Abstract
The South China Sea, which stretches from the Karimata Strait between the Islands of Sumatra and Borneo in Indonesia to the Strait of Taiwan, encompasses hundreds of rocks, reefs, and small islands. The majority of them are located in the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos (See Map 6.1). The question of who owns these islands has become one of the most fundamental barriers to closer interstate relations in the region, particularly since potentially huge oil and gas deposits were found in the area in the late 1960s.1 By the 1980s, seven East Asian countries became involved in disputes over the territory, and all of the claimants – except for Brunei and Indonesia – have established some kind of physical presence on at least one of those islands. Currently, Vietnam occupies more than twenty islands and reefs, China eight, Taiwan one, the Philippines eight, and Malaysia one (Lo 1989; Manning 2000; Burgess 2003; Tønnesson 2003).2
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Notes
- 1.
Prewar claims and counterclaims to these islands can be traced to the late nineteenth century. The United Kingdom was the first European power to establish its control in the area. Yet the economic and strategic value of those dispersed islands had remained outside of colonial competition until France formally notified the world of its possession of those islands in July 1933. Japan immediately raised a formal protest against the French occupation and succeeded in occupying the entire archipelago by force by 1939. For Japanese militarists, the island groups had enormous economic and strategic values as Japan was entering the Pacific War. After Japanese troops withdrew from the area at the end of the war, both the Nationalist Chinese government and the French colonial administration in Vietnam immediately attempted to restore their prewar claims to the islands. When the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Vietnam were established in 1949 and 1955, respectively, both governments endorsed those claims (Luu 1996: 49–61; Peng Er 1996: 997–8; Catley and Keliat 1997: 24–30; Tønnesson 2006).
- 2.
Indonesia claims none of the contested islands but a zone northeast of Natuna Island that overlaps the outer limits of China’s and Vietnam’s traditional claims. Brunei claims a huge maritime zone running through the Spratly area, based on a straight-line projection of its EEZ as stipulated by the UNCLOS.
- 3.
- 4.
Snyder (1996) points to Chinese “salami tactics,” in which China tests the other claimants through aggressive actions and then backs off when it meets significant resistance. China’s ambiguity on the extent and nature of its claims is regarded as a tactical ploy to stall or defer any attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement until it is prepared to get what it wants through military strength. In a similar vein, Fravel (2003: 73–80) argues that only severe international shocks that threaten China’s strategic interests and overall position in the international system would likely create incentives to compromise over the disputed islands.
- 5.
By contrast, violent actions and reactions marked the other dispute dyads in the 1990s. Most notably, China occupied the aptly named Mischief Reef in the Spratly group, a circular reef well within the EEZ of the Philippines, leading to encounters between military vessels from the Philippines and China in spring 1995. In the same year, Taiwanese artillery opened fire on a Vietnamese supply ship. In January 1996, three alleged Chinese vessels engaged in a 90-minute gun battle with a Philippine navy gunboat. In 1998, Vietnamese soldiers opened fire on a Philippine fishing boat. The dispute over structures built on Mischief Reef reemerged in 1999 as a security flashpoint between China and the Philippines (Gurtov and Hwang 1998: 259–66; Burgess 2003: 9).
- 6.
Fravel (2003: 382–5) disagrees with the strategic set-up argument. He argues that China’s behavior was shaped by ad-hoc incentives created by the changing strategic context of the dispute, rather than by well-planned military scenarios. As evidence for his argument, he points out that there were no PLAN vessels on patrol in the Crescent or Amphitrite groups when China issued the January 11th statement; the only ships were fishing boats, which usually monitored South Vietnamese activities for the PLAN.
- 7.
In 1970, the Philippines completed a seismic survey of the energy resources in the South China Sea and began drilling test wells in 1971. To bolster its maritime rights, the Philippine government occupied five islands and reefs in the Spratly group in 1970–71. Philippine forces challenged through a show of force Taiwan’s garrison on Itu Aba, the largest in the Spratly chain. Other claimants to the area, including China and South Vietnam, issued formal diplomatic notes of protest, asserting their own claims. Around the same time, South Vietnam also launched a program to exploit offshore petroleum resources. With its entry into the UN in 1971, China began to participate in the work of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. China also became an enthusiastic supporter of convening the UNCLOS. Accordingly, China extended its claims to include nearby waters of the islands and the resources thereof (Park 1978; Fravel 2003: 375).
- 8.
With the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement between North Vietnam and the U.S., U.S. forces withdrew not only from Vietnam but also from the surrounding Asian mainland area. Hanoi looked upon the Peace Agreement as a major victory because it enabled the North to continue the war in the South against only the South Vietnamese troops at a time of their own choosing (http://www.ehistory.com/vietnam/essays/theend/0001.cfm, Accessed 10 February 2009).
- 9.
In 1971, the Soviet Union signed a treaty with India that provided access to the Indian Ocean, edging closer to Southeast Asia. In 1972–73, the Soviet Union issued diplomatic notes concerning access to the Straits of Malacca, which would link its Pacific Fleet to the Indian Ocean, further indicating its interest in the South China Sea (Fravel 2003: 376–7).
- 10.
By contrast, China’s attitude towards the other two claimants, the Philippines and Malaysia, were much more restrained, as they assumed a new, positive role in China’s anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese united front. During 1974–84, China sought to contain the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia over the Spratly Islands, stressing the importance of peaceful solutions (Lo 1989: 38–9, 137–8, 147–57).
- 11.
In 1887, just after Vietnam became a French colony, a treaty was signed in Beijing stipulating that longitude 108°3′18′E formed the boundary between China and Tonkin (French Vietnam). The boundary regime had remained stable until the 1970s. But with the end of the Vietnam War and burgeoning Vietnamese-Soviet relations, the issue of boundary delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin became a major irritant between Beijing and Hanoi. Vietnam insisted that the 1887 treaty line delimited not only land borders but also the sea boundary in the Gulf. For China, this interpretation was not acceptable because such a line would give two thirds of the Gulf to Vietnam. Not surprisingly, two rounds of talks in 1974 and 1977–78 did not produce any solution (Valencia 1995: 33–7).
- 12.
These included rice-husking factories, sugar refineries, paper mills, match factories, chemical plants, shipyards, iron and steel complexes, railroads, and radio networks. China also assisted North Vietnam with 700 million yuan in commodity aid during the war years and reconstruction period (1965–75), while sending about 20,000 advisers, specialists, and technicians. According to Chinese sources, the total value of China’s aid to Vietnam exceeded $20 billion (Vo 1990: 42).
- 13.
In the first five-year plan period (1961–65), the Soviet Union assisted North Vietnam with a grant of 20 million rubles and a loan of 430 million rubles. The Soviet Union also promised to fund nearly 100 projects, about half of which were considered major. During the war years and reconstruction period, the Soviet Union provided North Vietnam with 1.5 billion rubles in aid (Vo 1990: 41).
- 14.
For instance, China issued a statement on June 14, 1976 asserting “[the Spratly Islands as well as the Paracel, Macclesfield, and Pratas Islands] have always been part of China’s territory…China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent sea areas…[T]he resources there belong to China…Any foreign country’s armed invasion and occupation of any of [the Spratly Islands] or exploration and exploitation of oil and other resources in [the Spratly Islands] area constitute encroachments on China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and are impermissible. Any foreign country’s claim to sovereignty over any of [the Spratly Islands] is illegal and null and void” (Quoted in Lo 1989: 98–9).
- 15.
In July 1977, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua gave a speech to a closed meeting of senior cadres in which he clearly defended China’s claims to the South China Sea: “Another important question is the problem of the jurisdiction of the islands of the South China Sea…The jurisdiction of the Paracel and Spratly Islands has been in dispute since oil-exporting Arab countries, following the fourth Middle East War, initiated oil warfare which triggered the energy crisis in the capitalist world…Since the Paracel Islands are under our control, we do not mind whether Vietnam keeps saying that they are theirs…But the crux of the problem is the Spratly Islands. Although we refrain from dealing with the problem of the Spratly Islands for the time being, their jurisdiction is still ours. No exploitation of resources on the Spratly Islands and their surrounding seabeds is valid without China’s consent. You may exploit them as you like; but we will confiscate all of them in due time…When we will recover these islands depends upon opportunity” (Quoted in McGregor 1988: 15–6).
- 16.
Vietnam’s second five-year plan (1976–80) was a complete failure, with economic growth reaching only 0.4% per year. Compounding the postwar hardships, Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia resulted in diplomatic and economic isolation, further straining its resources (Alpert and Sanders 2005: 35). Hanoi was in desperate situation. After the termination of Chinese aid (and the U.S. refusal to help in Vietnam’s rehabilitation), Vietnam’s ties with the Soviet Union grew rapidly. During the period of 1976–80, the Soviet Union provided Vietnam with economic and technical assistance for the 94 important economic projects, while supplying Vietnam with 46.2% of its needs in machinery and equipment, 8.2% in oil products, 16.6% in wheat and flour, 6.4% in cotton fiber. It is estimated that the Soviet Union provided $3.8 billion in economic assistance during the same period (Vo 1990: 98–101).
- 17.
In April 1977, Cambodian forces launched a large-scale military operation along the Vietnam–Cambodia border. Hanoi long suspected that Phnom Penh had been collaborating with Beijing in a plot to contain Vietnam. The intransigence of Phnom Penh in the border dispute exacerbated Hanoi’s suspicions and eventually led Vietnam to invade Cambodia on December 25, 1978 with the support from the Soviet Union. In February 1979, China decided to “teach Vietnam a lesson” and launched a military attack on Vietnam. In the short but bloody three-week Sino–Vietnamese border war, 85,000 Chinese troops penetrated into Vietnam, leaving behind them a trail of destruction in a 30-mile belt south of the eastern sector of the Sino–Vietnamese border. For more details about the war, see Leifer (1979), Tretiak (1979), Heder (1981), Segal (1985), McGregor (1988), Kimura (1989), Duiker (1995) and Amer (1994).
- 18.
In March 1982, for instance, Vietnam arrested a number of Chinese armed vessels allegedly operating under the disguise of fishing boats on the Vietnamese side of the Gulf of Tonkin. China condemned the deliberate act as having aggravated Sino–Vietnamese tensions. Several days later, China retaliated by capturing a Vietnamese vessel in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands (Lo 1989: 119–20).
- 19.
The Soviet Union’s serious domestic economic crises from the early 1980s made it even more important for Moscow to improve Sino–Soviet relations. However, Sino–Soviet negotiation over rapprochement during the Andropov and Chernenko periods had been unsuccessful due to China’s three preconditions for diplomatic rapprochement: (1) disengagement from the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; (2) Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; and (3) a reduction of troops along the Sino-Soviet border. Beijing offered Moscow a choice between improved Sino–Soviet relations (and thus weakened Soviet–Vietnamese relations) and the status quo in the Cambodian crisis. Faced with economic collapse and political rebellion in the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Gorbachev rose to the top leadership position in the Communist Party. His response was perestroika, or democratic liberalization, a process that ultimately led to independence in the former Soviet bloc in Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. Moscow’s hands-off policy in the March 1988 Sino–Vietnamese naval clash raised questions about the real value of the 1978 Soviet–Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (Ross 1991: 1174; Austin 1998: 84; Sloreby 2002: 43).
- 20.
After Mao’s death in 1976, the PLAN was instrumental in bringing reformist leaders into power and keeping them there. From 1977 to 1993, Deng Xiaoping was engaged in an exhausting struggle with his own army leadership and chose to strengthen the PLAN’s power base in Beijing to counterbalance the army. It was no coincidence that Deng brought Liu Huaqing into the Central Military Commission (CMC) as a personal adviser in 1979. As hoped by Deng, Liu and his PLAN cohorts provided core support for all aspects of reform and opening, including the subordination of military strengthening to the larger task of economic reconstruction (Heginbotham 2002: 112–3).
- 21.
It was almost impossible for Hanoi to physically challenge Beijing given the former’s limited military capability and enormous economic problems at home. Between 1979 and 1988 there had been a substantial shift in the relative power of the two countries. In the 1980s Vietnam was no match at all in fighting a naval war against China that had reportedly deployed 25 submarines, five destroyers, and 200 coastal attack crafts near the disputed area. Moreover, Vietnam had demobilized half of its armed forces since 1987, from about 1.2 million to 600,000 soldiers. Thus China’s 260,000 PLAN far outranked that of Vietnam which had mere 31,000 personnel in the navy and naval infantry (Catley and Keliat 1997: 96).
- 22.
While the PLAN was useful in staving off a final surge by conservative revolutionary figures in 1992–93, the death or retirement of those figures in the mid-1990s eliminated one political motivation for naval promotion (Heginbotham 2002: 115).
- 23.
As noted previously, Soviet aid in loans and various other forms was of great importance to Vietnam. Furthermore, the bulk of Vietnam’s foreign trade was carried out within the Soviet bloc. Yet the network of economic relationships within the Soviet bloc began to unravel in 1989, and by the end of 1991 Soviet aid had almost disappeared. Barter trade agreements with Eastern European countries were in many cases cancelled, and many others simply became inactive. Soviet and Eastern European technical advisers were recalled as well (Sharpe 2005: 151–2).
- 24.
The costly venture in Cambodia had become a major cause of Vietnam’s diplomatic isolation for a decade. On May 26, 1988, a joint statement by Hanoi and Phnom Penh announced a proposed withdrawal of 50,000 Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. In addition, Vietnam promised to dismantle its military high command in Cambodia, while leaving the reassignment of the remaining troops to Cambodian command. The joint announcement reflected a compromising attitude from Vietnam towards China. At the same time, its timing marked only 11 days after Moscow started withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, and three days prior to the U.S.–Soviet summit meeting in Moscow (Sloreby 2002: 46).
- 25.
In 1988 the Soviet Union accounted for 40% of Vietnam’s exports and 65% of imports. The collapse of those economies forced Vietnam to quickly move into other markets. By 1999, Vietnam’s dealings with countries in the Asia–Pacific region accounted for 60% of trade, including ASEAN countries, which represented about 18% of the total. As of 2002 about 35% of Vietnam’s export trade was with East Asian countries, of which the top partners were Japan (14.9%), Australia (7.6%), China (6.6%), and Singapore (5.5%). Vietnam’s leading importers are also from Asia: South Korea (12.7%), China (12.2%), Japan (12.1%), Singapore (11.8%), and Thailand (5.4%) (Sharpe 2005: 144–57).
- 26.
The border trade has done much to meet consumer demand in Northern Vietnam. It is of considerable political importance for China as well. Development in the provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, due to the increased Sino–Vietnamese border trade, supports Beijing’s claim and propaganda that interior provinces as well as coastal areas are benefiting from economic reforms (Sutter 1993: 35).
- 27.
When the work to delimit the border according to the 1999 border treaty began in December 2001, the Vietnamese public discovered that some villages considered Vietnamese seemed to be ending up on the Chinese side. This led to widespread protests among overseas Vietnamese, arrests and trials of the most active Vietnamese dissidents, and problems inside the VCP. Dissidents and overseas Vietnamese also criticized the Gulf of Tonkin treaties, claiming that the government had given over to China thousands of square kilometers of Vietnamese maritime territory (Tønnesson 2003: 62–5).
- 28.
At the same summit, China and ASEAN also signed three other landmark agreements: (1) the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Nontraditional Security Issues; (2) the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation; and (3) the Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural Cooperation. At their 2003 summit in Bali, Indonesia, China formally became the first nonASEAN state to sign the ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and subsequently signed the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity with ASEAN, which addresses a wide range of political, social, economic, and security issues. At their 2004 summit, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao proposed two further initiatives: (1) to build upon the 2001 Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation and Establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area to create a similar free trade area in East Asia; and (2) to establish an East Asian community to discuss political and other issues (Shambaugh 2004/05: 75–6).
- 29.
The contested gas fields in the Nam Con Son Basin about 370 km off Vietnam’s southeast coast, are both run by British energy giant BP through a production sharing contract with state-owned PetroVietnam and in partnership with American oil firm ConocoPhillips (Symon 2007).
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(2010). The Island and Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea. In: Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-89670-0_6
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