Abstract
This paper explores the use of Spin for the verification of cryptographic protocol security properties. A general method is proposed to build a Promela model of the protocol and of the intruder capabilities. The method is illustrated showing the modeling of a classical case study, i.e. the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Authentication Protocol. Using the model so built, Spin can find a known attack on the protocol, and it correctly validates the fixed version of the protocol.
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Maggi, P., Sisto, R. (2002). Using SPIN to Verify Security Properties of Cryptographic Protocols. In: Bošnački, D., Leue, S. (eds) Model Checking Software. SPIN 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2318. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46017-9_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46017-9_14
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