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Generalized Vickrey Auction

1995; Varian

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Encyclopedia of Algorithms

Keywords and Synonyms

Generalized Vickrey auction ; GVA ; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism ; VCG

Problem Definition

Auctions are used for allocating goods, tasks, resources, etc. Participants in an auction include an auctioneer (usually a seller) and bidders (usually buyers). An auction has well-defined rules that enforce an agreement between the auctioneer and the winning bidder. Auctions are often used when a seller has difficulty in estimating the value of an auctioned good for buyers.

The Generalized Vickrey Auction protocol (GVA) [5] is an auction protocol that can be used for combinatorial auctions [3] in which multiple items/goods are sold simultaneously. Although conventional auctions sell a single item at a time, combinatorial auctions sell multiple items/goods. These goods may have interdependent values, e. g., these goods are complementary/substitutable and bidders can bid on any combination of goods. In a combinatorial auction, a bidder can express...

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Recommended Reading

  1. Ausubel, L.M., Milgrom, P.R.: Ascending auctions with package bidding. Front. Theor. Econ. 1(1) Article 1 (2002)

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  2. Clarke, E.H., Multipart pricing of public goods. Publ. Choice 2, 19–33 (1971)

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  3. Cramton, P., Steinberg, R., Shoham, Y. (eds.): Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, Cambridge (2005)

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  4. Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M.D., Green, J.R.: Microeconomic Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1995)

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  5. Varian, H.R.: Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In: Proceedings of the 1st Usenix Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1995

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  6. Vickrey, W.: Counter speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. Financ. 16, 8–37 (1961)

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© 2008 Springer-Verlag

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Yokoo, M. (2008). Generalized Vickrey Auction. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_163

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