Abstract
This chapter describes monitoring and verification technologies, which are discussed within the context of arms control treaties. Nations remain in arms control treaties because they judge the disadvantage of controls on nuclear weapons to be far less dangerous than a system with no controls. The failure of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive–Test–Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its subsequent withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty are exceptions to a global consensus; the world awaits what is in store for arms control.
Trust, but verify.
(Pres. Ronald Reagan to General-Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev, Dec. 8, 1987)
The two leaders had just signed the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in Washington. Signing INF marked the beginning of the end of the cold war, 2 years before the November 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, 3 years before the Conventional Arms in Europe Treaty (CFE) was signed in 1990 and 5 years before the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was signed.
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Notes
- 1.
S. Pifer, “After NEW START: What Next?” Arms Control Today, December 2010, p. 8–14.
- 2.
T. Collina, “Cartwright urges nuclear spending cuts,” Arms Control Today, September 2012, p. 36–37.
- 3.
T. Graham and D. Hafemeister, “Nuclear Testing and Proliferation – an Inextricable Connection,” Disarmament Diplomacy 91, 15–26 (summer 2009).
- 4.
S. Taylor and E. Hartse, “A procedure for estimation of source and propagation amplitude corrections for regional seismic discriminates,” Journal of Geophysical Research 103(B2), 2781–89 (1998).
- 5.
R.L Garwin, “The Scientific Roots and Prospects for the CTBTO and the IMS,” CTBTO, Vienna, 8 June 2011. www.fas.org/RLG/ and www.CTBTO.org.
- 6.
The author was technical lead on TTBT in the State Department (1987), testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on TTBT (October 1988), was lead the technical SFRC staff (1990–1992) on TTBT ratification and Mitchell-Hatfield testing ban, and was the lead NAS technical staff on the CTBT study (2000–2002).
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Hafemeister, D. (2014). Verification and Arms Control Treaties. In: Physics of Societal Issues. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-9272-6_4
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