Abstract
Spurred by the public controversy about the implementation of the NATO dual-track decision, the Western Alliance is currently in ‘the third phase of its strategy debate’.1 The first phase ended in 1957 with the official adoption of the doctrine of massive retaliation whose centre-piece was NATO’s threat to respond to a Soviet attack in Europe by an early and if need be massive use of nuclear weapons.
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Notes
Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? A Reappraisal’, in Donald G. Brennan (ed.), Arms Control and Disarmament (London 1961 ), p. 138.
General Bernard W. Rogers, Greater Flexibility for NATO’s Flexible Response, Strategic Review, vol. xi (Spring 1983 ), p. 13.
Cf. Peter Schmidt, ‘Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany’, in Orbis, Winter 1985, p. 731, and Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2627 January 1985, p.1, and 21 March 1985, p. 12.
Henry A. Kissinger, ‘The Future of NATO’, in Kenneth A. Myers (ed.), NATO — The Next Thirty Years (Boulder and London, 1980 ), p. 8.
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© 1988 P. Terrence Hopmann and Frank Barnaby
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Lübkemeier, E. (1988). Current NATO Strategy and No First Use: What Can They Accomplish?. In: Hopmann, P.T., Barnaby, F. (eds) Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09181-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09181-2_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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