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The Innovative Trade and Climate Action-Linkage in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: A Template for the EU’s New Approach to Green Trade Agreements

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2022

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 13))

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Abstract

Continental Europe and the UK have always had a special relationship—within and outside of the European Union (EU). British concerns over national sovereignty have led the UK to withdraw from the EU. Despite many disputes and alienation, it should not be forgotten that the EU and UK continue to share many interests and policy preferences. This includes climate action. The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)—the international agreement which governs the new bilateral relationship post Brexit—reflects this: The parties were able to agree on innovative provisions on climate action. These are unprecedented in the EU’s practice of free trade agreements (FTAs). This article explores how the TCA intertwines trade and investment commitments with climate action. It claims that the TCA may serve as a template for the EU’s (and even third states’) external trade and climate policy in the future—and has foreshadowed the Commission’s new approach to green FTAs communicated on 22 June 2022 (see European Commission, The Power of Trade Partnerships: Together for Green and Just Economic Growth, 22.6.2022, COM(2022) 409 final).

As an analytical basis, the article will, firstly, outline why climate action constituted a relevant issue in negotiating the new relations between the UK and the EU (Sect. 1). It will then map and systematise the innovative provisions of the TCA on trade and climate change, distinguishing substantive law (Sect. 2) and dispute settlement (Sect. 3). In doing so, the article compares the TCA to the designs of earlier EU FTAs and situates the TCA within the parties’ obligations in international climate change law. Lastly, taking a birds-eye perspective, the article contends that the TCA may serve as a template for trade and climate action-linkages in future FTAs (Sect. 4).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See the letter by David Frost to Michel Barnier of 19.5.2020, pp. 2-3, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/886168/Letter_to_Michel_Barnier_19.05.20.pdf.

  2. 2.

    European Parliamentary Research Service (2021) The Level Playing-Field for Labour and Environment in EU-UK Relations. PE 590.576, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/690576/EPRS_BRI(2021)690576_EN.pdf (accessed 30.6.2022), p. 2.

  3. 3.

    Leonelli (2021), p. 614.

  4. 4.

    On this rationale in EU trade policy, see Hradilová and Svoboda (2018), pp. 1021–1022.

  5. 5.

    Hereinafter, Articles cited without specifying a treaty relate to the TCA.

  6. 6.

    See for example Durán (2020), pp. 1034–1043 on the key elements of SD chapters.

  7. 7.

    North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (concluded 14.9.1993, effective 1.1.1994) (1993) ILM 32(6):1480–1498; North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (concluded 14.9.1993, effective 1.1.1994) (1993) ILM 32(6):1499–1518; for a historical overview that includes subsequent FTAs see Bartels (2016), pp. 376–379.

  8. 8.

    European Commission (2021) Trade Policy Review. COM(2021) 66 final, p. 4; for a characterisation of EU trade policy as a “vector for the EU’s identity in international affairs”, see Araujo (2016), pp. 40–49.

  9. 9.

    Paris Agreement (concluded 22.4.2016, effective 4.11.2016) 3156 UNTS 1.

  10. 10.

    See for example Article 1(1) EU-Central America Association Agreement; Article 2(1) EU-Moldova Association Agreement; Article 1(1) EU-Vietnam Framework Agreement; Article 1(1) EU-Canada Strategic Partnership Agreement; for an analysis see Bartels (2013), pp. 299–301.

  11. 11.

    Gehring MW (2021) Analysis 5 of the Brexit Deal: Environment and Climate Provisions. EU Law Analysis Blog Post, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/01/analysis-5-of-brexit-deal-environment.html considers that “[t]he language is one of the strongest found in any trade agreement”.

  12. 12.

    See for example Article 188 EU-CARIFORUM FTA; Article 296(2) EU-Ukraine Association Agreement; Article 16.2(2) EU-Japan FTA; Article 12.12(2) EU-Singapore FTA; Article 277(1) and (2) EU-Colombia, Peru and Ecuador FTA; Article 13.7(2) EU-Korea FTA and Article 24.5(2) CETA. In contrast, for example, Article 273 EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement as well as Article 2(3) EU-Mexico- and Article 2(3) EU-MERCOSUR-Agreement in Principle only contain hortatory language in this regard. For a scholarly analysis see Durán (2020), pp. 1038–1040. For a contrary position, see Leonelli (2021), pp. 622–624 who argues that the non-regression clauses are aspirational in nature due to the right to regulate clauses—however, it appears much more convincing to understand the former as limitations of the latter.

  13. 13.

    For similar clauses in earlier FTAs, see Durán (2020), p. 1039.

  14. 14.

    The non-regression clauses of other modern EU FTAs vary slightly in the wording by which they express that the parties may not change domestic law to decrease environmental protection, including for example not to “relax or lower” the environmental protection (e.g. Article 16.2(2) EU-Japan FTA) or not to “waive or otherwise derogate” from environmental laws (e.g. Article 24.5(2) CETA). Only Article 12.12 (1) EU-Singapore FTA does not express specifically that a derogation to lower standards is prohibited by using the neutral formulation “shall not waive or otherwise derogate from […] its environmental and labour laws […]”. Object and purpose of this provision, however, can only be understood as to preventing that the parties introduce lower environmental and labour standards to gain a competitive advantage.

  15. 15.

    For the UK, see UK Government (2020) United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s Nationally Determined Contribution, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/943618/uk-2030-ndc.pdf; for the EU see Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 (“European Climate Law”) OJ 2021 L 243/1, Article 4(1). For an analysis that observes equal climate action ambition by the EU and the UK post Brexit, see Kuzemko et al. (2022), p. 15.

  16. 16.

    See for example ECtHR, Vecbaštika and others v Latvia, Appl. No. 52499/11, Decision of 19.11.2019, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:1119DEC005249911; CJEU, Case C-24/19, A and Others (Wind turbines at Aalter and Nevele), ECLI:EU:C:2020:503.

  17. 17.

    Durán (2020), pp. 1038–1039.

  18. 18.

    The provision states: “A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”

  19. 19.

    In the Matter of Guatemala – Issues Relating to the Obligations under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR, Final Report of the Panel, 14.6.2017, http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/usa_cafta/Dispute_Settlement/final_panel_report_guatemala_Art_16_2_1_a_e.pdf, para. 190.

  20. 20.

    In the same vein Bronckers and Gruni (2021), pp. 32–33; for a contrary position see Greener UK (2020) Initial Environmental Analysis of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, https://greeneruk.org/sites/default/files/download/2020-12/GreenerUK_initial_analysis_of_the_EU-UK_deal.pdf, p. 1; Morris M (2020) The Agreement on the Future Relationship: A First Analysis, https://www.ippr.org/files/2020-12/agreement-on-future-relationship-ippr-assessment-1-.pdf, p. 7; Leonelli (2021), pp. 625–627.

  21. 21.

    Panel of Experts Proceeding Constituted under Article 13.15 of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Report of the Panel of Experts, 20.1.2021, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/January/tradoc_159358.pdf, para. 93.

  22. 22.

    Panel of Experts Proceeding Constituted under Article 13.15 of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Report of the Panel of Experts, 20.1.2021, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/January/tradoc_159358.pdf, paras 90–93.

  23. 23.

    See Bartels (2017), p. 206; Bronckers and Gruni (2021), p. 30. In the abovementioned Panel Report on the Guatemala case, the Panel denied in paras 49–152, 197 that intention by the parties was a requirement; however, the wording of Article 16.2.1 CAFTA-DR also does not contain any language indicative of this.

  24. 24.

    The same is true for Article 13.3(2) EU-Vietnam FTA. For a contrary position see European Parliamentary Research Service (2021) The Level Playing-Field for Labour and Environment in EU-UK Relations. PE 590.576, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/690576/EPRS_BRI(2021)690576_EN.pdf, p. 7 which considers that requirements present in other EU FTAs are implied in the TCA.

  25. 25.

    In the same vein Bronckers and Gruni (2021), p. 32.

  26. 26.

    Only Article 16.2(2) s. 2 EU-Japan FTA expressly connects the obligation to effectively enforce with the previously mentioned obligation not to relax or lower the level of protection as the former served “to that effect”, that is, as an expression of the latter.

  27. 27.

    For example, Article 13.7(1) EU-Singapore FTA; Article 24.5(3) CETA; for an exceptional contrary example see Article 290(3) EU-Central America Association Agreement.

  28. 28.

    Supported for example by Gehring MW (2021) Analysis 5 of the Brexit Deal: Environment and Climate Provisions. EU Law Analysis Blog Post, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/01/analysis-5-of-brexit-deal-environment.html (accessed 29.6.2022).

  29. 29.

    For example, Article 268 EU-Columbia, Peru and Ecuador FTA; Article 13.2 EU-Vietnam FTA.

  30. 30.

    See for example Article 13.5(2) EU-Vietnam FTA; for scholarly analyses across all EU FTAs, see Durán (2020), pp. 1035–1038; Leonelli (2021), p. 616–617.

  31. 31.

    Similar provisions are enshrined in Article 275 EU-Colombia, Peru and Ecuador FTA and Article 13.6 EU-Vietnam FTA.

  32. 32.

    For a viewpoint that the temperature goals represent a binding collective obligation of all PA parties, see Huggins (2018), p. 204; for a contrary position, see Mayer (2021), pp. 595–597.

  33. 33.

    Article 16.9 EU-Japan FTA; Article 13.11 EU-Vietnam FTA only briefly recognise the precautionary approach.

  34. 34.

    UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I).

  35. 35.

    Panel of Experts Proceeding Constituted under Article 13.15 of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Report of the Panel of Experts, 20.1.2021, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2021/January/tradoc_159358.pdf, para. 129.

  36. 36.

    For a criticism that this public international law notion sets a higher standard than the EU precautionary principle, see Leonelli (2021), pp. 619–620.

  37. 37.

    Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (concluded 25.6.1998, effective 30.10.2001) 2161 UNTS 447.

  38. 38.

    An ETS defines the maximum amount of GHG that certain sectors may emit per year and converts these amounts into certificates that companies must acquire for their emissions. Companies can also trade certificates and thus profit from sustainable practices. For a general analysis on ETS, see e.g. Munro (2018). For a general introduction into market mechanisms, including carbon taxes, see Hsu (2016), pp. 240–278.

  39. 39.

    Directive 2003/87/EC, OJ 2003 L 275/32.

  40. 40.

    HM Government and others (2022) Developing the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1067125/developing-the-uk-ets-english.pdf, p. 14.

  41. 41.

    For an overview of the new UK ETS, see for example Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment (2022) The Future of UK Carbon Policy: How Could the UK Emissions Trading Scheme Evolve to Help Achieve Net-Zero? https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/The-future-of-UK-carbon-policy_How-could-the-UK-ETS-evolve-to-help-achieve-net-zero.pdf, p. 4; for a comparison to the EU ETS see Pollitt (2022), pp. 171–172.

  42. 42.

    Directive (EU) 2018/410, OJ 2018 L 76/3.

  43. 43.

    See COM(2021) 551 final, 4, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/revision-eu-ets_with-annex_en_0.pdf

  44. 44.

    See HM Government and others (2022) Developing the UK Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1067125/developing-the-uk-ets-english.pdf, p. 101.

  45. 45.

    Hsu (2016), pp. 240–244.

  46. 46.

    Kuzemko et al. (2022), p. 11 with a critique and further references.

  47. 47.

    COM(2021) 564 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0564.

  48. 48.

    House of Commons (2022) Greening imports: a UK carbon border approach, Fifth Report of Session 2021–22, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/9570/documents/162115/default/.

  49. 49.

    Lowe S (2021) CBAM: What Might an EU Carbon-Border Adjustment Mechanism Mean for the UK? Blog Post of 3.8.2021, https://ukandeu.ac.uk/eu-cbam-uk/.

  50. 50.

    Or simply by linking the parties’ ETS which would likely prevent coverage by the draft EU CBAM, see Kuzemko et al. (2022), p. 11.

  51. 51.

    Data from https://ourworldindata.org/emissions-by-sector.

  52. 52.

    Dent (2021), pp. 2–4.

  53. 53.

    Directive (EU) 2018/2001, OJ 2018 L 328/82 (RED II).

  54. 54.

    The EU’s FTAs usually only contain rather general obligations of conduct “to strive to facilitate” trade and investment in goods or services of particular relevance to climate change, including sustainable energy, see for example Article 16.5(c) and Article 16.12(h) EU-Japan FTA; Article 24.9(2) and 24.12(f) CETA; Article 26.6(2) EU-Korea FTA; from the literature, see Dent (2021), pp. 10–16 who observes a focus on different forms of cooperation.

  55. 55.

    These Chapters and provisions contain obligations against non-tariff barriers to trade and investment in renewable energy, e.g. on standards, technical regulations and conformity assessments; see Dent (2021), p. 16.

  56. 56.

    For the EU, see European Commission, RED III Proposal, COM(2021)557 final; for the UK, see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/major-acceleration-of-homegrown-power-in-britains-plan-for-greater-energy-independence.

  57. 57.

    Subsidies are important in light of indications that the UK aims at introducing a new state aid system focussing on a green economy, see Kuzemko et al. (2022), p. 10.

  58. 58.

    Following the observation in the Opinion of A.G. Sharpston, Opinion 2/15, EU:C2016:992, para. 491 that already the EU-Singapore FTA contains provisions on labour and environmental protection “in isolation from their possible effects on trade”; see also Durán (2020), pp. 1043–1049.

  59. 59.

    On the origins see Bartels (2013), pp. 305–306.

  60. 60.

    The only exception is the EU-CARIFORUM FTA which partly allows environment-related, sanction-based dispute settlement on SD matters, however excluding labour- and environmental-related provisions in Article 213(2), see Durán (2020), pp. 1041 fn. 41.

  61. 61.

    But consider the institutional provisions in earlier EU FTAs which include a treaty body (Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development), domestic advisory groups and a civil society forum which monitor the respondent’s reaction to reports and which themselves constituted an innovation in the early 2010s, see Durán (2013), pp. 136–139.

  62. 62.

    For this comparison, see for example Bartels (2017), pp. 208; Hradilová and Svoboda (2018), pp. 1031–1039; Durán (2020), p. 1042; for a comparative analysis of US FTAs’ enforcement of provisions on labour standards which function similarly to their environmental counterparts, see Abel (2018), pp. 158–180; for an analysis of innovative enforcement of forest protection-related obligations in the US-Peru FTA, see Pacheco Restrepo (2019), pp. 250–257.

  63. 63.

    See for example European Parliament, Resolution on Human Rights and Social and Environmental Standards in International Trade Agreements, P7_TA(2010)0434, 25.11.2010, para. 22(c); Bartels (2013), pp. 311–312; Bronckers and Gruni (2021), p. 33. For a critique related to labour standards which identifies problems also in terms of substance and scope, see Harrison (2019), pp. 270–272.

  64. 64.

    Bronckers and Gruni (2021), pp. 37–39; for a proposal that includes claims by individuals in the trade and labour context, see Stoll et al. (2018), pp. 410–422; for a contrary position see Hradilová and Svoboda (2018), pp. 1039–1041.

  65. 65.

    See for example Bronckers and Gruni (2021), pp. 32, 40 who consider that the TCA introduced sanctions by means of the rebalancing provision, without however also reflecting on dispute settlement before Panels of Experts.

  66. 66.

    Peers (2022), p. 54.

  67. 67.

    Lydgate E et al. (2021) Taking Stock of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Governance, State Subsidies and the Level Playing Field. UKTPO Briefing Paper 54, https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/files/2021/01/BP_54.pdf, p. 4 consider this to be particularly relevant for actions against the UK.

  68. 68.

    Durán (2020), p. 1042.

  69. 69.

    In the same vein Collins (2021), p. 619; Countouris N, Ewing KD, Hendy J (2021) The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement and workers’ rights. ETUI Policy Brief No 3/2021, https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/The%20EU-UK%20Trade%20and%20Cooperation%20Agreement%20and%20workers%27%20rights_2021.pdf, p. 3; House of Commons (2021) The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Level Playing Field. Briefing Paper No. 9190, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9190/CBP-9190.pdf, p. 53.

  70. 70.

    Herrmann and Abel (2022), para. 144.

  71. 71.

    On the distinction between binding character, justiciability and enforceability, see Bodansky (2016), p. 143.

  72. 72.

    Bronckers and Gruni (2021), p. 37; in the same direction Durán (2020), p. 1042. Article 298(3) EU-Central America Association Agreement even defines the residual terms of reference as entrusting the Panel “to make non-binding recommendations for solution of the matter”.

  73. 73.

    Direct quotes of Article 16.18(2) EU-Japan FTA and Article 12.7(6) EU-Singapore FTA; similarly Article 13.17(6) EU-Vietnam FTA; Article 23.10(8) CETA; Article 285(2) and (4) EU-Colombia, Peru and Ecuador-FTA; Article 17(6) of the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement in Principle. Closer to the TCA is Article 17(6) of the Trade and Sustainable Development Chapter of the Modernized EU-Mexico Global Agreement which entrusts the Panel with “findings and recommendations for the resolution of the matter”.

  74. 74.

    Similarly Article 12.17 EU-Singapore FTA: “findings of facts, the applicability of the relevant provisions, and the basic rationale behind any findings and recommendations”; Article 13.15(2) EU-Korea FTA: “The Parties shall make their best efforts to accommodate advice or recommendations of the Panel of Experts on the implementation of this Chapter.” Closer to the TCA is Article 23.10(11) CETA which stipulates that reports include “findings of fact, its determinations on the matter including as to whether the responding Party has conformed with its obligations under this Chapter and the rationale behind any findings, determinations and recommendations that it makes” (emphasis added).

  75. 75.

    This argument for a non-binding effect is suggested for example by Countouris N, Ewing KD, Hendy J (2021) The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement and workers’ rights. ETUI Policy Brief No 3/2021, https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/The%20EU-UK%20Trade%20and%20Cooperation%20Agreement%20and%20workers%27%20rights_2021.pdf, p. 3; House of Commons (2021) The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Level Playing Field. Briefing Paper No. 9190, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9190/CBP-9190.pdf, p. 63.

  76. 76.

    Lester S (2020) Will the Post-Brexit EU-UK Trade Agreement Limit Regulatory Competition. CATO Blog Post of 28.12.2020, https://www.cato.org/blog/will-post-brexit-eu-uk-trade-agreement-limit-regulatory-competition.

  77. 77.

    For a more detailed analysis see Collins (2021), pp. 627–630; for an overview distinguishing rebalancing from the other dispute settlement procedures described above, see Peers (2022), pp. 76–78.

  78. 78.

    Ortino F (2022) Protecting Workers’ Rights Using the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/2022-01/Protecting%20Workers%27%20Rights%20using%20the%20EU-UK%20TCA%20report%20for%20the%20TUC%20by%20Professor%20Federico%20Ortino%20%281%29.pdf, p. 31 argues that because this would run counter to the commitment to maintaining high standards in Article 355(4), rebalancing would be unavailable in this scenario; however, one would have expected Article 411 to express this in clear terms, but the wording is neutral in this regard.

  79. 79.

    Supported by Gehring MW (2021) Analysis 5 of the Brexit Deal: Environment and Climate Provisions. EU Law Analysis Blog Post, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2021/01/analysis-5-of-brexit-deal-environment.html; Collins (2021), pp. 623–626. Lydgate E et al. (2021) Taking Stock of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Governance, State Subsidies and the Level Playing Field. UKTPO Briefing Paper 54, https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/files/2021/01/BP_54.pdf, p. 6 consider the effects to be unclear.

  80. 80.

    In general, on the question if the EU should include sanctions for SD related provisions in FTAs, see for example Bronckers and Gruni (2021), pp. 37–39 for a supportive and Durán (2020), pp. 1058–1063 for a sceptical position.

  81. 81.

    On the role of the UK as a supporter of climate action in the time of its EU membership, see Dupon and Moore (2019), pp. 52–56; on how regulatory convergence occurs more slowly “starting from a position of convergence”, see Armstrong (2018), p. 1115.

  82. 82.

    This had been the position in the European Commission (2018) Non-Paper, Feedback and Way Forward on Improving the Implementation and Enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development Chapters in EU Free Trade Agreements. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/february/tradoc_156618.pdf, p. 3. On the new EU-New Zealand FTA that has been concluded after the editorial deadline of this chapter, see only Ceretelli C (2022) EU-New Zealand FTA: Towards a New Approach in the Enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development Obligations, EJIL:talk! Blog Post of 28.9.2022, https://www.ejiltalk.org/eu-newzealand-fta-towards-a-new-approach-in-the-enforcement-of-trade-and-sustainable-development-obligations/

  83. 83.

    On such “evolution” clauses, see Leonelli (2021), pp. 629–631 with further references.

  84. 84.

    For a contrary assessment, see Leonelli (2021) pp. 635–637.

  85. 85.

    Armstrong (2018), p. 1114.

  86. 86.

    In the same vein Wachowiak J (2021) EU-UK climate cooperation post-Brexit: A case for optimism? EPC Policy Brief, https://epc.eu/content/PDF/2021/EU-UK_Climate_cooperation_PB.pdf, p. 2.

  87. 87.

    Peers (2022), p. 50.

  88. 88.

    This is the main criticism by Leonelli (2021), pp. 635–637.

  89. 89.

    See for example the criticism presented by House of Commons (2021) The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Level Playing Field. Briefing Paper No. 9190, https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9190/CBP-9190.pdf, p. 52.

  90. 90.

    European Commission, The Power of Trade Partnerships: Together for Green and Just Economic Growth, 22.6.2022, COM(2022) 409 final, p. 1.

  91. 91.

    COM(2022) 409 final, pp. 4–12.

  92. 92.

    COM(2022) 409 final, p. 11.

  93. 93.

    In the same vein as a general reform proposal without focus on the TCA, see Dröge et al. (2018), p. 30.

  94. 94.

    On 15.6.2022, the European Commission (re-)launched infringement proceedings against the UK “for not complying with significant parts” of the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol, see https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3676. On a general level, see Usherwood (2021), p. 121 who analyses that politically, “there appears to be no clear trajectory for future relations”.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Passau, Passau, Germany

    Patrick Abel

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  1. Patrick Abel
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Leuphana University, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jelena Bäumler

  2. Bundeswehr University Munich, Neubiberg, Germany

    Christina Binder

  3. Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

    Marc Bungenberg

  4. University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Erlangen, Germany

    Markus Krajewski

  5. Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany

    Giesela Rühl

  6. University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

    Christian J. Tams

  7. Leuphana University, Lüneburg, Germany

    Jörg Philipp Terhechte

  8. Université de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Andreas R. Ziegler

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Abel, P. (2022). The Innovative Trade and Climate Action-Linkage in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement: A Template for the EU’s New Approach to Green Trade Agreements. In: Bäumler, J., et al. European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2022. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2022_91

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/8165_2022_91

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