Abstract
Considering that the Syrian decision to intervene militarily in Lebanon was an infringement of the sovereignty of a fully independent neighbouring state, the wide-ranging support accorded to the Syrian action was indeed surprising. Approval was voiced by a substantial segment of Lebanese society, the international community at large, and particularly the United States, with the muted acquiescence of Syria’s bitterest antagonist, Israel—all of whom perceived the Syrian intervention as the only remaining alternative which could save Lebanon from anarchy and the inevitable disintegration of the country’s social and political systems. Yet Syria’s intervention was also deeply rooted in the history of the region. This was so not only because the religious and communal tensions and cleavages which lay at the heart of the recent Lebanese civil war had been operative for over a hundred years, but also because these tensions in Lebanon invariably induced similar eruptions in other parts of Syria, for until recently that area was perceived to be a single geographical and social entitity.1 Thus, a civil war in 1860 between the Christian Maronites and the Druzes in Lebanon, which ended in a series of defeats for the Christians, sparked off a massacre of Christians by Moslems in neighbouring Damascus.
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Notes
See for example, Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate (London: Oxford University Press, 1958) pp. 1–6;
John B. Glubb, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan (London: Thames & Hudson, 1967) pp. 7–9;
Tabitha Petran, Syria (London: Ernest Benn, 1972) chs 1 and 2;
A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London: Oxford University Press, 1946) chs 1–4.
H. B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (London: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc, 1962) p. 106.
See Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968). In this highly authoritative study, Hudson maintains that the Maronite leaders who sought independence from the mandatory power appreciated ‘the urgent necessity of integrating Arab nationalist Sunnite notables into the political institutions of the state to preserve its viability once independence was achieved, and it took pains to cultivate the support of these notables and to wean them from rigid insistence that an independent Lebanese entity be merged into a united Syria’ (p. 42). Similarly, Enver Koury (op. cit., p. 47) states that in 1943 ‘the Christian leaders advocated the partition of Lebanon into Christian and Moslem entities, in response to the Lebanese Moslem leaders who were seeking federation in a Greater Syria as the way to avoid partition’. It is also interesting to note that after the Druze-Christian civil war of 1860, the great powers rescued the Maronite community by establishing Lebanon as an autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire. However, this new province was confined only to the Mount Lebanon area, excluding the Sunni-dominated coastal strip, Beirut, the Beqa’ and the northern plain.
For excellent analyses of the post-war structure of Lebanon’s political system, see Hudson, op. cit.; Suleiman, op. cit.; R. Hrair Dekmejian, Patterns of Political Leadership: Egypt, Israel, Lebanon (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1975) chs 2, 5;
David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana (New York: Elsevier, 1975) chs 3, 4, 5:
and Leonard Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York: John Wiley, 1966).
By far the best book on this period of Syrian history is Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post- War Arab Politics, 1945–1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).
A. I. Dawisha, ‘The Transnational Party in Regional Politics: The Arab Baath Party’, Asian Affairs, vol. 61 (1974) p. 23.
The best account of the 1958 Lebanese civil war is Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, Washington, D.C.; Middle East Institute, 1961; see also M. S. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis: A Documentary Study (London: Asia Publishing House, 1965).
A good account of this period of Syria’s history is Itamar Rabinovitch, Syria Under the Ba’th, 1963–1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972).
For an intimate and fascinating account of the Arab planning and execution of the October war, see Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (London: Collins, 1975).
Abbas Kelidar and Michael Burrell, ‘Lebanon: The Collapse of a State’, Conflict Studies, no 74 (August 1976) p. 6.
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© 1980 Adeed I. Dawisha
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Dawisha, A.I. (1980). The Historical Setting. In: Syria and the Lebanese Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05371-1_2
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