Summary
We provide an alternative proof of the existence of core allocations in exchange economies with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable “insider trading” be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.
I thank Dan Acre, Erik Balder, Myrna Wooders, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful comments. This paper is a greatly revised version of my paper entitled, “A Variational Problem Arising in Market Games with Differential Information,” written in August of 1991
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Page, F.H. (2005). Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core. In: Glycopantis, D., Yannelis, N.C. (eds) Differential Information Economies. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 19. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26979-7_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-26979-7_7
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