Abstract
Military power is a pervasive instrument of foreign policy, whose central role is to serve the objective of national security. This has been the case throughout the recorded history of the international system. And, despite the great easing in political tensions between East and West in recent times, which has been manifested by the decreasing emphasis on military force as the fundamental bulwark of international order in the northern hemisphere, military power will continue to play a crucial role in the ordering of relations between states in the global political system, throughout which security uncertainties will persist. Indeed, the removal of the Cold War straitjacket and the declining ability of the United States and especially the Soviet Union to impose discipline on past and present client states could result in an increase in political instabilities and concomitant threats to the great powers’ preferred views of international security.
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Notes
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© 1992 James Wyllie
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Wyllie, J.H. (1992). The Deterrence Condition. In: Carey, R., Salmon, T.C. (eds) International Security in the Modern World. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10772-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10772-8_4
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