Abstract
Our intent in this module is to motivate the development of a new index of power in n-person simple games that models the collective decision-making process of players whose explicit behavioral objective is to effect change. Our concern is with games that closely correspond to the character of interpersonal interaction found in organizations, committees, and legislatures; situations in which power and authority, rather than monetary forms of payoff, are the motivating force (i.e., the interaction may be characterized as being “political” in nature).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Brams, S. J. Game Theory and Politics, The Free Press, 1975.
Brams, S. J., and Affuso, P. J. “Power and Size: A New Paradox,” Theory and Decision, 1976.
Banzhaf III, J. F. “Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A Mathematical Analysis,” Rutgers Law Review, 19 (1965), 317–343.
Caplow, T. “A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad,” American Sociological Review 21 (1956), 489–493.
Coleman, J. S. “Control of Collectivities and the Power of a Collectivity to Act,” Social Choice (Bernhardt Lieberman, ed.) Gordon and Breach, New York, 1971.
Deegan, Jr., J., and Packel, E. W. “A New Index of Power for Simple n-Person Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, 7(1978), 113–123.
Dubey, P. “Some Results on Values of Finite and Infinite Games,” Ph. D. Thesis, Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University, 1975.
Lucas, W. F. “Measuring Power in Weighted Voting Systems,” 1981. Chapter 9 in this volume.
Riker, W. H. The Theory of Political Coalitions, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut, 1962.
Riker, W. H., and Ordeshook, P. C. An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1973.
Shapley, L. S., and Shubik, M. “A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System,” American Political Science Review, 48 (1954) 787–792.
Straffin, Jr., P. D. “Power Indices in Political Science,” 1982. Chapter 11 in this volume.
Vinacke, W. E., and Arkoff, A. “Experimental Study of Coalitions in the Triad,” American Sociological Review, 22 (1957), 406–415.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1983 Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Deegan, J., Packel, E.W. (1983). To the (Minimal Winning) Victors Go the (Equally Divided) Spoils: A New Power Index for Simple n-Person Games. In: Brams, S.J., Lucas, W.F., Straffin, P.D. (eds) Political and Related Models. Modules in Applied Mathematics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5430-0_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-5430-0_10
Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY
Print ISBN: 978-1-4612-5432-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-4612-5430-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive