Abstract
The last seven months of peace before August 1914 have been among the most intensely studied and hotly debated in the history of Europe. Explanations of the origins of the First World War have ranged from the absurdly simple to others of such complexity as to threaten to drive all but the most assiduous reader to despair. It has been attributed in particular to German ambition and militarism, or more generally to imperialism (variously defined), monopoly capitalism, the arms race, secret diplomacy, unbridled nationalism, the use of foreign policy to ease domestic problems, not to mention sundry combinations of these and other factors. The war has been described both as inevitable and avoidable. Alistair Home suggests that a ‘sort of impassioned triviality’ prevailed in 1914, while James Joll argues that the ‘rhetoric’ of imperialism contributed ‘even more than the reality’ to the widespread mood in Europe which made war possible, acceptable, and — in some cases — welcome.*
‘… in a certain sense it was a preventive war’. (Bethmann Hollweg)
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Notes and References
See e.g. G. Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre (1965), ii. 218–9.
D. McDonald, United Government, (1994), p. 207.
D. Lieven, Nicholas II, pp. 195–8.
D. McDonald, United Government, pp. 199–204.
V. Berghahn, Germany, p. 136. The determinants of German foreign policy in the years leading to 1914 are carefully and lucidly discussed by J. Lowe, The Great Powers (1994), Chapters 3 and 4.
V. Berghahn, Germany, pp. 136–9.
Ibid, pp. 140–2.
Ibid, pp. 140–5.
J. Joll, Origins, p. 8.
S. R. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (1991), pp. 4–6, 11.
Ibid, pp. 171 ff.; J. Joll, Origins, p. 92. John Leslie, The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary’s War Aims’, in Archiv und Forschung, band 20 (1993), pp. 307–94.
Ibid, pp. 375–89, 394.
Ibid, pp. 365–8. On Austria see F. Fellner, ‘Austria-Hungary’ in K. Wilson (ed.), Decisions for War, 1914 (1995), Chapter 1.
F. Bridge, Habsburg Monarchy, p. 336.
On Moltke, see M. Balfour, Kaiser, pp. 263–4; J. C. G. Röhl, ‘Germany’ in K. Wilson, Decisions, Chapter 2; V. Berghahn, Germany, pp. 181–3. Critics of German policy (‘the most complete madness’) which led to war included business magnates Albert Ballin and Walter Rathenau, and the, diplomat, Prince Lichnowsky (see above Röhl ‘Germany’ p. 28).
V. Berghahn, Germany, pp. 175–8, 181 ff., 194–5. He stresses that policy-making was still the preserve of Wilhelm II and his advisers — a small’ strategic clique’. These were men who were guided by a narrow and dogmatic view of the world, with more than a few hints of a tendency to panic and overreact. Yet, they ‘were cool enough’ to try to calculate how much time they had in which to act before their position became desperate. Many scholars have underlined the growing fears of the German military and some civilian groups — notably the big landowners — at what they believed to be deteriorating prospects for the conservative order at home. War was preferable to slow death at home and abroad.
Ibid, p. 198–200, 211.
M. Cornwall,’ serbia’ in K. Wilson, Decisions, pp. 77–80, and Chapter 3 passim.
D. Lieven, Nicholas II, pp. 204 ff.
D. McDonald, United Government, pp. 107, 204–7.
D. Lieven, Nicholas II, p. 147.
W. Fuller, Strategy and Power, pp. 435–51; D. Lieven, Nicholas II, pp. 141–51.
V. Berghahn, Germany, p. 216.
For France and Britain, see J. F. V. Keiger, ‘France’, and K. Wilson, ‘Britain’ in K. Wilson, Decisions, Chapters 5 and 7; or at greater length, J. F. V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (1983); Z. Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (1977); M. Brock, ‘Britain enters the War’ in R. J. W. Evans and H. P. von Strandmann (eds.), The Coming of the First World War (1990), pp. 145–64; and K. Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar, pp. 338–40, 370–1.
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© 1996 C. J. Bartlett
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Bartlett, C.J. (1996). To August 1914 and the End of an Era. In: Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914. European History in Perspective. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24958-9_8
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