Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Funding of Claims in Investor-State Dispute Settlements: Could Third-Party Funding Enhance Access to Justice?

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions 2022

Part of the book series: YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions ((YSEC,volume 2022))

  • 92 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter addresses the issue of funding of claims in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), aiming to investigate whether the mechanism of “third-party funding” (TPF) could facilitate access to justice for a potential claimant. After a preliminary assessment on the role of the individual in the context of international investment law, the chapter will focus on the possible identification and recognition of the right of access to justice in investment arbitration, notably through the indirect analysis of denial of justice and the relevance of bilateral investment treaty provisions. Once the main aspects of access to justice in ISDS have been addressed, the problematic nature of high costs in investment arbitration procedures will be discussed, which sometimes represents a real obstacle to access to justice, especially for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Against this background, the mechanism of TPF will be analyzed, first by defining the nature of the agreement underpinning it and then by looking at the potential legal implications might be. The overall conclusion reached is that, although TPF facilitates access to justice, there are several complexities that could make its use rather difficult in ISDS. The chapter ends with some recommendations to overcome the main obstacles.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Brown (1992), p. 204.

  2. 2.

    Kotlik (2017), p. 93.

  3. 3.

    Chavez (2008), p. 63.

  4. 4.

    United Nations Development Programme UNDP (2005), p. 5.

  5. 5.

    Abdoella v. the Netherlands, no. 12728/87, §24, 25 November 1992.

  6. 6.

    Storskrubb and Ziller (2007), pp. 178–183.

  7. 7.

    Cf., Human Rights Act 1998, Schedule 1, United Kingdom, 1998; Chapter II article 9, Sweden, 1974; Constitutión Española, arts. 54, 119, 241, 1171 and 1201, Spain, 1978.

  8. 8.

    Gáspár-Szilágyi (2013), pp. 165–169.

  9. 9.

    UDHR, 10 December 1948, article 8; ECHR, 4 November 1950, arts. 6, 13; ACHR, 22 November 1969, arts. 8, 25; ICCPR, 16 December 1966, arts. 2 (3), 9 (3), 9 (4); OPICCPR, article 2; ACHPR, 28 June 1981, articles 3, 7(1); CFR, 7 December 2000, article 47(2).

  10. 10.

    Pustorino (2023), pp. 55–56.

  11. 11.

    Gerards and Glas (2017).

  12. 12.

    Viñuales et al. (2020), p. 79.

  13. 13.

    Crawford and Brownlie (2019), pp. 105–133.

  14. 14.

    Sterio (2008), p. 213.

  15. 15.

    Peters et al. (2009), pp. 1–33.

  16. 16.

    Bantekas (2004), p. 309.

  17. 17.

    Higgins (1978), pp. 2–5.

  18. 18.

    Trindade (2011), pp. 17–49.

  19. 19.

    Mills (2013), pp. 187–239.

  20. 20.

    Sitaraman (2016), pp. 5–23.

  21. 21.

    Hollis (2005), p. 137.

  22. 22.

    Dörr (2005), pp. 905–916.

  23. 23.

    Giorgetti (2018), p. 1085.

  24. 24.

    Palombino (2020), pp. 745–750.

  25. 25.

    Gärditz (2014), pp. 86–93.

  26. 26.

    These concern two fields where the contribution of the individual has been particularly relevant, namely international human rights law, Pustorino (2022), pp. 269–271, and international criminal law, Aitala (2021), pp. 10–16.

  27. 27.

    Mauro (2019), p. 87.

  28. 28.

    de Oliveira and Hourani (2020).

  29. 29.

    Schreuer et al. (2022), pp. 1–10.

  30. 30.

    Boisson de Chazournes and McLachlan (2016), pp. 255–256.

  31. 31.

    Viñuales (2014), pp. 317–362.

  32. 32.

    Titi (2014).

  33. 33.

    Korzun (2017).

  34. 34.

    Although originally intended to be used in inter-state relations as a necessary condition for retaliation (Spiegel (1938), pp. 63–81), the concept subsequently evolved, meaning any internationally wrongful act against which diplomatic protection could be exercised, i.e., the action taken by one sovereign against another to obtain reparation, Focarelli (2012), para 6.

  35. 35.

    International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, November 2001, (A/56/10), where it is specified that: “[…] Something further is required before international law becomes relevant, such as a denial of justice by the courts of the State in proceedings brought by the other contracting party. […]”, p. 41.

  36. 36.

    Paulsson (2005), p. 5.

  37. 37.

    Padilla (2011), pp. 296–297.

  38. 38.

    Kammerhofer (2021).

  39. 39.

    Yackee (2019), pp. 71–110.

  40. 40.

    Francioni (1975), pp. 255–280.

  41. 41.

    Bilateral Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between the Government of The Republic of Colombia and The Government of the People’s Republic of China, signed on 22.11.2008 and entered into force on 02.07.2013, article 2 c) “Promotion, Admission and Protection of Investments”.

  42. 42.

    (BLEU) Model BIT 2019, article 4, para 3, lett. b), c) “Promotion and Protection of Investments”.

  43. 43.

    Article 1105 of NAFTA protects investors through the provision and enforcement of FET (fair and equitable treatment) and full protection and security, Dumberry (2014), pp. 47–73.

  44. 44.

    The Lœwen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Lœwen v. United States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/3, Award (26 June 2003), para 119.

  45. 45.

    Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/97/1, Award (30 August 2000), para 91.

  46. 46.

    Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/99/6, Award (12 April 2002), para 143.

  47. 47.

    Bekker and Ogawa (2013), pp. 314–330.

  48. 48.

    Deva and Van Ho (2023), pp. 413-414.

  49. 49.

    Elkins et al. (2006), pp. 814–819.

  50. 50.

    Nyombi and Mortimer (2018), pp. 46–53.

  51. 51.

    “Model Agreements” or “Model BITs” are sometimes adopted by states as a reference model for negotiating or renegotiating their BITs, Nam (2017), pp. 1280–1282.

  52. 52.

    Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (with Protocol). Signed at Managua, on 21 January 1956 between Nicaragua and USA, art. 24, para 2.

  53. 53.

    Vandevelde (2017).

  54. 54.

    Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and exchange of notes), Germany and Pakistan, article 11, para 2, lett. a), b).

  55. 55.

    Gáspár-Szilágyi (2020), pp. 389–415.

  56. 56.

    Agreement between the Argentina Republic and Japan for the promotion and protection of investment, signed on 1.12.2018, Cap. I “Investment”, art. 5 “Access to the Courts of Justice”; Agreement between Japan and The Republic of Armenia for the liberalization, promotion and protection of investment, signed on 14.02.2018 and entered into force on 15.05.2019, Cap. I “Investment”, art. 5 “Access to The Courts”.

  57. 57.

    Bayefsky (2017), pp. 71–104.

  58. 58.

    For example, the concept of fair and equitable treatment (FET) and most-favoured-nation treatment (MFN) stem from the notion of non-discrimination. On the first topic, see: Palombino (2018), pp. 19–56; for an analysis of the second topic see: Acconci (2012), pp. 363–406.

  59. 59.

    Compare: Agreement between The Government of The Republic of Armenia and The Government of The United Arab Emirates, signed on 22.07.2016 and entered into force on 21.11.2017, art. 3, para 4, “Protection of investments” and Agreement between The Republic of Rwanda and The United Arab Emirates on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments, signed on 01.11.2017, art. 3, para 4 “Promotion and encouragement of investments”.

  60. 60.

    Agreement between Japan and The Republic of Kazakhstan for the promotion and protection of investment, signed on 23.10.2014 and entered into force on 25.10.2015, art. 6 and art. 12, para 4.

  61. 61.

    Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee Revised Draft of Model Agreements for Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 9 “Access to courts and tribunals”, 1985.

  62. 62.

    Government of the Republic of Chile, 1994.

  63. 63.

    The Government of the Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003.

  64. 64.

    See, respectively: Chile Model BIT, art., 6 para 3 “Expropriation and compensation” and the Kenya Model BIT, art. 5, lett. c) “Expropriation and Compensation”.

  65. 65.

    Netherlands model Investment Agreement, 22 March 2019.

  66. 66.

    Netherlands model Investment Agreement, 22 March 2004.

  67. 67.

    Netherlands model Investment Agreement, 22 March 2019, article 5 “Rule of law”.

  68. 68.

    Netherlands model Investment Agreement, 22 March 2019, article 5, para 2.

  69. 69.

    Netherlands model Investment Agreement, 22 March 2019, article 5, para 3.

  70. 70.

    Bradfield and Verdirame (2014), p. 411.

  71. 71.

    Scholars, about cost relating to access to justice, contributed in a different way. See Barendrecht et al. (2006), who argue that cost of access to justice includes “[…] (all) the barriers that people experience when they seek access to justice […]”, including time spent on the case, costs resulting from delay, etc, p. 3. Gramatikov (2009) defines it as “[…] all costs incurred on the quest to solve a legal problem, including out-of-pocket costs, opportunity costs, and intangible costs […].”, p. 10.

  72. 72.

    Kudrna (2013), p. 2.

  73. 73.

    Clearly, parties are not always free to choose the arbitral institution to refer to.

  74. 74.

    Bjorklund and Vanhonnaeker (2021), pp. 225–243.

  75. 75.

    Giorgetti (2019), pp. 1–93.

  76. 76.

    Tanzi (2020), pp. 57–75.

  77. 77.

    These costs range from the first official act, which could often be the so-called ‘notice of intent’, to the rendering of the award.

  78. 78.

    Clearly, such costs are not certain per se, but these expenses need to be considered.

  79. 79.

    Benedettelli et al. (2017), p. 1160.

  80. 80.

    Franck (2019), pp. 253–296.

  81. 81.

    International Chamber of Commerce (2022), Cost calculator. https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/costs-and-payments/cost-calculator/. Accessed 27 Feb 2022. This seems a valuable indicator for access to justice: having a minimum idea of the costs involved, notably for companies operating on a balance sheet basis, could be decisive in deciding whether to engage in ISDS arbitration.

  82. 82.

    European Court of Arbitration (2022), Cost Calculator. https://cour-europe-arbitrage.org/the-costs-of-arbitration/. Accessed 27 Feb 2022.

  83. 83.

    Bühler (2005), pp. 179–182.

  84. 84.

    Assareh (2012), p. 12.

  85. 85.

    ICSID Schedule of Fees (2022).

  86. 86.

    In pure variable fee forums, the cost of initiating legal proceedings varies directly according to the amount of the dispute.

  87. 87.

    An interesting dynamic is that of hybrid forums, where the costs of initiating proceedings are calculated using a combination of variable and fixed fee formulas.

  88. 88.

    According to research conducted in 2012, the average total costs of ISDS proceedings have averaged $8 million and, in very exceptional cases, over $30 million, see Gaukrodger and Gordon (2012), p. 19.

  89. 89.

    Hodgson et al. (2021).

  90. 90.

    Bottini et al. (2020).

  91. 91.

    As well known, the amendment process began in 2016 and—after different suggestions with the aim of amending the rules—in 2021 the ICSID Secretariat published 6 working papers, see ICSID (2021), About the ICSID Rule Amendments.

  92. 92.

    Alarcon (2020).

  93. 93.

    Hodgson et al. (2021), p. 8.

  94. 94.

    ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), article 37.

  95. 95.

    Cement Investment & Trade S.A. v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/07/2, Award (13 August 2009), paras. 185–186.

  96. 96.

    Camilleri (2021), pp. 851–862.

  97. 97.

    Walton and Williams (2014), p. 304.

  98. 98.

    European Commission, European contract law in business-to-business transactions: Summary (2011), https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/965.

  99. 99.

    World Bank and the International Finance Corporation Doing Business 2019 (2019), https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/AnnualReports/English/DB2019-report_web-version.pdf.

  100. 100.

    Butler and Herbert (2014), pp. 186–221.

  101. 101.

    Walton and Williams (2014), p. 433.

  102. 102.

    Van Harten and Malysheuski (2022).

  103. 103.

    Karl (2017), pp. 245–249.

  104. 104.

    Gebert (2017), pp. 292–293.

  105. 105.

    Karl (2017), p. 261.

  106. 106.

    Fach Gómez and Titi (2023), pp. 32–40.

  107. 107.

    Solas (2019), pp. 17–37.

  108. 108.

    Latham and Ventures (2022).

  109. 109.

    Kalyanpur and Newman (2021), pp. 773–790.

  110. 110.

    Viñuales (2017), pp. 1071–1072.

  111. 111.

    Giovanni Alemanni and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/07/8, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (17 November 2014), para 278.

  112. 112.

    Santosuosso and Scarlett (2018), pp. 8–16.

  113. 113.

    Garcia (2018), p. 2913.

  114. 114.

    Guven and Johnson (2019), pp. 3–7.

  115. 115.

    The term ‘third-party’ is used because it is a third party to the dispute between the state and the investor. These are usually private investment funds, which have found excellent investment opportunities in the current legal market, see for example the Omni Bridgeway Annual Report (2020), in section “Proceeds from litigation funding”, pp. 6–7.

  116. 116.

    In current market there are several third-party funders with a background in international litigations and arbitrations. In this respect, the work carried out by the “TPF Observatory”, an independent initiative from the “ICCA/QMUL Task Force on Third Party Funding”, is quite interesting. The Observatory created a list of TPF funders and TPF brokers (whose task is not to directly fund a dispute but to act as an intermediary between parties seeking funding and funders).

  117. 117.

    The tasks carried out by the fund, particularly at the time when the funding opportunity is submitted, consists of due diligence work, see Third Party Funders for International Arbitration.

  118. 118.

    Park and Rogers (2015), p. 4.

  119. 119.

    Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, provisionally entered into force on Sept. 21st, 2017. For an overview, see Bungenberg and Reinisch (2022).

  120. 120.

    CETA, Chapter eight “Investment”, Section A “Definitions and scope”, art. 8.1 “definitions”.

  121. 121.

    CETA, Chapter eight “Investment”, Section F “Resolution of investment disputes between investors and states”, article 8.26 “Third party funding”.

  122. 122.

    It concerns the request for an opinion, pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU, submitted to the Court by Belgium, concerning the compatibility of some CETA’s investment provisions (Section F, Chapter VIII) with the EU Treaties, including with fundamental rights. See C-1/17 EU:C:2019:341 (30 April 2019) (Opinion 1/17).

  123. 123.

    Fanou (2020), p. 16.

  124. 124.

    EU - Viet Nam Investment Protection Agreement (EVFTA) (2019), signed on 30.06.2019 and entered into force on 1.08.2020.

  125. 125.

    EVFTA, article 3.28, lett. i), which defines TPF as “[…] means any funding provided by a natural or juridical person who is not a party to the dispute but who enters into an agreement with a disputing party in order to finance part or all of the cost of the proceedings in return for a remuneration dependent on the outcome of the dispute, or any funding provided by a natural or juridical person who is not a party to the dispute in the form of a donation or grant […]”.

  126. 126.

    EVFTA, art. 3. 37, paras 1–2.

  127. 127.

    EVFTA, art. 3.48.

  128. 128.

    EVFTA, art. 3.53.

  129. 129.

    EVFTA, art. 3. 37, para 3.

  130. 130.

    Colombia Model BIT (2017).

  131. 131.

    Colombia Model BIT (2017), p. 5.

  132. 132.

    Colombia Model BIT (2017), where it is also specified that the form must contain “[…] any sort of financing agreement is reached, even if it takes place after the submission of a claim to arbitration, without delay as soon as the agreement is concluded […]”, p. 16.

  133. 133.

    Colombia Model BIT (2017), p. 21.

  134. 134.

    Netherlands model Investment Agreement (2019), art. 19, para 8.

  135. 135.

    Slovakia Model BIT (2019), art. 21, paras 1–2.

  136. 136.

    Slovakia Model BIT (2019), art. 21, para 3.

  137. 137.

    Vargiu (2021), pp. 13–15.

  138. 138.

    Canada Model BIT (2021).

  139. 139.

    Canada Model BIT (2021), article 42.

  140. 140.

    Agreement for the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments between The Argentine and The United Arab Emirates, signed on 16.04.2018, art. 24.

  141. 141.

    Acuerdo entre la República de Colombia y el Reino de España para la promoción y protección recíproca de inversiones (2021), signed on 16.09.2021.

  142. 142.

    Colombia – Spain BIT (2021), art. 22, para 4.

  143. 143.

    Colombia – Spain BIT (2021), art. 33, para 5.

  144. 144.

    Accord entre le Conseil fédéral suisse et le Gouvernement de la République d’Indonésie concernant la promotion et la protection réciproque des investissement (2022), art. 20, paras 1–2.

  145. 145.

    Indonesia-Switzerland BIT, art. 20, para 3.

  146. 146.

    European Parliament (Committee on Legal Affairs), 2020/2130(INL), (2021), available online https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/JURI-PR-680934_EN.pdf.

  147. 147.

    Saulnier et al. (2021).

  148. 148.

    Some reference to the TPF can be found in the Directive (EU) 2020/1828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2020 on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC, Official Journal of the European Union (2020), recital nn. 25, 52 and art. 10, para 2, (a) and 18.

  149. 149.

    CJEU, Case C-248/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158.

  150. 150.

    S & T Oil Equipment and Machinery Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/07/13, Order of Discontinuance of the Proceeding (16 July 2010).

  151. 151.

    Oxus Gold plc v. Republic of Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL Case, Final Award (17 December 2015), para 127.

  152. 152.

    South American Silver Limited v. Plurinational State of Bolivia, PCA Case No 2013-15, Procedural Order No. 10 (11 January 2016) para 79.

  153. 153.

    EuroGas Inc and Belmont Resources Inc v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/14/14, Transcript of the First Session and Hearing on Provisional Measures (17 March 2015), p. 145.

  154. 154.

    Manuel Garcia Armas et al v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, UNCITRAL PCA Case No 2016-08, Procedural Order No 9, Decision on Request for Provisional Measures (original in Spanish), para 2–3.

  155. 155.

    Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case Nos ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15, Award (3 March 2010), para 691.

  156. 156.

    Oxus Gold plc v. Republic of Uzbekistan, Award, 17 December 2015.

  157. 157.

    Julio Miguel Orlandini-Agreda and Compania Minera Orlandini Ltda v. Bolivia, Case No. 2018-39, 04.02.2019 (Procedural Order No. 1), para 11.

  158. 158.

    Muhammet Çap & Sehil In_aat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. Sti. v. Turkmenistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/6, 12.06.2015 (Procedural Order No. 3), para 13.

  159. 159.

    ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), International Chamber of Commerce.

  160. 160.

    ICC Arbitration Rules (2021), article 11 para 7.

  161. 161.

    For comparison, see SCC Policy disclosure of third parties with an interest in the outcome of the dispute (2019), Stockholm Chamber Commerce Board, where it is immediately specified that “[…] Each party is encouraged to disclose […]”, available online https://sccinstitute.com/media/1035074/scc-policy-re-third-party-interests-adopted.pdf.

  162. 162.

    Portman and Muti (2022).

  163. 163.

    See ICSID Arbitration Rules (2022), rule 14.

  164. 164.

    This refers to the well-known events concerning the case Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No ARB/05/15, where the Tribunal decided in favour of the investor, which in turn would later have to reimburse its lawyers for financing part of the litigation. However, the company later decided to settle with the Egyptian state, thus having no obligation to reimburse the law firm, and this resulted in several difficulties and related further disputes between the company and the financing law firm.

  165. 165.

    See both the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (2014), International Bar Association, General standard (7) “Duty of the Parties and the Arbitrator”, and the recent Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration (2021), International Chamber of Commerce.

  166. 166.

    Pauciulo (2021), pp. 319–364.

  167. 167.

    Storskrubb (2020), p. 115.

  168. 168.

    Chun (2021), pp. 478–498.

  169. 169.

    Shao (2021), pp. 445–447.

  170. 170.

    Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2011-17.

  171. 171.

    Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2011-17, Solicitud de cautio judicatum solvi (12 February 2013), paras 26–27.

  172. 172.

    Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2011-17, Procedural Order No. 14 (11 March 2013), para 9.

  173. 173.

    Guaracachi America, Inc. and Rurelec PLC v. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No 2011-17, Procedural Order No. 14 (11 March 2013), paras. 6–10.

  174. 174.

    Rosenfeld (2016), pp. 160–166.

  175. 175.

    RSM Production Corp v Saint Lucia, ICSID Case No ARB/12/10, Decision on Saint Lucia’s Request for Security for Costs (13 August 2014), para 83.

  176. 176.

    Or, in the event of a request for security for costs, the tribunal’s decision would be processed more rapidly, as it would not be necessary to disclose—as already known—both the existence of the TPF and the identity of the Funder.

  177. 177.

    QMUL-CCIAG Survey: Investors’ Perceptions of ISDS (2020), p. 18.

References

  • Acconci P (2012) Most-favoured-nation treatment. In: Muchlinski P, Ortino F, Schreuer C (eds) The Oxford handbook of international investment law. Oxford Academic, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Aitala RS (2021) Diritto internazionale penale. Le Monnier Università, Firenze

    Google Scholar 

  • Alarcon MJ (2020) ICSID reform: balancing the scales? Kluwer Arbitration Blog. DIALOG. https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2022/01/28/icsid-reform-balancing-the-scales/

  • Assareh A (2012) Forum shopping and the cost of access to justice-cost and certainty in international commercial litigation and arbitration. J Law Comm 31:1–44

    Google Scholar 

  • Bantekas I (2004) Corporate social responsibility in international law. Boston Univ Int Law J 22:309

    Google Scholar 

  • Barendrecht M, Mulder J, Giesen I (2006) How to measure the price and quality of access to justice?

    Google Scholar 

  • Bayefsky AF (2017) The principle of equality or non-discrimination in international law. In: Farrior S (ed) Equality and non-discrimination under international law. Routledge, London, pp 71–104

    Google Scholar 

  • Bekker P, Ogawa A (2013) The impact of Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) proliferation on demand for investment insurance: reassessing political risk insurance after the ‘BIT Bang’. ICSID Rev 28(2):314–350

    Google Scholar 

  • Benedettelli M, Consolo C, Radicati di Brozolo L (2017) Commentario breve al diritto dell’arbitrato nazionale ed internazionale. Wolters Kluwer Italia, CEDAM, Milano

    Google Scholar 

  • Bjorklund A, Vanhonnaeker L (2021) Applicable law in international investment arbitration. In: Lim C (ed) The Cambridge companion to international arbitration (Cambridge companions to law). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 225–243

    Google Scholar 

  • Boisson de Chazournes L, McLachlan C (2016) Preface-the intersection of investment arbitration and public international law. ICSID Rev 31(2):255–256

    Google Scholar 

  • Bottini G, Titi C, Aznar FP, Chaisse J, Jovanovic M, Sola OP (2020) Excessive costs and recoverability of costs awards in investment arbitration. J World Invest Trade 21(2-3):251–299

    Google Scholar 

  • Bradfield M, Verdirame G (2014) Costs in investment treaty arbitration. In: Giorgetti C (ed) Litigating international disputes. Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, pp 411–434

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown BS (1992) The protection of human rights in disintegrating states: a new challenge. Chic Kent Law Rev 68:203

    Google Scholar 

  • Bühler MW (2005) Costs of arbitration: some further considerations. In: Aksen G, Briner R (eds) Global reflections on international law, commerce and dispute resolution Liber Amicorum in Honour of Robert Briner. ICC Publication, pp 179–190

    Google Scholar 

  • Bungenberg M, Reinisch A (2022) CETA investment law: article-by-article commentary. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Butler P, Herbert C (2014) Access to justice for small and medium sized enterprises: the case for a bilateral arbitration treaty. N Z Univ Law Rev 26(2):186–221

    Google Scholar 

  • Camilleri SP (2021) Between rags and riches: rethinking security for costs in international commercial arbitration. Arbitr Int 37(4):851–862

    Google Scholar 

  • Chavez RB (2008) The rule of law and courts in democratizing regimes. In: Caldeira GA, Kelemen RD, Whittington KE (eds) The Oxford handbook of law and politics. (online edn). Oxford Academic, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Chun YH (2021) ‘Security for costs’ under the ICSID regime: does it prevent ‘arbitral hit-and-runs’ or does it unduly stifle third-party funded investors’ due process rights? Pepp Disput Resolut Law J 21:477

    Google Scholar 

  • Crawford J, Brownlie I (2019) Brownlie’s principles of public international law. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • de Oliveira LVP, Hourani S (2020) Access to justice in arbitration: concept, context and practice. Wolters Kluwer

    Google Scholar 

  • Deva S, Van Ho T (2023) Addressing (in)equality in redress: human rights-led reform of the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. J World Invest Trade 24(3):398–436

    Google Scholar 

  • Dörr O (2005) Privatisierung “des Völkerrechts”. JuristenZeitung 60:905–916

    Google Scholar 

  • Dumberry P (2014) Denial of justice under NAFTA Article 1105: a review of 20 years of case law. ASA Bull 32(2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Elkins Z, Guzman AT, Simmons BA (2006) Competing for capital: the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960–2000. Int Organ 60(4):811–846

    Google Scholar 

  • Fach Gómez K, Titi C (2023) Facilitating access to Investor-State Dispute Settlement for small and medium-sized enterprises: tracing the path forward. Eur Bus Law Rev 34(7) (forthcoming)

    Google Scholar 

  • Fanou M (2020) The CETA ICS and the autonomy of the EU legal order in opinion 1/17 – a compass for the future. Camb Yearb Eur Leg Stud 22:106–132

    Google Scholar 

  • Focarelli C (2012) Denial of justice. In: Encyclopedia of public international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Francioni F (1975) Compensation for nationalisation of foreign property: the borderland between law and equity. Int Comp Law Q 24(2):255–283

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck SD (2019) Arbitration costs: myths and realities in investment treaty arbitration. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Garcia FJ (2018) Third-party funding as exploitation of the investment treaty system. Boston Coll Law Rev 59:2911

    Google Scholar 

  • Gärditz KF (2014) Bridge of Varvarin. Am J Int Law 108(1):86–93

    Google Scholar 

  • Gáspár-Szilágyi S (2013) EU Member State enforcement of ‘mixed’ agreements and access to justice: rethinking direct effect. Leg Issues Econ Integr 40(2):163–189

    Google Scholar 

  • Gáspár-Szilágyi S (2020) Let us not forget about the role of domestic courts in settling investor-state disputes. Law Pract Int Courts Trib 18(3):389–415

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaukrodger D, Gordon K (2012) Investor-state dispute settlement: a scoping paper for the investment policy community. OECD Working Papers on International Investment. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/investor-state-dispute-settlement_5k46b1r85j6f-en

  • Gebert A (2017) Legal protection for small and medium-sized enterprises through investor-state dispute settlement: status quo, impediments, and potential solutions. In: Rensmann T (ed) Small and medium-sized enterprises in international economic law. Oxford Academic, Oxford, pp 291–308

    Google Scholar 

  • Gerards JH, Glas LR (2017) Access to justice in the European Convention on Human Rights system. Neth Q Hum Rights 35(1):11–30

    Google Scholar 

  • Giorgetti C (2018) Rethinking the individual in international law. Lewis Clark Law Rev 22:1085

    Google Scholar 

  • Giorgetti C (2019) The selection and removal of arbitrators in Investor-state Dispute Settlement. Brill, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Gramatikov M (2009) A framework for measuring the costs of paths to justice. J Juris 2:111

    Google Scholar 

  • Guven B, Johnson L (2019) The policy implications of third-party funding in investor-state dispute settlement. Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, CCSI Working Paper

    Google Scholar 

  • Higgins R (1978) Conceptual thinking about the individual in international law. Rev Int Stud 4(1):1–19

    Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson M, Kryvoi Y, Hrcka D (2021) Empirical study: costs, damages and duration in investor-state arbitration. The British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL). DIALOG. https://www.biicl.org/publications/empirical-study-costs-damages-and-duration-in-investor-state-arbitration

  • Hollis DB (2005) Why state consent still matters-non-state actors, treaties, and the changing sources of international law. Berkeley J Int Law 23:137

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalyanpur N, Newman A (2021) The financialization of international law. Perspect Polit 19(3):773–790

    Google Scholar 

  • Kammerhofer J (2021) International investment law and legal theory: expropriation and the fragmentation of sources, vol 158. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Karl J (2017) Enterprises in international investment law. In: Rensmann T (ed) Small and medium-sized enterprises in international economic law. Oxford Academic, Oxford, pp 241–266

    Google Scholar 

  • Korzun V (2017) The right to regulate in investor-state arbitration: slicing and dicing regulatory carve-outs. Vand J Transnatl Law 50(2):355–414

    Google Scholar 

  • Kotlik M (2017) Defying the theoretical constraints of state-centric approaches: a review of non-state actors in international law. Isr Law Rev 50(1):87–105

    Google Scholar 

  • Kudrna J (2013) Arbitration and right of access to justice: tips for a successful marriage. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (JILP) Online Forum. https://blogs.law.nyu.edu/transnational/2013/02/arbitration-and-right-of-access-to-justice-tips-for-a-successful-marriage/

  • Latham S, Ventures A (2022) The third party litigation funding law review, 6th edn. The Law Reviews

    Google Scholar 

  • Mauro MR (2019) Diritto internazionale dell’economia. Teoria e prassi delle relazioni economiche internazionali. Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Napoli

    Google Scholar 

  • Mills A (2013) Rethinking jurisdiction in international law. Br Yearb Int Law 84(1):187–239

    Google Scholar 

  • Nam J (2017) Model bit: an ideal prototype or tool for efficient breach. Georget J Int Law 48(4):1275–1308

    Google Scholar 

  • Nyombi C, Mortimer T (2018) Rights and obligations in the post investment treaty denunciation period. Int Arbitr Law Rev 21(2):46–53

    Google Scholar 

  • Padilla C (2011) Denial of justice to foreign investors. Cuad der transl 3(1):296–301

    Google Scholar 

  • Palombino FM (2018) Fair and equitable treatment and the fabric of general principles. T.M.C. Asser Press/Springer, The Hague/Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Palombino FM (2020) Revisiting the ‘humanization of international law’ argument through the lens of international investment law. Dir comm internaz 2020(3):745–750

    Google Scholar 

  • Park WW, Rogers CA (2015) Third-party funding in international arbitration: the ICCA Queen-Mary Task Force. Austrian Yearb Int Arbitr:14–67

    Google Scholar 

  • Pauciulo D (2021) Provisional measures in ICSID arbitration proceedings: between the current legal framework and the proposed reform. In: Palombino FM, Virzo R, Zarra G (eds) Provisional measures issued by international courts and tribunals. Springer, pp 319–364

    Google Scholar 

  • Paulsson J (2005) Denial of justice in international law, vol 17. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Peters A, Koechlin L, Förster T, Zinkernagel GF (eds) (2009) Non-state actors as standard setters. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Portman S, Muti N (2022) Increased transparency under the new ICSID rules: a way forward for ISDS legitimacy. Jus Mundi Blog. Available via DIALOG. https://blog.jusmundi.com/increased-transparency-under-the-new-icsid-rules-a-way-forward-for-isds-legitimacy/. Accessed 12 Jun 2023

  • Pustorino P (2022) Tutela internazionale dei diritti umani. Cacucci Editore, Bari

    Google Scholar 

  • Pustorino P (2023) Introduction to international human rights law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • QMUL-CCIAG Survey: Investors’ Perceptions of ISDS (2020). https://arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/QM-CCIAG-Survey-ISDS-2020.pdf

  • Rosenfeld F (2016) Security for costs in ICSID arbitration: RSM Production Corporation v St Lucia. Arbitr Int 32(1):157–166

    Google Scholar 

  • Santosuosso T, Scarlett R (2018) Third-party funding in investment arbitration: misappropriation of access to justice rhetoric by global speculative finance. Boston Coll Law Rev 60:8

    Google Scholar 

  • Saulnier J, Koronthalyova I, Müller K (2021) Responsible private funding of litigation: European added value assessment. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service. DIALOG. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/662612/EPRS_STU(2021)662612_EN.pdf

  • Schreuer C, Kriebaum U, Dolzer R (2022) Principles of international investment law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Shao X (2021) Disrupt the Gambler’s Nirvana: security for costs in investment arbitration supported by third-party funding. J Int Disput Settlement 12(3):427–447

    Google Scholar 

  • Sitaraman S (2016) State participation in international treaty regimes. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Solas GM (2019) Third party funding. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Spiegel HW (1938) Origin and development of denial of justice. Am J Int Law 32(1):63–81

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterio M (2008) The evolution of international law. Boston Coll Int Comp Law Rev 31:213

    Google Scholar 

  • Storskrubb E (2020) Emergency arbitration: a maturing and evolving procedure. In: Calissendorff A, Schöldström P (eds) Stockholm arbitration yearbook 2020. Wolters Kluwer

    Google Scholar 

  • Storskrubb E, Ziller J (2007) Access to justice in European comparative law. In: Francioni F (ed) Access to justice as a human right. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 177–203

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi A (2020) On judicial autonomy and the autonomy of the parties in international adjudication, with special regard to investment arbitration and ICSID annulment proceedings. Leiden J Int Law 33(1):57–75

    Google Scholar 

  • Titi C (2014) The right to regulate in international investment law. Hart, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Trindade AAC (2011) The access of individuals to international justice. Oxford Academic, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • UNDP, HDR (2005) Programming for justice: access for all. A practitioner’s guide to a human rights-based approach to access to justice. Bangkok. https://www.asia-pacific.undp.org/content/rbap/en/home/library/democratic_governance/programming-for-justice.html

  • Van Harten G, Malysheuski P (2022) Who has benefited financially from investment treaty arbitration? An evaluation of the size and wealth of claimants. In: Behn D, Fauchald O, Langford M (eds) The legitimacy of investment arbitration: empirical perspectives (studies on international courts and tribunals). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 394–423

    Google Scholar 

  • Vandevelde KJ (2017) The first bilateral investment treaties: US postwar friendship, commerce and navigation treaties. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Vargiu P (2021) Stakeholders of investment arbitration: establishing a dialogue among arbitrators, states, investors, academics and other actors in international investment law. In: Fach Gómez K (ed) Private actors in international investment law. Springer, pp 5–25

    Google Scholar 

  • Viñuales JE (2014) Sovereignty in foreign investment law. In: Douglas Z, Viñuales JE, Pauwelyn J (eds) The foundations of international investment law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 317–362

    Google Scholar 

  • Viñuales JE (2017) Sources of international investment law: conceptual foundations of unruly practices. In: Besson S, d’Aspremont J (eds) The Oxford handbook of the sources of international law. Oxford Academic, Oxford, pp 1069–1094

    Google Scholar 

  • Viñuales JE, Gaeta P, Zappalá S (2020) Cassese’s international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Walton J, Williams DA (2014) Costs and access to international arbitration. Int J Arbitr Med Disput Manag 80(4)

    Google Scholar 

  • Yackee J (2019) Investor-State Dispute Settlement at the dawn of international investment law: France, Mauritania, and the nationalization of the MIFERMA iron ore operations. Am J Leg Hist 59(1):71–110

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome, Italy

    Manfredi Marciante

Authors
  1. Manfredi Marciante
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Manfredi Marciante .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

    Eva Storskrubb

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Marciante, M. (2023). Funding of Claims in Investor-State Dispute Settlements: Could Third-Party Funding Enhance Access to Justice?. In: Storskrubb, E. (eds) YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions 2022. YSEC Yearbook of Socio-Economic Constitutions, vol 2022. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/16495_2023_54

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/16495_2023_54

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-38509-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-38510-0

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation