Abstract
In object oriented environments a small but powerful base protection mechanism is needed which supports the specification of access based on the right to invoke an object interface routine. This base protection mechanism can be used to build up different security policies. The MONADS computer architecture is an efficient realisation of the base protection mechanism. The paper presents a solution for an implementation of different security policies in the MONADS environment.
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© 1994 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Vosseberg, K., Brössler, P., Keedy, J.L. (1994). A Base for Secure Object Oriented Environments. In: Thuraisingham, B., Sandhu, R., Ting, T.C. (eds) Security for Object-Oriented Systems. Workshops in Computing. Springer, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-3858-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-3858-7_4
Publisher Name: Springer, London
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-19877-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4471-3858-7
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