Abstract
A class of N-person, general-sum differential games is considered for which non-cooperative Nash equilibria can characterize situations such as bargaining during a strike. A subclass of strategies is shown to be playable equilibria. The existence and uniqueness of this subclass, as well as the possibility of profitable re-contracting, are analyzed and illustrated with examples. Equilibrium implies that any player will eventually fare as well as if he had accepted the claim of all other players at any earlier time. Possible generalizations are outlined or discussed.
S. Clemhout and H. Wan, Jr. acknowledge beneficial discussions during the Spring of 1970 with P. Varaiya concerning a four-party bargaining model. They are also grateful for helpful suggestions by J. Harsanyi and R. Selten. Special thanks are due to Dean R. B. McKersie for stimulating exchanges of ideas. This research has been supported by the National Science Foundation (GP-24205) and the Office of Naval Research (N00014-69-A-0200-1012).
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© 1976 Plenum Press, New York
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Clemhout, S., Leitmann, G., Wan, H.Y. (1976). Equilibrium Patterns for Bargaining Under Strike: A Differential Game Model. In: Ho, Y.C., Mitter, S.K. (eds) Directions in Large-Scale Systems. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2259-7_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-2259-7_13
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