Abstract
In my analysis of inferential knowledge claims I drew attention to the importance of evidence. We come to this matter again with the challenge of falsification and in particular, to the question of evidence, demonstration and proof in the case of religious assertions. Are religious assertions cognitively meaningful? And can they be verified or falsified?
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Notes
In New Essays in Philosophical Theology edited by A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (London: SCM Press, 1969) pp.96–9.
Cf. R. S. Heimbeck, Theology and Meaning (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969) p.88. Most of Chapter 3 of this book is a discussion of Flew’s paper and its implications.
On this see the writings of John Hick, especially Faith and Knowledge (London: Cornell University Press 1970) pp.169–99.
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© 1988 Brian Haymes
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Haymes, B. (1988). Falsification. In: The Concept of the Knowledge of God. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19066-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-19066-9_6
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