Abstract
If we had a situation where these [steel workers] were our constituents and someone was breaking in their house and raping and robbing and pillaging them, we would want to send in a policeman to do something. In this instance, they [importers of foreign steel] are just coming in and taking their future, they are taking their jobs, they are taking all of their dreams away ... We must stand up for the people of this nation. We must stand up with a force of steel and with a backbone of steel. (Mr. Klink, Pennsylvania, Congressional Record, 1999)
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Kaempfer, W.H., Tower, E., Willett, T.D. (2004). Trade Protectionism. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_202
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