Abstract
Game theory is for proving theorems, not for playing games. (Reinhard Selten, quoted in Goerre and Holt, 2001)
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Hanson, R.D. (2004). Game Theory in Public Choice. In: Rowley, C.K., Schneider, F. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_108
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