On Being Obliged to Act

Abstract

There are various ways in which a person’s freedom of action may be diminished or restricted. Instead of acting, he may be acted upon; or he may be unable to help doing what he does. He may suffer from some disability, have a duty imposed on him or do something because he is obliged to do it. In this essay, I wish to examine the notion of being obliged to do something. I shall investigate the differences between ‘being obliged by A to do X’ and ‘being obliged to A for X’; between ‘being obliged to do X’ and ‘having (or being under) an obligation to do X’; between being physically obliged and being morally, legally and logically obliged; and between saying ‘X is something I am obliged to do’, ‘X is something I choose to do’ and ‘X is something I ought to do’. I am indebted to my colleagues at Hull, to H. L. A. Hart of Oxford, P. J. Fitzgerald of Leeds and A. Sloman of Sussex for criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.