The Dynamics of Factionalism in Contemporary Africa

Abstract

‘War made the state and the state made war’. Although Tilly’s aphorism applies to many states within and outside Africa, there is reason to believe that it is at variance with at least as many archaic states of which we have no record, and not a few modern ones where the state-building functions of warfare are very much in doubt. Uganda, Chad, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Zaire are among the most conspicuous examples that come to mind. In each case armed factions have threatened the very existence of the state, and the threat has never been more ominous than where their military capabilities have risen in proportion to their dependence on external patrons. As one observer recently noted, ‘domestic factionalization is a prime cause of insecurity because it sets the regime against internal rivals, and because such friction permits exploitation by other countries’.¹ From 1978 to 1982 no fewer than twelve African states have experienced the devastating effects of foreign-linked factionalism; as of today at least four — Chad, Sudan, Mozambique and Angola — are desperately trying to insure their own survival against the dual threat of domestic factionalism and external intervention.