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Strategic Issues

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Weapons without a Cause
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Abstract

To what extent do strategic issues explain weapons acquisition? In addressing this issue, three questions will be applied to each of the four case studies. First, was the weapon intended to carry out a necessary military mission? The strategies underlying the military missions for each weapon will be briefly examined when answering this question: if the strategy is suspect, then so must be the military mission. Second, was the weapon capable of carrying out its military mission? Given that it takes several years to develop a weapon, its military mission may well change. The weapon ought to be able to adapt accordingly. Third, were there other, more cost-effective alternatives for meeting this mission requirement? Since nuclear weapons also serve international political purposes independent of their military missions, two additional questions will be addressed when examining the strategic rationales for the MX and B-2. First, was it meant to serve as a symbol of national resolve, to ward off enemies and reassure allies? Second, was it needed as a bargaining chip to wring concessions out of the Soviets in arms negotiations?

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Notes

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© 1997 Theo Farrell

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Farrell, T. (1997). Strategic Issues. In: Weapons without a Cause. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25109-4_2

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