Abstract
By bargaining we mean negotiations between two or more parties about the terms of possible cooperation, which may involve trade, employment (collective bargaining), a joint business venture, etc. For lack of space we will only discuss bargaining between two parties, and will restrict ourselves to the case of complete information. (For n-person bargaining, see Harsanyi, 1977, chs 10 to 13; for the case of incomplete information, see Harsanyi, 1982, and Harsanyi and Selten, 1987).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Edgeworth, F.Y. 1881. Mathematical Psychics. London: Kegan Paul; New York: A.M. Kelley, 1967.
Harsanyi, J.C. 1956. Approaches to the bargaining problem before and after the theory of games: a critical discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s theories. Econometrica 24, 144–57.
Harsanyi, J.C. 1977. Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Harsanyi, J.C. 1982. Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi—Selten solution theory, I-II. Mathematical Social Sciences 3, 179–91 and 259–79.
Harsanyi, J.C. and Selten, R. 1987. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Hicks, J.R. 1932. The Theory of Wages. London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1963.
Luce, R.D. and Raiffa, H. 1957. Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley.
Nash, J.F. 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–62.
Nash, J.F. 1953. Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica 21, 128–40.
Neumann, J. von and Morgenstern, 0. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pigou, A.C. 1905. Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace. London and New York: Macmillan.
Roemer, J.E. 1985. Axiomatic bargaining theory of economic environments. University of California, Davis, Working Papers Series No. 264.
Roth, A.E. 1979. Axiomatic Models of Bargaining. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Roth, A.E. and Schoumaker, F. 1983. Subjective probability and the theory of games: some further comments. Management Science 29, 1337–40.
Zeuthen, F. 1930. Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: A.M. Kelley, 1968.
Editor information
Copyright information
© 1989 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Harsanyi, J.C. (1989). Bargaining. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., Newman, P. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20181-5_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-49537-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-20181-5
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)