Abstract
The objective of this paper is to show that a dualist model is not only possible but also most appropriate in order to understand the problem of consciousness and the existence of Free Will. By “dualist” we refer to the assumption that reality cannot be explained exclusively by observable causes in space-time. The dualist view we speak about here does not totally correspond to the classical conception of “dualism,” according to which matter and consciousness would be two radically separate things.
The first part of this paper is dedicated to EPR-type experiments which show that no matter what the interpretations are, we are obliged to call into question the classical notions of time and space and obliged to accept that ultimate reality cannot be localized in or be dependent on time and space.
In the second part I will be arguing that in order to be understood the experiments of Benjamin Libet must be studied in a dualist framework, even though Libet was not himself a dualist. A Copernican revolution is therefore possible not only in our understanding of the world but also in our comprehension of the nature of consciousness.
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Notes
- 1.
This idea is the result of a conversation about this subject with Jean-François Lambert.
- 2.
Some research shows that the “out of body experiences” described by some people who have been close to death might not be an illusion as is generally thought (Van Lommel et al. 2001; Sabom and Kreutzinger 1978; Sabom 1983). Benjamin Libet himself has refined a protocol for testing the reality of this phenomenon in a rigorous fashion (Libet 2004, p. 216–219).
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Staune, J. (2013). Towards Non-physical Realism. In: Suarez, A., Adams, P. (eds) Is Science Compatible with Free Will?. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5212-6_14
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