Skip to main content

Three Roads to Cultural Recurrence

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Evolutionary Psychology and Information Systems Research

Part of the book series: Integrated Series in Information Systems ((ISIS,volume 24))

Abstract

Social scientists have long remarked that there is consistency in what people believe and value over time, especially within definable groups. Anthropologists call this body of information “culture .” There are (at least) three causal mechanisms that can explain the recurrence of cultural traits . Recurrence can occur through (1) strong individual learning biases ; (2) population-level normalizing effects on what is adopted; and (3) replicator-based inheritance . Each of these mechanisms is favored by a particular brand of evolutionary theorizing about human society. Evolutionary psychologists (EPs) advocate the first option, which emphasizes the ability of universal structures in the evolved mind to come up with the same responses to environmental conditions time and again. What explains cultural consistency over time, then, is evolved psychological decision-making processes in the face of common environmental challenges. A group I call “cultural selectionists ” (CSs) prefer the second option, which notes that even poor social learning abilities can still produce consistently shared features at the level of the group if there are widely shared psychological preferences for traits or the types of individuals from whom to acquire culture. The third option, based on replication of the same information from generation to generation, is the memetic position. In this scenario, the cultural features that keep popping up are the phenotypic expressions of memes , or cultural replicators, disseminating through the population via social communication or mediated transmission via information machines such as computer networks. This variety in the possible explanations for cultural evolution is not generally recognized nor do advocates of one position generally acknowledge the validity of others. But I will argue in this chapter that all three of these possibilities are viable in our present state of ignorance about the means through which cultural traits reappear each generation; any one of them may account for a particular aspect of cultural inheritance .

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    In a similar fashion, prions only account for a small proportion of diseases, but the peculiar pathologies they do cause – transmissible spongiform encephalopathies like “mad cow” disease – nevertheless represent an interesting species of disease which requires its own kinds of analysis and treatment. The same would be true of memetic culture: significant interest would attend the discovery of memes, and projects to uncover the replicative abilities of cultural traits and the unique kinds of dynamics they introduce would naturally develop.

References

  • Atran S (2001) The trouble with memes: Inference versus imitation in cultural evolution. Hum Nature 12:351–381

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aunger R (2000) The life history of culture learning in a face-to-face society. Ethos 28(2):1–38

    Google Scholar 

  • Aunger R (2002a) The electric meme: a new theory of how we think and communicate. The Free Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Aunger R (2002b) Exposure versus susceptibility in the epidemiology of everyday beliefs. J Cogn Cult 2(2):113–154

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aunger R (2006) What’s the matter with memes? In: Grafen A, Ridley M (eds) Richard Dawkins: how a scientist changed the way we think. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Aunger R (2010a) Types of technology. Technol Forecasting Soc Change 77:762–782

    Google Scholar 

  • Aunger R (2010b) What’s special about human technology? Camb J of Econ 34:115–123

    Google Scholar 

  • Blackmore S (1999) The Meme Machine. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R, Richerson PJ (2000) Memes: universal acid or a better mouse trap? In: Aunger R (ed) Darwinizing culture: the status of memetics as a science. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 143–162

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins R (1976) The selfish gene. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins R (1982) The extended phenotype. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins R (1999) Introduction to Blackmore (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins R, Krebs JR (1979) Animal signals: Information or manipulation? In: Krebs JR, Davies NB (eds) Behavioral ecology. Blackwell, London, pp 282–309

    Google Scholar 

  • Freeman WJ (1999) How brains make up their minds. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Gil-White FJ (2001) L’evolution culturelle a-t-elle des règles? La rechérche Hors Série No. 5(Avril):92–97

    Google Scholar 

  • Henrich J, Boyd R (2002) On modeling cognition and culture: why cultural evolution does not require replication of representations, J Cogn Cult 2:87–112

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewontin RC (1970) The units of selection. Annu Rev Ecol System 1:1–18

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McCrone J (1999) Going inside: a tour round a single moment of consciousness. Faber and Faber, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller GF (1999) Sexual selection for cultural displays. In: Dunbar R, Knight C, Power C (eds) The evolution of culture. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh

    Google Scholar 

  • Pinker S (1997) How the mind works. Penguin, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperber D (2000) An objection to the memetic approach to culture. In: Aunger R (ed) Darwinizing culture: the status of memetics as a science. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 163–74

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperber D (1996) Explaining culture: a naturalistic approach. Blackwell, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Sperber D, Wilson D (1986) Relevance: communication and cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Tooby J, Cosmides L (1992) The psychological foundations of culture. In: Barkow JH, Cosmides L, Tooby J (eds) The adapted mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 19–136

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

A previous version of this chapter was profitably read by Robert Boyd, Dan Sperber, and Ned Kock.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Robert Aunger .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Aunger, R. (2010). Three Roads to Cultural Recurrence. In: Kock, N. (eds) Evolutionary Psychology and Information Systems Research. Integrated Series in Information Systems, vol 24. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6139-6_16

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-6139-6_16

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4419-6138-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4419-6139-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics