Abstract
Every public official must exercise discretionary judgement in the course of carrying out his duties; does this inescapable necessity constitute a threat to liberty? If the exercise of judgement were inherently an act of license, tantamount to an exercise of unbridled power, then constitutionally limited government and its intended end of individual liberty would be unattainable and indeed scarcely approachable. If, on the other hand, officials’ judgements can be contained and regulated by law, then the hope of constitutional government would remain feasible. Arbitrary decision, wilful and lawless, is the enemy of liberty; but discretionary judgement is its essential servant.
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© 1987 George Feaver and Frederick Rosen
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Letwin, W. (1987). Policy-Making, Discretionary Judgement, and Liberty. In: Feaver, G., Rosen, F. (eds) Lives, Liberties and the Public Good. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08006-9_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-08006-9_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-08008-3
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-08006-9
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