Abstract
In his study of gift-giving in several pre-industrial socictres, Marcel Mauss (1925, 1967) discovered that much of this activity is of a certain quid pro quo nature. However, unlike a market transaction that establishes a quid pro quo relation between objects exchanged, a gift establishes a quid pro quo relationship between the giver and the recipient. A gift involves giving away something of the self, which means the giver has given up something of value. The recipient has an obligation to receive the gift and is thus placed in a state of dependence upon the giver. Because the giver is not immediately compensated in the exchange, the receiver has an obligation to repay the gift. Mauss’s work continues to be relevant in modern societies.
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Chua, V.C.H., Wong, C. (2002). Charitable Giving By Individuals: An Empirical Perspective. In: Kapur, B.K., Chong, KC. (eds) Altruistic Reveries. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0809-0_9
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