Abstract
A decision to modernise the nuclear portion of Britain’s armed forces is not in principle different from a decision to modernise other portions. It is quite usual for one capability to demand little more than the cost of operation and maintenance of existing equipment for many years before requiring a marked increase in allocations for new equipment. Every line item in a budget can expect to have peaks and troughs over the years. It is the art of managing a budget to ensure that too many peaks do not occur simultaneously. Thus, just because the nuclear force is going to cost more in the 1980s than in the 1970s, does not by itself mean that it can only be accommodated with a drastic effect elsewhere in the country’s defence effort. The opportunity cost of nuclear forces in terms of conventional forces will depend on what else urgently needs to be done and the general level of resources available.
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© 1980 Royal Institute of International Affairs
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Freedman, L. (1980). Defence Priorities. In: Britain and Nuclear Weapons. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16388-5_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16388-5_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-30511-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-16388-5
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