4621 (Supp. 1978); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §37.2801 (Supp. 1978–79); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§64–304, 64–392 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5–38 (West 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §297(9) (Supp. 1972–1977); ORE. REV. STAT. §§659.105, 659.435 (1973); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4419e(6)(b) (Vernon 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§49.60.030(2) (Supp. 1976).

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  180. 18 U.S.C. §6002(1976).

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  181. See Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).

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  182. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).

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  183. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.

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  184. See e.g. IOWA CODE ANN. §17A.19(7),(8) (1978).

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Sales, B.D., Powell, D.M., Duizend, R.V. (1982). Prohibiting Discrimination. In: Disabled Persons and the Law. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-0794-6_10

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