Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a method by which smart cards can be used to enhance the security of session key distribution in the third-party setting of Needham & Schroeder. We extend the security model of Bellare & Rogaway to take into account both the strengths and weaknesses of smart card technology, we propose a session key distribution protocol, and we prove that it is secure assuming pseudo-random functions exist.
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References
M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Provably secure session key distribution—the three party case. In 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 57–66, 1995.
O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser, and S. Micali. How to construct random functions. Journal of the ACM, 33:210–217, 1986.
T. Leighton and S. Micali. Secret-key agreement without public-key cryptography. In Advances in Cryptology-Crypto’ 93, pages 456–479, 1993.
R. Needham and M. Schroeder. Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers. Communications of the ACM, 21:993–999, 1978.
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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Shoup, V., Rubin, A. (1996). Session Key Distribution Using Smart Cards. In: Maurer, U. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’96. EUROCRYPT 1996. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1070. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68339-9_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-68339-9_28
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